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Abstract 
 
Animals, Science and Gender: Animal Experimentation in Britain, 1947-1965 
 
This thesis is an historical analysis of the culture of science and its use of animals in 
experiments by the British military and in medical scientific research, and its regulation 
by law, during the period 1947 to 1965. The overall aim of this thesis is to demonstrate 
the gendered nature of scientific experimentation on animals in mid-twentieth century 
Britain. To do this, it addresses two aspects of animal experimentation; firstly, exploring 
how scientific research forms power-knowledge relations through the use of nonhuman 
animals. Secondly, this thesis analyses the intersection of animal use in science with that 
of the broader socio-cultural context, asking was science in mid-twentieth century Britain 
gendered? As a consequence, it explores the effects of this knowledge production upon 
animals and women. My findings are twofold: that the construction of scientific 
knowledge through the use of nonhuman animals was one that created subject-object 
binaries, and this had powerful and detrimental consequences for nonhuman animals. 
Secondly, this objectification of the nonhuman had resultant power-knowledge effects 
that reinforced the continuation of specific kinds of scientific knowledge and its 
associated masculinist ontology of positivism. Consequently, the effects of these power-
knowledge relations were gendered and had implications for (and intersections with) 
normative representations of women at the time. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction: Accounting for the More-Than Human in History 
 
In July of 1958, at Lincoln College, Oxford, thirty-six leading psychiatrists, physiologists 
and animal experimentalists attended a four day conference on ‘Stress and Psychiatric 
Disorder’. During the panel on the ‘Disorganisation of Behaviour in Animals’, a 
zoologist from the University of Cambridge named Robert Aubrey Hinde spoke about 
the nature of stress in relation to population overcrowding, declaring: 
 
A[n] idea of an order of priority of types of behaviour underlies the ethological 
approach to the homosexual, or rather pseudofemale, behaviour which is shown 
by some fish and birds when male behaviour is impossible. If ten-spined 
sticklebacks are crowded in a tank, one male becomes dominant and establishes a 
territory while the remaining males behave as females1 
 
What Hinde was claiming was that fish, if overcrowded in a tank, would revert to female 
behaviour once a male dominance hierarchy was achieved. Not only that, Hinde 
suggested that the behaviour of both fish and birds was comparative to human 
behaviour. With this comparison, Hinde also noted that the homosexual person was a 
‘pseudofemale’, whose behaviour was akin to that of a woman’s. Hence, animals, women 
and pseudofemale homosexuals were lower in a given social hierarchy because of their 
very nature. Hinde implied that heterosexual male dominance was a natural and 
inevitable part of society. His overarching position about male and female behaviour, 
therefore, may indicate a position which is gendered, and was at the time a reflection of a 
scientific view which was more widespread. It will be my task to examine this attitude in 
more detail.   
 
R. A. Hinde was a well known primatologist in post-war Britain,2 and the quote above 
sets the main theme for this thesis: that there is a historical intersection between science, 
gender and animality, specifically, an intersection of oppression between nonhuman 
animals and other subjugated and marginal human groups in society. For the purposes of 
my research in this thesis, the treatment of animals ran parallel to discrimination towards 																																																								
1 Robert Hinde, "Disorganisation of Behaviour in Animals: An Ethological Approach," in Stress 
and Psychiatric Disorder, ed. J. M. Tanner (Oxford: Blackwell Scientfic Publications, 1960). p.54. 2	Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (New 
York, USA: Routledge, 1989). p124, 139, 151, pp.167-168.	
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women. This gendered entanglement of the animal and human permeated all aspects of 
British science and culture in the period 1947-1965. And it is this aspect of British 
science, namely, animal experimental science in the military, in the medical spheres, and 
its regulation by law, that this thesis explores.  
 
Robert Hinde’s comment about the behaviour of the stickleback, a common salt–and-
freshwater fish in Britain, stood in for the behaviour of human beings in society. With 
male heterosexual behaviour assumed to be the epitome of being human, and passive 
female behaviour being the least worthy. Despite the scientific claims, Hinde is espousing 
a view that dates back many centuries. According to the Great Chain of Being, 
everything is ranked from the highest to the lowest, from the heavenly and Divine, to 
human then animal, and lastly inanimate objects. 3  Hinde’s rationalist and humanist 
science posits an order of things similar to that of the theological Great Chain of Being, 
and as we shall see in the forthcoming chapters, despite science’s claims of objectivity, 
and value-neutrality, this value-laden and gendered hierarchy permeated different aspects of 
science and society. 
 
The period immediately following the Second World War, and running to the mid-1960s, 
was a time of great change in the form of government policy-making. Not only was the 
welfare state introduced, but also, this era was one of great technocracy. This was an era 
dominated by scientific experts, who took up prominent positions in government, and 
advised politicians and policy makers on ways to govern the populace.4 Moreover, the 
immediate post-war period was sustained by a return to traditional heterosexual gender 
roles, emphasising the importance of the stay at home mother, housewife and male 
breadwinner. Even though politicians encouraged older women, to work in part-time 
positions, women’s career prospects stagnated, despite the expansion of higher 
education. This expansion of higher education was mainly focused on the sciences, 
which disproportionately recruited males.5 																																																								
3 Joanna Bourke, What It Means to Be Human: Reflections from 1791 to Present (London, UK: Virago 
Press, 2011). p.2. 
4 Jon Lawrence, "Paternalism, Class and the British Path to Modernity," in The Peculiarities of 
Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain, ed. Simon Gunn and James Vernon (California: California 
Press, 2011). 
5 Helen McCarthy, "Gender Equality," in Unequal Britain: Equalities in Britain since 1945, ed. Pat 
Thane (London: Continuum UK, 2010).pp108-109.Dolly SmithWilson, "Gender: Change and 
Continuity," in A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939-2000, ed. Paul Addison and Harriet Jones 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005).p.246. 
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So, R.A. Hinde’s point about gendered behaviour is one that reflected the broader social 
context at the time, and contemporary concerns driving scientific understandings of 
animal and human behaviour.  Science however needed test subjects. The test subjects 
for the new weapons and the new medical cures came in the guise of nonhuman animals. 
Millions of nonhuman animals were used in the period 1947-1965. Regulated by law, in 
the form of the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, the scientists of the military and medical 
establishments could test their hypotheses on such living beings without fear of reprisal 
from government authorities.  
 
Cruelty to Animals Act 
 
The experiments discussed in this thesis would have come under a piece of legislation 
entitled ‘The Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876”. It is worth noting the main points of that 
Act here, even though they are greatly expanded upon in chapter six, especially in 
relation to what is called the “pain condition”. Nevertheless, all experiments in the 
period 1947-1965 were subject to regulation by law under this Act dating from the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. 
 
It was in 1876 the Government introduced a Bill to prevent the infliction of cruelty on 
experimental animals. Following representations from the General Medical Council and 
other medical organisations, the Bill was amended so as to allow for the gaining of 
abstract knowledge and of saving life or alleviating suffering in animals as well as human 
beings.6 The law states that: 
The experiment must be performed with a view to the advancement by new 
discovery of physiological knowledge or of knowledge which will be useful for 
saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering7 
 
Provision was  also added requiring the scientists and the organization they worked for 
to hold a license, which was granted by the Secretary of State and which had to be signed 
for by a prominent member of the scientific community, such as The Royal Society or 
																																																								
6 "Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on Animals,"  (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965). pp.5-6. 
7 "1876 Cruelty to Animals Act." p.2. 
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President of the Royal Societies in London, Edinburgh or Dublin. 8   The license 
prevented experimenters from carrying out tests on animals without anesthetic, and to be 
killed after the experiment so as not suffer any ‘unnecessary pain’. 9  Furthermore, 
Inspectors were employed, to visit institutions that conducted experiments on animals. 
These inspectors would observe practices including animal husbandry and the actual 
experiments. 
 
Despite the imposition of these sanctions, there were still ways and means around them, 
especially in relation to the licensing system and the classification of types of experiment. 
One could be granted a license but for specific researches a certificate had to be attained. 
Certificates were labeled from A-F, with A being required if experiments were to be done 
without anesthetic, ‘B’ allowing for experiments to be conducted which kept the animal 
alive after the anesthetic had ceased. Certificate ‘E’, contra to the Act, allowed a scientist 
to perform experiments on cats and/or dogs without anesthetic, and this must be 
granted with certificate ‘A’. Certificate ‘F’ was for experiments on horses and donkeys, 
without anesthetics and also had to be accompanied by certificate A.10 
 
With any of these certificates being granted, and with a licensing system in place, it was 
clear that scientists were free to conduct any form of experiment whilst at the same time 
being seen to be regulated under the gaze of the Secretary of State. What this thesis 
focuses on the most in terms of the legal aspect of animal experimentation is the “Pain 
Condition”. It is worth noting, in full, the provisos of this clause, which states: 
(a) If an animal at any time is found to be suffering pain which is either severe or 
is likely to endure, and if the main result of the experiment has been attained, 
the animal shall forthwith be painlessly killed. 
(b) If an animal at any time during any such experiment is found to be suffering 
severe pain which is likely to endure, such an animal shall forthwith be 
painlessly killed; 
(c) If an animal appears to an Inspector to be suffering considerable pain, and if 
such Inspector directs such an animal to be destroyed, it shall forthwith be 
painlessly killed.11 
 
It is obvious then, that the definition of pain followed by animal experimenters was 
highly subjective, and the decision as to if and when an animal was in pain relied heavily 																																																								
8 "Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on Animals." P.6, p.222. "1876 
Cruelty to Animals Act." p.4. 
9 "1876 Cruelty to Animals Act." p.2. 
10 "Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on Animals." pp.225-237. 
11 Ibid. p.55. 
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on the scientists themselves, or one of ‘Her Majesty’s Inspectors’. Although, as is 
demonstrated over the course of this thesis, the contestation of pain in the animal by the 
scientific profession, and government actors, was a highly subjective and dynamic 
phenomenon. The definition of pain shifted dramatically in mid-twentieth century 
Britain to encompass aspects of psychological distress. This would legitimate further, the 
practice of vivisection. 
 
Aims and Questions 
 
The overall aim of this thesis then, is to demonstrate the existence of an historical 
conjunction between scientific experimentation on animals and the construction of 
gender in Britain during the period 1947-1965.  This research is an analysis of the culture 
of science and its use of animals in its experimental techniques in mid-twentieth century 
Britain. I address two aspects of animal experimentation, firstly looking at how scientific 
research formed gendered power-knowledge relations through the use of nonhuman 
animals, creating subject-object relations between humans and nonhuman animals. 
Secondly, I analyse the intersectionality of animal use in science with that of the 
normative assumptions of women in this era, and consequently, explore the effects of this 
knowledge production onto animals and women. The research questions guiding this 
work are discussed towards the end of this section; firstly, we need to turn to one aspect 
of sociology that is not necessarily treated as mainstream in the discipline, that of 
Historical Sociology. 
 
My work runs parallel to the scholarship of various ecofeminists and feminist historians 
of science. Most notably, Carolyn Merchant, Evelyn Fox-Keller, Donna Haraway, 
Ludmila Jordanova and Londa Schiebinger. 12  The research by these academics are 
covered in chapter two, in the Literature Review. Therefore, my thesis uncovers the 																																																								
12 Londa Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard Universtiy Press, 1989), Londa Schiebinger, Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern 
Science (Boston, MA: Beacon Press Books: 1993), Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, 
Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1983), Carolyn 
Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture (Oxon UK: Routledge, 2004), 
Evelyn Fox-Keller, Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science (London: : 
Routledge, 1992), Evelyn Fox-Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985), Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science, 
Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association 
Books, 1991), Ludmilla Jordanova, Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine between the 
Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Wisconsin: The University of Wisonsin Press, 1989). 
	 12	
gendered nature of this previously described feminist critique of science, using the above 
mentioned to inform and inspire the historiographical and methodological standpoint of 
the thesis (see chapters two-three). 
 
 
Making Sociology Historical 
 
By doing this research, I hope to provide a useful link between (historical) sociology, 
gender studies and the newly emerging area of animal studies. It is no surprise then, that 
the research embraces methodological pluralism and interdisciplinarity, as it does not fit 
neatly within the confines of sociology. However, this does not matter, as historically, 
animals have been seen as marginal and insignificant to the study of sociology. 13 
Moreover the very definition of sociology, according to well-known scholars John 
Macionis and Ken Plummer, is ‘the systematic study of human society’. 14  What this 
statement implies, is that animals (in the conventional sense of the term) are 
automatically excluded from the domain of the human life and therefore neglected as 
one of the “subjects” of sociology.  
 
This thesis hopes to address this neglect of the nonhuman animal in sociology by 
locating it within the purview of historical sociology. Historical sociology analyses the 
development of societies and their attendant apparatuses of power over time. According 
to historical sociologist Richard Lachmann, sociology was originally an historical 
discipline, as its principal founders, Marx, Durkheim and Weber, were able to understand 
contemporary society through an analysis of the past.15 The cultural historian Peter Burke 
concurs, and argues that the two disciplines are complementary: 
 
Historians and sociologists have not always been the best of neighbours. 
Intellectual neighbours they certainly are, in the sense that practitioners of both 
disciplines are concerned with society viewed as a whole and with the whole 
range of human behaviour… Sociology may be defined as the study of human 
society, with an emphasis on generalisations about its structure and development. 
History is better defined as the study of human societies in the plural, placing 
emphasis on differences between them and also on the changes which have taken 																																																								
13 Kay Peggs, Animals and Sociology (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). p.1. 
14 John Macionis and Ken Plummer, Sociology: A Global Introduction, 5 ed. (London Prentice Hall, 
2011). p.4. [my italics]. 
15 Richard Lachmann, What Is Historical Sociology? (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2013). p.1. 
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place in each one over time. The two approaches have sometimes been viewed as 
contradictory, but it is more useful to treat them as complementary.16 
 
Burke calls for historians to use the social theory of sociologists to inform their work, 
and like Lachmann, states that sociology was once historical, again, making reference to 
Marx, Durkheim and Weber. 17  Yet, there is one problem with these definitions of 
historical sociology: they are all anthropocentric. To be anthropocentric is to centre 
research on and for the human, neglecting the nonhuman animal and their contributions 
to the making of society. Like Marcionis and Plummer’s definition of sociology, the 
human has been the focus of historical studies for a very long time. I, on the other hand, 
hope to carve a space out for the nonhuman in history, and add to the burgeoning 
animal histories, which have emerged over the past decade.18 To do this I have taken the 
advice from leading animal historian and literary scholar, Erica Fudge, who writes: 
 
In the history of animals, to question the anthropocentric view of the world – to 
brush history against the grain – is to challenge the status of the human, which in 
turn is to throw all sorts of assumptions into question. If we can no longer 
assume our own status then we can no longer take the status of animals as given. 
What was assumed to be natural – human dominion – is revealed instead to be 
manufactured, that is, ideological. Through anthropocentrism – the recognition 
that the only vision is the human vision, the only history a human history – we 
can in fact work against anthropocentrism, make it untenable.19 
 
In other words, Fudge is arguing for animal histories to be written against the human. 
This thesis hopes to do this, by addressing several neglected aspects of historical study; 
firstly, with its focus on the nonhuman animal, and arguing for their centrality in the 
construction of historical knowledge as much as the human is. Secondly its intersectional 
and feminist approach, and thirdly, its emphasis on the historical relationships between 
human-animals in the laboratory.  
 
Yet it is worthy of note that the writing of animal history is not a new endeavour and 
dates back to the late 1980s with the work of Harriet Ritvo, closely followed by Hilda 
Kean and Erica Fudge (see chapter three). This research fits into the broader scholarship 
of animal histories, especially in relation to the work of Harriet Ritvo, Hilda Kean and 																																																								
16 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1992). p.2. 
17 Ibid. pp.10-14. 
18  Hilda Kean, "Challenges for Historians Writing Animal-Human History: What Is Really 
Enough?," Anthrozoös 25, no. Supplement (2012). p.S57. 
19 Erica Fudge, "A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals," in Representing Animals, 
ed. Nigel Rothfels (Bloomington, USA: Indiania University Press, 2002). p.14. 
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Erica Fudge. However, I am positioning it in terms of looking at the sometimes complex 
and messy entanglements between humans and animals in the context of scientific 
animal experimentation. 
 
Furthermore, within the animal history paradigm, this thesis has moved on from the idea 
of evidencing animal agency, to one where the research ‘use[es] agency as a starting point 
and map[s] the varied economic, political, social and cultural contexts in which animals 
are embedded’. 20  Therefore, the conscious boundaries of the thesis recognise the 
importance of animal agency but within the broader social and cultural context unto 
which this history serves. Joshua Specht argues for this and states: 
It seems clear that animals have some form of agency, that is, the ability to shape 
in meaningful ways the world around them. But instead of cataloguing instances 
of agency, historians would be better served developing a more nuanced 
understanding of how autonomous action operates within and is constrained by 
surrounding structures. If this is true of humans, it is especially true of animals, 
which are so often at the mercy of human needs. Animal historians would be well 
served to treat agency as their starting point of their analysis and lay aside the 
jargon of agency. Agency should always be the start of the analysis, rather than 
the conclusion of the argument.21 
 
To do this type of animal history then, I have three main research questions to answer, 
beginning with: how is it that in science the nonhuman body is objectified, and how, as a 
result of this, does the animal body as object presuppose them as being useful for animal 
experiments? What kinds of knowledge does laboratory animal science produce, under 
what circumstances and methodologies, and how does this link to the exercise of power 
both within and without the laboratory? Is the production of scientific knowledge 
through the use of animals gendered and what are the effects of such knowledge 
production? These research questions will be discussed in more detail in chapter three 
where I address methodological issues in the writing of animal histories.  
 
Gender and Science: Is Science Inherently Masculine? 
 
As has been discussed, this thesis is an extension of the work of many ecofeminists and 
feminist science studies scholars who have argued that science, in its prinicples and 
practices, is inherently gendered. It is important then, to outline here, the general critique 																																																								
20 Joshua Specht, "Animal History after Its Triumph: Unexpected Animals, Evolutionary 
Approaches, and the Animal Lens," History Compass 14, no. 7 (2016). p.332. 
21 Ibid. p.332.	
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of science, lead by leading scholars Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Then, moving 
on to the feminist critique which had informed to this thesis.  
 
Science is Social and Cultural 
 
Scientific knowledge rests on the idea of objective nature, external to our own field of 
perception and hence, our own social and cultural life. Nature then, rests in this domain 
of the objective and in order to study ‘it’ specific methodological steps have to be taken 
in order to render distinct fact from fiction, truth from myth. The detached knowers 
(scientists) can only directly observe this external nature through observations and the 
use of mathematical concepts which fall directly under the idea of the scientific 
experiment. 22 This notion of science depends on the assumption that through 
mathematical conceptualisation of objective nature, we can directly know and understand 
the world as it is, free from the bias of social and cultural values.  
 
Yet, this epistemology, despite its claims of objectivity and neutrality has over the last 
quarter of a century or more come under increasing scrutiny.23 None-more-so than for its 
epistemological incoherence in terms of its reliance on claimed theory-neutral 
observations and its assertion of it being asocial. As Will Wright states, we need to: 
Investigate scientific knowledge as a legitimating belief system, a belief system 
that is inherently legitimating and thus the validity of which, as knowledge, is an 
issue of social life, not strictly of esoteric epistemological issues. From this 
perspective scientific knowledge could be coherently and legitimately criticised in 
terms of its social and ecological effects.24 
 
Scientific knowledge, as I argue, has lost its legitimating principle of value neutrality, 
rather, following Wright, science is social and cultural. Science legitimates certain social 
practices as well has containing certain cultural norms and values in its very 
practices.25And, it is this cultural critique of science which I draw upon in this thesis. 
 
																																																								
22 Will Wright, Wild Knowledge: Science, Language and Social Life in a Fragile Environment (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota Press, 1992). p. 24. 
23 Ibid. p.27. 
24 Ibid.p.41. 
25 Ibid. p.43. 
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This was first brought to light by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.26 In this text Kuhn did an historical investigation to undermine the prevailing 
views about science as involving a progressive accumulation of objective knowledge 
towards a universal truth.27 Rather, for Kuhn, science is a series of historical changes with 
ever shifting rules and theories, which once agreement has been reached in the scientific 
community, this sets the basis for future research within the disciplines. Kuhn calls this a 
‘paradigm’, and research is subsequently carried out under the auspices of this school of 
thought. 28  The notion of paradigm is central to his model of science and helps to 
demonstrate how science is a social and cultural endeavour. For Kuhn, the key point is 
that within a particular area of science there will be a shared set of theoretical 
assumptions, a commonly accepted view on the nature of reality (ontology), and an 
accepted methodology for evaluating research, all which provide rules for future 
practice:29 
Scientists work from models acquired through education and through subsequent 
exposure to the literature often without quite knowing or needing to know what 
characteristics have given these models the status of community paradigms. The 
coherence displayed by the research tradition in which they participate may not 
imply even the existence of an underlying body of rules and assumptions that 
additional historical or philosophical investigation might uncover. The scientists 
do not ask or debate what makes a particular problem or solution legitimate 
tempts us to suppose that, at least intuitively, they know the answer. Paradigms 
may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for 
research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them.30  
 
In other words, Kuhn’s paradigms form the basis of an understanding of science that is 
cultural and has its own unconscious and unspoken set of norms and values which ‘the 
scientists do not ask or debate’ about. If we take cultural studies scholar, Raymond 
Williams’ suggestion of culture as being the unspoken acceptance of ‘activities, 
relationships and [social] processes’ within a particular society at a given time and place.31 
Then we can combine this with Kuhn’s view on paradigms, to suggest that specific 
norms, values, expected behaviours, and research endeavours are endemic to the 
disciplines of science, which in turn create a culture of science.  																																																								
26 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4 ed. (London: The University of Chicago 
Press Ltd, 2012). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. pp43-45. 
29 Ibid. p.46-50. 
30 Ibid. p.45. 
31 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 3 ed. (London: HarperCollins, 
1988). p.92. 
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Furthermore, the self-styled anarchist, Paul Feyerabend argues along similar lines in 
terms of the relativist nature of science and its inherent social and cultural values, 
arguing: 
Science has no greater authority than any other form of life. Its aims are certainly 
not more important than are the aims that guide the lives in a religious 
community or tribe that is united by a myth. At any rate they have no business 
restricting the lives, the thoughts, the education of the members of a free society 
where everyone should have a chance to make up his own mind and to live in 
accordance with the social beliefs he finds most acceptable. The separation 
between church and state must therefore be complemented by the separation 
between state and science.32 
 
So, for Feyerabend, there are no methodological principles that distinguish science from 
non-science, and so no reason to hold science in a superior position to those other forms 
of understandings of the world such as religions and tribal communities. Hence, science’s 
privileged position through its self-styled declarations of objective neutrality have come 
under increasing scrutiny, with the identification of the subjective and epistemologically 
flawed nature of its research.  
 
After Kuhn and Feyeraband’s critiques of science as being replete with social values, in 
the 1980s, space opened up for a feminist critique of science. And it is this critique which 
informs my thesis and unto which I provide evidence in support of. For feminists, 
science is inherently masculine, its observations of the world are built on patriarchal 
assumptions stemming from the work of early pioneers of the scientific method, most 
notably, Francis Bacon and René Descartes.33  
 
The feminist critique of science operates on two levels, firstly, emphasising the exclusion 
of women from science and analysing how this exclusion took place.34 They held the 
view that not only were women excluded from science but, when present, held ancillary 
and supporting roles (see chapter five in support of this). But, and in line with the basic 
premise of this thesis, at its most fundamental level, the feminist critique of science can 
be seen as one which identifies the whole project of an objective knowledge of nature 																																																								
32 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 4 ed. (London: Verso, 2010).p.299. 
33 Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution. 
34 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press, 1986), 
Hilary Rose, Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards a Feminist Transformation of the Science (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1994). 
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(and hence, nonhuman animals) as inseparable from a white Western masculine desire to 
dominate nature, women and racial ‘others’ (see especially chapter four for this).35 As 
Hilary Rose states: 
The trouble with science and technology from a feminist perspective is that they 
are integral not only to the systems of domination of late capitalism and its new 
forms of imperialism, but also to one of patriarchal domination; yet to try and 
discuss science under these structures of domination or to argue that they 
constitute one social formation has proved difficult.36 
 
This thesis hopes to add to the burgeoning evidence around the feminist critique of 
science, as Rose rightly asserts ‘such racializing and gendering of science was not 
confined to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but is present today, despite the 
ideological claims of the neutrality of science’.37 And it is the science of mid-twentieth 
century Britain which I hope will add to this feminist analysis of science and its 
attributes. 
 
The influential work by the ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant (see chapter two for literature 
review), established connections between the medieval practice of witch-hunting and 
male challenges to female roles (in midwifery especially), and the shift away from an 
holistic and feminine vision of the world to the impersonal, mechanical philosophy of a 
science proposed in the seventeenth century.  
 
Evelyn Fox-Keller furthers this work and explores the gendered and sexual metaphors by 
which the scientific revolution justified itself. Kellar’s argument is that wider social and 
cultural changes in gender relations contributed to the formation of a new masculine 
ideology and thus, influenced the practice of science.38 Further, the growing authority of 
science fell in line with masculine virtues which, she argues, contributed to the 
reformation of new gender divisions in wider society. Kellar uses psychoanalysis (Object 
Relations Theory) to expose science’s enfolding of masculine values, and the association 
of masculinity with the domination of nature as ‘other’ are explained in terms of the 																																																								
35 Rose, Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards a Feminist Transformation of the Science, Merchant, The 
Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution, Fox-Keller, Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: 
Essays on Language, Gender and Science, Fox-Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, Evelyn Fox-
Keller, "Language and Ideology in Evolutionary Theory: Reading Cultural Norms into Natural 
Law," in Feminism and Science, ed. Evelyn Fox-Keller and Helen E. Longino (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
36 Rose, Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards a Feminist Transformation of the Science. p.4. 
37 Ibid. p.17. 
38 Fox-Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science. 
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unconscious. However, Kellar hopes to transform science not completely abandon this 
domain of exploration by reclaiming: 
From within science of science a human instead of a masculine project, and the 
renunciation of the division of emotional and intellectual labour that maintains 
science as a male preserve.39 
 
The idea for Kellar, is to create a science that embodies the themes of respect and love 
for nature, and the recognition of complexity in the world around us. This is widely 
shared by other feminists (used in thesis), and these particular concerns are acutely 
present when they intersect with compassion for the suffering of animals as the subject 
of research. Lynda Birke (see chapter two) has explored these interconnections between 
masculine training in the scientific methods and the repression of compassion to the 
suffering of animals. Donna Haraway has also addressed the woman, human, animal and 
science issues which are evidenced in this work (see chapters two and three for Donna 
Haraway’s dominant influence on this thesis).40 
 
 
Structure of Thesis 
 
The work is divided into seven chapters, three of which are empirical and based on my 
primary research. Chapter two outlines the broader literature in relation to this area of 
research. This broad overview aims to demonstrates the specific areas of influence and 
also highlight the larger gaps in existing knowledge. The chapter covers four main areas, 
firstly, the work of Peter Singer and his ground-breaking book on the rights of animals. 
Peter Singer is considered to be one of the main protagonists of the animal rights 
movement of the 1970s, and his work continues to influence scholars and activists alike 
today. Following this, the (seen to be) founder of animal studies Jacques Derrida and his 
paper ‘The Animal That Therefore I am (More To Follow)’ will be critically analysed by 
using the work of Susan Fraiman, who argues that despite Derrida’s status as the 
“founding father” of animal studies in the humanities and social science, his work comes 
after a wealth of ecofeminist and feminist animal studies scholars’ research.41 The credit 																																																								
39 Ibid.p.178. 
40 Lynda Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew (Buckingham, UK: Open 
University Press, 1994), Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science.	
41 Susan Fraiman, "Pussy Panic Versus Liking Animals: Tracking Gender in Animal Studies," 
Critical Inquiry 39, no. 1 (2012). 
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for the ‘animal turn’ in the humanities is misplaced onto Derrida to the detriment of the 
wealth of important work done prior, and subsequently, to, him by ecofeminists. The 
second section of the literature review will look at the work of ecofeminists and feminist 
animal studies scholars, with a particular focus on Carol J. Adams and her book The 
Sexual Politics of Meat.42 Then sociological studies of research into animal experimentation 
will be reviewed, and finally historical work concerning the history of science and gender 
is appraised, followed by the research of Donna Haraway. 
 
Chapter three is the methodology; here I advocate a pluralistic approach to the research 
and writing of nonhuman histories. Using Donna Haraway’s notion of research design 
being a ‘Cat’s Cradle’ of knotty and entangled relations between different paradigms, I 
argue that methodology is as much about the epistemology of research as it is about 
technique.43 This “cat’s cradle” of a methodology draws on the approaches of social and 
cultural histories including the Foucauldian concepts of knowledge, power and discourse; 
feminist animal studies in the guise of the conceptual apparatus of intersectionality and 
feminist science studies, most notably the material-semiotic epistemology of Haraway. I 
discuss these methodological and conceptual underpinnings to the thesis, followed by an 
explanation of the primary sources drawn on. I have used a variety of primary sources to 
explore narratives of animal experimentation; archival documents from The National 
Archives and The Wellcome Library in London as well as documents from Hull History 
Centre, coupled with books and journal articles of the time.  
 
Chapter four is the first of the three empirical chapters and focuses on Britain’s testing of 
biological weapons in various parts of the world during the late 1940s to the mid-1950s. 
In this chapter I argue that the use of animals in biological warfare trials contributed to 
the development of Britain’s military-animal-industrial-complex, which extends the work 
of Barbara Noske and her notion of the animal-industrial-complex. First used by Noske 
to describe the often opaque and mutually reinforcing networks of political and 
economic relations between the state and other powerful political actors. Noske 
described how these networks had implications for the animal, in relation to 
																																																								
42 Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat (Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 1990). 
43 Donna Haraway, "A Game of Cat's Cradle: Science Studies, Feminist Theory, Cultural 
Studies," Configurations 2, no. 1 (1994). 
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contemporary agricultural-industrial relations.44 The military-animal-industrial complex is 
a term used by leading Critical Animal Scholars to denote the use of animals in warfare, 
and in my example, in the production of biological weapons of mass destruction. This 
chapter aims to uncover these power relations between the nonhuman animal and the 
human military scientist between the years 1947-1955. Furthermore, I outline and discuss 
the role of post-mortem examinations of the nonhuman body in reinforcing power 
relations between the human and animal. I end this chapter with a discussion on how and 
why this growth of the military-animal-industrial complex extended to the broader social 
and cultural context of the time in relation to gender. 
 
This discussion on the gendering of science and its “objects” of study extends to chapter 
five where I focus on the relationship between the psychopathological discourses of 
stress and the emergence of laboratory animal welfare. I argue that during this period 
members of the scientific community modified their views about the nonhuman as a 
‘passive object’ of manipulation, to one of an ‘active object’. This indicated an 
internalisation of discourses of ‘care’ towards nonhumans under experiment. Scientists 
still bestowed upon nonhuman animals Cartesian principles - still soulless mechanisms. 
However, with recourse to Hans Selye’s idea of ‘stress’, scientists in medical research 
began to advocate a ‘humane’ approach to the treatment of laboratory animals, which is 
still present in British law today in the guise of the three ‘R’s’ (Reduction, Replacement, 
Refinement). Medical researchers re-shaped laboratory animal relations in two ways; via 
the very material spaces of the laboratory, and methodologically, through the very 
procedures used to test ideas about medical cures. The chapter ends with insights drawn 
from feminist science studies, to indicate that the treatment of the nonhuman in 
scientific culture intersected with the broader social context concerning issues of gender, 
especially epistemological claims about women and mental illness.  
 
With the two main areas of British scientific animal use having been discussed in the 
preceding chapters, chapter six explains the legal consequences of animal 
experimentation in Britain. Despite many scholars of animal rights law noting how mid-
twentieth century Britain was a time when antivivisection movements stagnated, I argue 
																																																								
44 Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals (London, New York and Montréal: 
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the opposite.45  In the early 1960s, due to pressure from a variety of antivivisection 
organisations, the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection and the RSPCA being 
just two of these groups, the Home Secretary called for a review of the 1876 Cruelty to 
Animals Act, a law that regulated the practice of animal experimentation, and meant that 
scientists and their places of employment had to be licensed in order to carry out these 
experiments. The focus of this chapter is on the analysis of the construction of, and 
concentration upon, the renaming of certain typologies of vivisection. This is with 
particular reference to the legal definition of “pain” in the nonhuman as constructed by 
scientists and which I call the ‘Power-Pain Nexus’. 
 
The Power-Pain Nexus draws on the Foucauldian idea of power-knowledge relations. 
Power and knowledge are intimately linked in this instance, in order to render nonhuman 
animals discrete from human animals. Consequently, this de-subjectification, through 
discourse, is constructed from a series of networked relations between scientists, 
government and legal actors, which signifies overall power and control over the 
experimental animal. Particularly, dictating terms, and definitions of the very subjective 
experience of pain. This concept is then evoked in relation to the gendered experience of 
pain, whereby insights from feminist animal studies scholars are used to articulate the 
gendered dimensions of law in relation to animal experimentation. 
 
The thesis ends with a concluding chapter, drawing together all aspects of the research 
and answering the research questions posed in the methodology chapter.  
 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
This thesis has examined a relatively short period of time, the years 1948-1965, and a 
particular place, Britain.  It has adopted a novel approach to the history of science by 
highlighting the experiences of animals in the scientific process. Furthermore, it has 
taken an intersectional approach to address the overlapping and entangled discourses 
surrounding the use of nonhuman animals in science and its resultant knowledge claims, 
and situated these in relation to gender. But much more could be researched and 																																																								
45See for example Richard Ryder, Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research (London, UK: 
National Anti-Vivisection Society, 1983). Ryder is also discussed in more detail in chapter six. 
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analysed. What has become clear during the writing of this thesis is that there is no single 
overlapping intersectional dimension to animal experimentation; rather there is a matrix 
of possibilities regarding the intersections of animals, gender, race and social class. This was 
evidenced in the chapter on Porton Down and their sea trials in the Caribbean, why did 
the establishment choose to conduct trials there?  Surely the weather was not the only 
factor; perhaps the colonial dimension of Britain and the conditions of its access to land 
played a part in the decision? And with regards to social class, the laboratory was a “hot 
house” of gender and class relations, with the majority of technical staff being women (as 
stated in chapter five) and ‘uneducated’ men (as stated in chapter six). These aspects need 
to be further explored and analysed in order for a fuller appreciation of the intersectional 
approach to human-animal studies to be demonstrated. 
 
 Another limitation was the neglect of the analysis of more cultural texts in the history of 
animals, science and gender. What I mean by this is an exploration into the literature and 
journalistic accounts of both science, animal experimentation and women’s experiences 
of medical, military and judicial practices in mid-twentieth century Britain. It was the 
early 1960s that the second wave feminist movement really began, but the movement did 
not gain momentum and public attention until the late 1960s. Despite this, a broader 
history of animals, gender and science might take into account the cultural and social 
impact of women writers of the period, such a Viola Klein, Simone De Beauvoir and 
Betty Friedan, or the narratives of animal experimentation that circulated in 
contemporary newspapers. So too could the historical period which this study focused 
upon be extended. I purposely chose this period as it was immediately after the Second 
World War and prior to the ‘Rights’ movements of the late 1960s and 1970s. A more 
thorough historical study might extend the research into the 1970s to discuss the 
emergence of the animal’s and women’s rights movements and how this affected 
scientific research and its knowledge claims. 
 
 
A Note On Terminology 
 
For most of this thesis I use the word animal to designate the more-than-human being. I 
acknowledge that this is a huge generalization, which eschews subjectivity of sentience, 
and places nonhuman animals, in all their individuality, into the very binary modes which 
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this thesis tries to address and overcome. I am, however, using the historical referential 
‘animal’ by using language that was used in the archival documents. 
 
Nonhuman animals have been generalised for the most part, with specific species being 
discussed in relation to the particular experiment in the narrative. Despite this, I take 
stock from Derrida, in his paper ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow)’, who 
examines “the animal” with particular reference to his cat (reviewed in chapter two), but 
also acknowledges the singularity of species: 
 
If I say “it is a real cat” that sees me naked this is in order to mark its 
unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds in its name, it doesn’t do so as the 
exemplar of a species called “cat”, even less so of an “animal” genus or kingdom. 
It is true that I identify it as a male or female cat. But even before that 
identification, it comes to me as this irreplaceable living being that one day enters 
my space, into this place where it can encounter me, see me, even see me naked. 
Nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an existence 
that refuses to be conceptualised.46 
 
I too, acknowledge this ‘unsubstitutable singularity’, but for historical purposes, to avoid 
anachronism, I use the term “animal” in places. 
 
On Gender 
 
As this thesis addresses the intersectional nature of animals, science and gender, it is also 
pertinent to discuss what I mean when I refer to gender. Here, I use Judith Butler’s idea 
of the performativity of gender, to suggest that one’s learned performance of gendered 
behavior (masculine or feminine) is something we act out, a performance. 47  This is 
imposed upon us by normative heterosexual standards (also, as I later argue through the 
construction of scientific knowledge via the use of nonhuman animals in experiments).  
 
Butler argues that gender is not a natural “thing” and therefore does not exist, she writes 
‘gender reality is performative which means, quite simply, that it is real only to the extent 
																																																								
46  Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. John Caputo (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008). p.9. 
47 Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory," in Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre, ed. Sue-Ellen Case 
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that it is performed’.48 I take Butler’s idea of gender, as one that is a social construction, 
open to change and contestation.  
Because there is neither an 'essence' that gender expresses or externalizes nor an 
objective ideal to which gender aspires; because gender is not a fact, the various 
acts of gender creates the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be 
no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its 
genesis.49 
 
Moreover, there is no dividing line taken between sex and gender, but rather, following 
Butler, I assume that our gendered performances affect people in material, corporeal 
ways, which in turn are affected by social constructions. Following Butler, I take the idea 
of sex  not as ‘a bodily given on which the construct of gender is artificially imposed, 
but…a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies’. 50  Rather than 
embrace radical constructivism, it is important to note how materialization of bodies 
(human and nonhuman) happens through discourse and social conventions. This 
involves a consideration of materiality and involves a turn to ‘matter, not as a site or 
surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, 
fixity, and surface we call matter.’51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
48 Ibid. p.278. 
49 Ibid. p.273. 
50 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter, 2nd ed. (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2011). pp.2-3. 
51 Ibid.p.xviii 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review  
 
Despite covering the major literature of each topic area in the forthcoming chapters 
(chapters four to six), it is still important to outline and discuss the broader literature of 
animal studies. I have taken a selection of work relevant to this thesis to discuss, from 
feminist animal studies/ecofeminism, scientific and natural histories to contemporary 
animal studies (sociological informed accounts of animal experimentation), including the 
highly influential work of Donna Haraway.  It is these areas of research, and scholars, 
which have influenced the writing of this thesis and played an important role in defining 
and focussing my topic for this research. 
 
Firstly, however, one must turn to the work of Peter Singer, one of the first scholars to 
argue for the rights of nonhuman ‘Others’. Then we turn to the work of Jacques Derrida, 
whose writings many animal studies scholars view as the foundational texts of the 
discipline. The following section will be focused on the feminist animal 
studies/ecofeminist literature, and then we turn to the work of those scholars who have 
researched animal experimentation from a sociological perspective. The final section is a 
broad overview on historical work related to my thesis, and this includes a review of the 
major works of Donna Haraway. 
 
The Animal Rights Years: Speciesism and Utilitarianism 
 
It was in 1975 that Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation first hit the shelves and caused a 
stir amongst the general public.52 The book by Singer is considered to be one of the key 
texts of the late twentieth century, and a book which signified the emergence of the 
animal rights movement. The book’s premise is to advocate for a moral consideration 
towards the treatment of animals in contemporary society.  
 
Singer argues that the moral treatment of animals, in every area of social life, from the 
farm, to the factory and the laboratory, is deeply and systematically immoral. He argues 
for a complete and radical revolution in the way we deal with other nonhuman species. 
Despite not coining the term, he describes this discriminatory treatment towards animals 																																																								
52 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 3rd ed. (London: Pimlico, 1975). 
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as speciesism. Richard Ryder first used the word to describe the use of animals in 
experiments and the discriminatory practices associated with it, Singer extends the term 
and has subsequently become synonymous with Animal Liberation.53 
 
Singer’s moral philosophy concerning the treatment of nonhuman animals is based on 
the principles of utilitarianism. By expanding the work of Jeremy Bentham, Singer’s 
utilitarianism is expanded to the nonhuman domain, and is based on the idea that 
pleasure is good and pain is bad. With regards to nonhuman animals, Singer advocates 
the view that animals can suffer pain and experience pleasure and therefore should 
encounter some moral consideration from human beings. Singer argues that the 
preference for increased pleasure applies to all living beings regardless of who you are, 
and he calls this the principle of equality. The principle refers to equal consideration of 
interests and preferences.54  For Singer, all beings that can experience pain have this 
utilitarian impulse to avoid it, and he asserts this as the foundation of all morality: 
If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that 
suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the 
principle of equality requires that its suffering – insofar as rough comparisons can 
be made – if any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of 
experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. 
So the limit of sentience for the capacity to suffer and/or experience enjoyment 
is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark 
this boundary by some other characteristic like intelligence or rationality would 
be to mark it in an arbitrary manner. Why not choose some other characteristic, 
like skin colour?55 
 
Singer’s moral consideration towards animals and his denigration of speciesism is 
expounded in the book, which covers all forms of animal use including agriculture and 
experimentation. The writing is underpinned by an advocacy of vegetarian values, and 
encapsulates a philosophical discussion on the historical construction of human 
domination over animals. Yet, his utilitarianism is questionable, as to rely on the 
calculability of pain and pleasure is a tricky subjective measure and could in fact lead to 
greater human and animal suffering.56 This is because, despite his appreciation for the 
links between sexism, racism and speciesism in terms of the treatment of living beings, 
Singer still seems to implicitly condone a human-animal hierarchy of being which would 
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54 Singer, Animal Liberation. p.5. 
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ultimately lead to those seen as lower in the hierarchy being more suitable for sacrifice 
for “the greater good”. This is undoubtedly unintentional, but can be analysed through 
his advocacy of utilitarian principles.57  
 
Even more so, his chapter on vivisection demonstrates the experiences of animals in the 
laboratory, with specific reference made to psychological experiments such as Harry 
Harlow’s maternal deprivation studies.58 Singer moralises about experimental animals and 
their suffering, but in the end, guided by his utilitarian principles, refuses to repudiate the 
infliction of suffering on experimental animals if it benefits human health and welfare, 
declaring ‘no doubt there have been some advances in knowledge which would not have 
been attained as easily without using animals’.59 At which point he turns to the historical 
and lists examples from as far back as William Harvey’s work on the circulation of blood 
(eighteenth century), and Banting and Best’s discovery of insulin, plus many more.  
 
However, he fails to successfully historically analyse these medical pioneers. For instance, 
Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin was first tested on rabbits; this did not work 
so he put the drug to one side believing it to be ineffective.60 Nor can one really compare 
the science of today to the scientific context that Harvey was working in.61 Singer’s work 
was ground-breaking in the 1970s and provided a space for the emergence of the animal 
right’s movement. But one must consider Singer’s work now within historical context 
rather than use it ahistorically.  
 
Richard Ryder and Tom Regan 
 
Despite Singer’s popular association with the development of the word ‘speciesism’, it 
was in fact Richard Ryder who coined the term, and which first appeared in his book 
Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research.62 This book gave an in-depth overview of 
animal experiments in the laboratory, starting with a chapter on speciesism and its 
definition: 																																																								
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I use the word ‘speciesism’ to describe the widespread discrimination that is 
practiced by man against the other species, and to draw a parallel with racism. 
Speciesism and racism are both forms of prejudice that are based upon 
appearances – if the other individual looks different then he is rated as being 
beyond the moral pale. Racism is today condemned by most intelligent and 
compassionate people and it seems only logical that such people should extend 
their concern for other races to other species also. Speciesism and racism (and 
indeed sexism) overlook or underestimate the similarities between the 
discriminator and those discriminated against and both forms of prejudice show 
a selfish disregard for the interests of others and their sufferings.63 
 
This definition, like Singer’s makes a distinct analogy between the treatment of animals 
and the treatment of people according to their race and gender. Not necessarily 
acknowledging the convergent treatment of certain groups of people and animals (this 
work was written prior to the feminist notion of intersectionality), but definitely using 
speciesism as analogous to racism and sexism.  
 
The book, like Singer’s, was one based on a moral philosophy of animal rights, which 
eschewed the emotional and upheld the rational. Other chapters in the book included 
discussions on non-medical research, a specific chapter on primates, legislation and a 
chapter devoted to a call for legal reform. Of particular importance to this research and 
Ryder’s future work, were his musings on pain and the felt experience of suffering in 
laboratory animals.64 His writings on pain fall between the utilitarianism of Singer and the 
Kantian inspired philosophy of Tom Regan, who posited that ethics are rule based, and 
the moral treatment of animals depends on the normative rules that govern a particular 
society’s behaviour (more on Regan below).  
 
For Ryder, all beings who feel pain have an inherent right not to experience suffering, as 
all living beings have an inherent value. Taking a utilitarian view, he writes ‘…all painful 
events are bad and all bad events are painful. The only possible justification for evil is 
that it brings greater good, and the only justification for pain is that is creates a greater 
pleasure – a greater joy or happiness’.65 Yet, he adds another dimension to this utilitarian 
moral principle, he adds the idea of subjectivity and phenomenology of experience ‘I 
believe that the only reality that we can be sure of is the universe of our own 
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awareness’.66 This embracing of subjectivity by Ryder, was not necessarily a rejection of a 
stark masculine viewpoint on the rights of animals, but rather still upheld by utilitarian 
principles, but ones that were inherently conservative and individualistic, he asserts: 
If pain forced upon the individual is to be justified convincingly, it must be in 
terms of the benefits accruing to the same individual. Of course some individuals 
may suffer and others gain by it. Such occasions arise daily. But to jump from the 
sphere of consciousness of one individual to that of another individual is literally 
to leap from one universe to another. Benefits justifying pain can only be benefits 
if they occur within the same sphere of consciousness, that is to say, within the 
same individual organism.67 
 
This solipsism abjures any notion of being able to understand nonhuman animals 
through a collective political effort, which  if were case, would threaten the Status Quo. 
Ryder instead embraces an individualistic utilitarianism that in the end neglects issues of 
power and prevents an exploration into the categorical imperative of ‘human and animal’. 
 
After Singer and Ryder came Tom Regan, in 1981 and his book The Case for Animal 
Rights,.68  Regan’s book moves away from the utilitarianism of Singer and Ryder and 
embraces the Kantian idea of deontological ethics and Natural Rights Theory.69This 
ethical position is based on the person being duty bound, or abiding by a set of rules, as 
Regan avers: 
The basic moral right to respectful treatment places strict limits on how subjects-
of-a-life may be treated. Individuals who possess this right are never to be treated 
as if they exist as resources for others; in particular, harms intentionally done to 
any one subject cannot be justified by aggregating benefits derived by others. In 
this respect, my position is anti-utilitarian, a theory in the Kantian…tradition. But 
the rights view parts company with Kant when it comes to specifying who should 
be treated with respect. For Kant, only moral agents exist as ends-in-themselves; 
only those who are capable of applying abstract, impartial moral principles to 
their decision making share the equal right to be treated with respect. By contrast, 
the rights view recognises the equal inherent value of all subjects-of-a-life, 
including those who lack the capacities necessary for moral agency. These moral 
patients, (as I call them) have the same equal right to treatment as do moral 
agents.70 
 
Yet, despite this extension (and contradiction) of Kant to include nonhuman (irrational) 
animals as ‘moral patients’ (even the word implies some degree of passivity at the hands 																																																								
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of an active human being), Regan affords this moral treatment to mammals only, ‘…the 
line I draw is “mentally normal mammals of a year or more”. 71  Furthermore, he 
considers those of moral worth as only those animals who are deemed to have a 
consciousness (like Ryder’s idea of subjectivity) or have the kind of complex awareness 
as those found in adult mammals.72 This then is similar to Singer and Ryder’s elevation of 
rationality and individualism over affect and emotionality. As Josephine Donovan argues: 
Thus, while it recognizes sensibility or feeling as the basis for treatment as a 
moral entity, the utilitarian position remains locked in a rationalist, calculative 
mode of moral reasoning that distances the moral entities from the decision-
making subject, reifying them in terms of quantified suffering. Just as the natural 
rights theory proposed by Regan inherently privileges rationality, Singer's 
utilitarianism relapses into a mode of manipulative mastery that is not unlike that 
used by scientific and medical experimenters to legitimate such animal abuses as 
vivisection.73 
 
This then, makes the early Right’s views on nonhuman animals inherently masculine 
despite the use of analogies to compare speciesism with the denigratory treatment that 
women and people of colour experience at the hands of sexism and racism. Again, 
Donovan writes: 
Unfortunately, contemporary animal rights theorists, in their reliance on theory 
that derives from the mechanistic premises of Enlightenment epistemology 
(natural rights in the case of Regan and utilitarian calculation in the case of 
Singer) and in their suppression/denial of emotional knowledge, continue to 
employ Cartesian, or objectivist, modes even while they condemn the scientific 
practices enabled by them.74 
 
Whilst still recognising the importance of Singer’s, Ryder’s and Regan’s ideas to the 
development of understanding human-animal relations from both the personal and 
political viewpoint, one must also treat their theories with caution, and criticality. 
Particularly in discussing the complex and socio-culturally situated relations we have with 
nonhuman others. 
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The Humanities Embrace Animals: Jacques Derrida’s Nakedness Amongst 
Female Felines 
 
Most animal studies scholars argue that it was Jacques Derrida, in his paper The Animal 
That Therefore I am (More To Follow), who influenced the turn to the study of the animal in 
the humanities and social sciences.75 However, following the argument made by Susan 
Fraiman in her article Pussy Panic Versus Liking Animals: Tracking Gender in Animal 
Studies I too contend that by situating Derrida as the ‘founding father’ of animal studies, 
it marginalises the wealth of ecofeminist work on animals which came before him, and 
which will be discussed shortly.76  
 
Derrida took an autobiographical and reflexive approach when questioning what or 
whom is an animal. To do this, he reflected on his nakedness in front of his pet cat 
during an interaction in his bathroom one morning, and wondered what his cat sees and 
thinks when she sees him naked.77 Gazed upon by his cat, Derrida observes his own 
embarrassment at the thought of being naked in front of her. He questions her existence 
by asking: 
Ashamed of what and naked before whom? Why let oneself be overcome with 
shame? And why this shame that blushes for being ashamed? Especially, I should 
make clear, if the cat observes me frontally naked, face to face, and if I am naked 
faced with the cat’s eyes looking at me from head to toe, as it were just to see 
without touching yet, and without biting, although that threat remains on its lips 
or on the tip of the tongue.78 
  
The cat, for Derrida, is a living, breathing, being, who responds to the world around her. 
He reassures the reader that, it is not so much about the cat being able to speak, but to 
respond to him which signifies her agency ‘the said question of the said animal in its 
entirety comes down to knowing not whether an animal speaks but whether one can 
know what respond means’.79 This interaction between the cat and human is Derrida’s 
autobiographical refrain throughout the whole essay. He questions historical and 
contemporary understandings of the animal, and tears apart the notion of the Cartesian 
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idea of the animal as machine.80 However, this autobiographical epiphany of animals 
being sentient and worthy of much more than their treatment in past and present times, 
is just that – autobiographical. Derrida’s undoubted contribution to animal studies is 
written from an anthropocentric perspective. He describes his experiences with his cat, 
and that is all.  
 
Nonetheless, this autobiographical and anthropocentric epiphany about nonhuman 
animals still reinforces a gendered hierarchy of being. It is, according to Fraiman: 
…[A] gendering that means to bare and implicate the speaker’s masculinity along 
with his humanity but that also has the further effects of staging a seemingly 
primal confrontation between masculinized human and feminized animal…True 
that Derrida’s cat is accorded the power of the gaze: the singular, discerning, 
“point of view” traditionally tied to cognition and reserved for humans. Yet the 
bathroom transaction overall – explicitly visual (and visually explicit) but 
definitely not tactile – leaves intact the old rationalist hierarchy valuing 
vision/mind/cognition over touch/body/emotion…Derrida’s cat is granted 
provisional subject status in implicitly humanist terms.81 
 
Derrida’s interaction with his cat, although hugely influential to contemporary animal 
studies and the broader historiography, is not without its faults, as Fraiman rightly 
asserts. The very nature of the bathroom scene is a sexualized one, 82  with Derrida 
acknowledging the femaleness of cats throughout art and literature, his cat is also female, 
by which Derrida feels embarrassed by the she-cat’s gaze.83 Derrida’s trepidation about 
gender and animals in the essay does not disappear but rather becomes slightly more 
fervent.  He decries the work of Descartes, and others such as Lacan, Kant, Heidegger 
and Levinas as ‘clearly all those (males and not females, for that difference is not 
insignificant here)’ who have never felt the gaze of an animal ‘other’ and ‘especially not 
naked, by an animal that addressed them’.84 Later, he castigates their work as promoting 
violence against animals. His treatise comes to an end with an implicit yet contradictory 
call for the abandonment of sexual difference and an acknowledgement of the 
philosopher as “she” as much as a “he”.85 
 
																																																								
80 Ibid. p.8-9. PP.69-87 
81 Fraiman, "Pussy Panic Versus Liking Animals: Tracking Gender in Animal Studies." pp.95-96. 
82 Ibid. p.94. 
83 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am. P.6. 
84 Ibid. pp.13-14. 
85 Ibid.pp. 48-49. 
	 34	
But despite this contradictory acknowledgment and assertion of de-binarised gendered 
beings86 in The Animal That Therefore I am (More To Follow), the work is, I concur here with 
Fraiman, about Derrida being a masculine rational human subject against a feminized 
animal.87 And it is at this point, that despite Derrida’s (misplaced) recognition of being 
the founder of animal studies, that we can turn to the work of ecofeminsts. They have 
laid the foundation for the area of human-animal studies, and their research was 
completed decades prior to Derrida’s reflection on the nonhuman animal. 
 
Ecofeminism/Feminist Animal Studies: Laying the Foundations Through 
Vegetarian Scholarship 
 
Derrida’s important contribution to Animal Studies, and to this thesis, cannot be 
understated. He is critical of a host of historical figures, most importantly for this 
research, of Descartes. He also places the nonhuman animal in the plural, recognizing 
individuality of being and agency, as much as sentience. However, one might ask, what is 
new about this? Derrida is oft quoted as being the “founding father” of Animal Studies88 
at the expense of the emotionally and politically engaged feminist work emerging from 
the late 1970s. It is here that I wish to review the broader literature in relation to this 
thesis from the area of feminist animal studies, or ecofeminism.89 
 
There is a small and influential cohort of ecofeminists who have theoretically and 
methodologically influenced this thesis. They include Andrée Collard and Joyce 
Contrucci, Carol J. Adams, Josephine Donovan, Susan Griffin, Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen 
and Lynda Birke.90 All of the work done by these scholars and activists challenges deeply 
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embedded assumptions about the connection between animals and women, whether that 
be, for example, of the intersection between women and animals as literal and 
metaphorical pieces of meat91 or as substitutes for each other in scientific experiments.92 
The methodological concept drawn upon by these scholars is intersectionality, which 
recognises the overlapping and mutually reinforcing categories of social analysis (gender, 
race, class and species) as forms of oppression or privilege. This concept is discussed 
more fully in chapter two, as it forms the theoretical backdrop to this thesis. 
Nevertheless, ecofeminists, taking inspiration from black feminists have used the 
concept of intersectionality to demonstrate the similar forms of oppression which 
subjugate both animals and women.  
 
All of this work predates Derrida substantially, emerging in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Ecofeminist approaches to the question of animal started from a political and 
activist standpoint mainly focusing on the consumption of animals and westernized 
representations and practices of meat eating. Since the 1990s, this branch of feminism 
developed into a fully-fledged, yet marginal, academic discipline.93 And, it was in this 
decade that the core debates and literature emerged concerning the interconnections 
between the oppression of animals and women, and also the role that feminism should 
play in highlighting this intersectional subjugation. For instance, ecofeminist Greta Gaard 
published her edited collection Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature in 1993 which 
demonstrated the growing concern ecofeminism had for animals.  
 
Alongside this growing recognition of the links between the exploitation of women and 
animals, in 1995, a debate in the journal Signs questioned the rise of feminists’ concern 
for animals and their vegetarianism. The debate was prompted by an article written by 
feminist scientist Kathyrn Paxton George entitled Should Feminists be Vegetarian?94 
George lambasted the concerns of ecofeminists regarding meat-eating, claiming that 
vegetarianism can be seen as having ‘deep male biases’ whilst being touted as: 
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An ideal lifestyle choice, ethical vegetarianism actually discriminates against 
women, infants, children, adolescents, some of the elderly, other races and 
ethnicities, and those living in other cultures…of particular concern to me is the 
apparent link between feminist ethics and moral concern for animals95 
 
Moreover, George went on to argue that by taking an ethical vegetarian stance, it 
consigns women and other marginalised groups of people to ‘a moral underclass of 
beings who cannot be completely moral; so the logic of domination is imbedded 
in…ethical vegetarianism’.96 In a sense turning the ecofeminist anti-dualist argument on 
its head, George claimed that the emerging ecofeminist concern for animals was actually 
a dualistic system in and of itself.97 Trained as a scientist, George argued that women’s 
bodies could not physiologically withstand a vegetarian diet (veganism had not entered 
into popular discourse in the mid-1990s!).  
 
In a subsequent issue, Carol J. Adams, Josephine Donovan and Lori Gruen replied to 
George’s claims, and argued that George reduced ‘vegetarianism to some quantifiable 
nutritional resource that could be measured scientifically’ 98 , therefore leaving 
unquestioned the epistemological status of science. Moreover, Donovan’s reply to 
George criticized the empirical evidence that George relied on to belittle the claims of 
ecofeminists and substantiated her claims with non-ethnocentric evidence that suggested 
the opposite.99 
 
This debate seemingly created the space for the emergence of the research we see today 
in certain branches of animal studies, such as Critical Animal Studies (CAS). CAS follows 
feminism in its theoretical and methodological aims, and it takes an avowedly political 
stance towards the study of nonhuman animals.100 It draws heavily on the work of the 
previously mentioned ecofeminists, whom despite being at the margins of scholarly 
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activity in the 1990s, are now moving more into the centre ground. The most prominent 
of these being Carol J. Adams, especially her book The Sexual Politics of Meat.101 
 
The Sexual Politics of Meat 
 
This thesis would not have been written if it was not for the influential work of Carol J. 
Adams, particularly her book, The Sexual Politics of Meat. This book outlines the myriad 
ways that patriarchal values are tied to meat eating and the treatment of animals. The 
book is mainly centred around one particular concept – ‘the absent referent’. The absent 
referent acts to cloak the violence inherent in the eating of meat, as ‘animals in name and 
body are made absent as animals for meat to exist’.102 Adams argues that through this 
renaming of the dead animal, we are able to forget about the living being that once was. 
Moreover, Adams finds that this idea of the absent referent in meat eating is also 
intersectional and applicable to the treatment of women, through its metaphorical 
usage,103 by positing that: 
…[A] structure of overlapping but absent referents links violence against women 
and animals. Through the structure of the absent referent, patriarchal values 
become institutionalized. Just as dead bodies are absent from our language about 
meat, in descriptions of cultural violence women are also the absent referent. 
Rape in particular, carries such potent imagery that the term is transferred from 
the literal experience of women and applied metaphorically to other instances of 
violent devastation…The experience of women thus becomes a vehicle for 
describing other oppressions. Women, upon whose bodies actual rape is most 
often committed, become the absent referent when the language of sexual 
violence is used metaphorically. These terms recall women’s experiences but not 
women.104 
 
The book shows the processes of similar objectification of women and animals in 
western culture. According to Adams, the continuation of the butchering of nonhuman 
animals in western culture, and consumption of them, is linked to both the 
representation of women and their treatment, which normalizes forms of sexualized 
consumption and ultimately violence.  
 
By highlighting the dual issue of animals and women’s oppression, Adams’ work could 
be considered to be the key foundational text in animal studies. Particularly, those studies 																																																								
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concerned with forms of intersectional oppression between the nonhuman and those 
considered to be human ‘Others’ in Western society. Adams continues this theme in her 
latest book The Pornography of Meat,105 in which she further develops the idea of the links 
between sexual violence towards women, the absent referent, meat eating and 
representations of women.  
 
Yet, Adam’s ideas do seem to implicitly reject the relationships between humans and 
animals in indigenous societies. Although she posits the sexual politics of meat eating as 
one situated in the Western and commercial agri-industrial complex, her ideas could 
seem to inadvertently embrace ethnocentrism. For instance, she discusses the historical 
association between racism and meat eating but at the same time generalizes and 
romanticizes non-Western cultures’ diets as predominately plant based (particularly for 
women).106 Adams takes these implicit universalistic assumptions about male dominance 
and meat eating, and asserts: 
Worldwide this patriarchal custom is found. In Asia, some cultures forbid 
women from consuming fish, seafood, chicken and duck, and eggs. In equatorial 
Africa, the prohibition of chicken to women is common. For example, the 
Mbum Kpau women do not eat chicken, goat, partridge, or other game birds. 
The Kufa of Ethiopia punished women who ate chicken by making them slaves, 
while the Walamo put to death anyone who violated the restriction of eating 
fowl.107 
 
While acknowledging the dominance of Western patriarchal values in relation to the 
treatment of animals and their use for consumption, Adams still inadvertently becomes 
ethnocentric in her writing. We do not find out why women in some cultures in Asia are 
not allowed to eat certain animal foods, nor do we get to understand the relationships 
and constructions of nonhuman animals and humans in indigenous cultures such as the 
Mbum Kpau or the Kufa of Ethiopia. Adams seems to eschew a cultural analysis of 
these very specific and different human-animal relations. For instance, some indigenous 
farming communities were very much based upon the principles of egalitarianism 
between women and men, animal and human, as sociologist Colin Samson writes: 
[A]mong indigenous farming peoples, both men and women had important roles 
but, despite the fact that women often had the most important ones, the US 
government efforts to make Native Americans into market farmers required that 
men and boys be farmers with women staying in the nuclear familial home…The 																																																								
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egalitarianism of many indigenous peoples, especially hunters, also encompasses 
relations between humans and the natural world. After a successful hunt it is 
important not to boast about animals that have been killed, or display any of the 
triumphalism associated with achievements in Western society. Indigenous 
hunting language conveys nothing equivalent to ‘quarry’, ‘trophy’ or even ‘game’, 
all of which imply a hierarchical relationship between people and animals…To 
brag of a good hunt is to place oneself above the animals, and therefore not 
show humility to forces upon which hunters depend.108 
 
Adams for all her influential analysis of human-animal relations in the West, has a 
tendency to generalize indigenous peoples and claim that such communities are also 
founded on inequalities between male and females, animals and humans. Further, 
naturalizing a plant-based diet as on that is essentially feminine. Yet, there is no doubt to 
the influence she has had on this thesis, in terms of addressing the parallels between the 
animals used for experiments in mid-twentieth century Britain and broader cultural 
imaginaries of women at the time. But, one must be cautious about generalising across 
cultures and histories without investigating the many different ways of life that the West 
has and is trying to suppress. 
 
Intersectional Animal Studies 
 
This emerging field of animal studies grows out of the groundbreaking research of 
Adams and other Ecofeminists such as Gruen and Donovan mentioned above. They too 
have grappled with the intersectional in terms of gender, women and animality. 
However, as stated previously, this literature is often seen as superficial, and/or quite 
often ignored.109 Many studies on the animal cite the work of Peter Singer and Jacques 
Derrida as the key literature, which means that ecofeminism’s work within the animal 
studies arena risks becoming erased. Greta Gaard’s Ecofeminism Revisited: Rejecting 
Essentialism and Re-Placing Species in a Material Environmentalism provides a 
manifesto against the erasure of ecofeminism. 110  She argues for an intersectional 
approach to scholarly activity, which is something this thesis attempts to do: 
The intersectional analysis of nature, gender, race, class, species and sexuality is 
not confined to an essentialist definition of feminism or ecofeminism, but rather 																																																								
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offers a strategic conceptual approach toward bringing about the social justice, 
economic and ecological democracy needed to solve environmental crises in the 
present moment.111 
 
Gaard suggests how ecofeminists such as Adams, have been both ignored and 
appropriated. Yet what is missing from this wealth of literature? Despite the strength of 
this scholarly work, and its influence on this thesis, my work is historical. Few histories, if 
any, have been written using the work of feminist animal studies scholars such as Carol J. 
Adams and Josephine Donovan. I hope to add to the emerging work in this area but take 
an historical purview rather than draw on contemporary empirical evidence to theorise 
the interrelationship between gender and animals. The distinction between the focus on 
women and gender is an important one. As demonstrated by the above literature, much 
ecofeminist work devotes attention entirely to the intersection between animals and 
women. I on the other hand, will be focusing more broadly on gender, its social 
construction and thus, its implications in terms of intersections of oppression (with that 
of animals and women) and privilege (with that of the sciences dominated by a socially 
constructed masculine epistemology and ontology). 
 
Questioning Animal Experimentation: Sociological Accounts 
 
The main scholars concerned with the use of animals in scientific experiments are Lynda 
Birke, Arnold Arluke, and Michael Lynch.112 Lynch’s main contribution to this growing 
body of writing is his paper Sacrifice and the transformation of the animal body into a 
scientific object: Laboratory culture and Ritual Practice in the Neurosciences, which 
appeared in the journal Social Studies of Science in 1988. Lynch draws on his own 
ethnographic observations in neuroscience laboratories in the late 1970s, to argue that 
the term ‘sacrifice’ is used in the laboratory to indicate a ‘systematic consecration’ of the 
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animal body, which give an air of almost religious importance. The animal body is 
sacrificed by science as a means of providing for a greater good.113  
 
Lynch goes on to discuss how the laboratory opens up a space for a new meaning of an 
animal to occur, by which he means that the animal body transforms from that of a 
‘naturalistic’ to an ‘analytic’ animal. By naturalistic animal, he means: 
 
 [T]he animal in ordinary perception and interaction; the animal of common 
sense, the animal as it is viewed and acted upon in the world of everyday life. The 
‘naturalistic’ animal is the animal appreciated by laymen; a subject of scientifically 
unfounded attributions which have little possibility of rigorous verification. It is 
the animal championed by animal rights advocates and to which human-like 
‘feelings’, perceptions, sensitivities, and even ‘thoughts’ are attributed.114 
 
Accordingly, the naturalistic animal is a representation that permeates the cultural rather 
than scientific realms of society. The nonhuman animal’s very being is 
anthropomorphized and relegated to a space of utter subjectification. On the hand, 
Lynch says that in the laboratory, the naturalistic animal transforms into an analytic one, 
which is: 
[O]stensibly an artifact – a product of human intervention. It is actively shaped 
by human agency, and in some cases literally carved up. Descartes’ argument that 
the animal is no more than a machine becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, since 
laboratory procedures assure the removal of characteristics that make up the 
naturalistic animal (its life, its holistic and reciprocal presence, and its ‘subjective’ 
attributes), in the scientific rendering of the phenomenon.115 
 
Although Lynch does not argue for complete separation of these two categories of 
animal, he still presupposes a boundary between the two, and a distinction between 
science and culture.116  And it is these boundaries that designate Lynch’s concepts as 
embedded with a dualistic presupposition about the nonhuman animal in and outside the 
laboratory. As is discussed in chapter five of this thesis, the boundaries and/or categories 
given by Lynch do not recognise the emergence of an appreciation for the 
psychosomatic in laboratory animals, which began in the 1950s and paved the way for 
the regulation of laboratory animal welfare legislation. 
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Other scholars who have taken on the issue of animal experimentation, following the 
writings and research of Michael Lynch are Lynda Birke, Arnold Arluke and Mike 
Michael. Lynda Birke can be seen as part of the feminist animal studies collective 
mentioned above. In her book Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew, she 
focuses on how society, through the generation of scientific knowledge, constructs ideas 
about the animal.117 She argues that scientific knowledge creates two ways of thinking 
about nonhuman animals, firstly by their similarities and differences to human beings. 
This tendency is most prevalent in using animals as replacements for the human in 
scientific experiments. The second is through the historically constructed separation of 
society and nature.  This is done by situating nonhuman animals within a construct of 
nature which is seen as fixed and stable, and which the human is seen as separate from, 
existing instead in the social.118 Moreover, throughout the course of this book, Birke 
draws on ecofeminist theory to question the views that feminists hold about the animal, 
and like Adams and Donovan, hopes to integrate the nonhuman into the parlance of 
feminist thinking. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the key to Birke is her questioning of scientific practice, 
its methodologies and their justification of the use of animals in research. In the second 
section of the book, she does turn to the historical by outlining the nineteenth century 
debates on vivisection, and links these to the broader social context of the time in terms 
of Britain’s imperial and industrial ambitions. She argues that vivisection practices in this 
period were only questioned because of the growing number of women entering into 
scientific, specifically physiological, research. Although this is commendable, the work 
lacks historical depth and breadth, and use of historical primary sources to justify her 
arguments. The history is briefly outlined and not sustained throughout the book, and 
therefore neglects completely mid-twentieth century science and its extensive use of 
animals. 
 
Despite this, Lynda Birke’s ideas are incredibly influential to this thesis, as she deals with 
animal experimentation science in all its guises, from the language of scientific reports 
that absent the animal (co-authored with Jane Smith and Dawn Sadler), to her work with 
Mike Michael on animal ethics and species boundaries in the laboratory as well as 																																																								
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writings with Consuelo Rivera-Fuentes on bodily pain and animal bodies, and research 
into the use of animals in medical research as a substitute for humans. 119  
 
Alongside Birke’s paper with Mike Michael, the two have also written a book together 
with Arnold Arluke, entitled The Sacrifice: How Scientific Experiments Transform Animals and 
People.120 According to the authors, the aim of the book is to ‘examine the changing 
contexts of scientific use of animals, and how researchers deal with ethical and emotional 
dilemmas in various context’.121 Their main concern is to address the interrelationships 
with animals and laboratory workers and how their interactions shape the identities of 
these humans who work in the laboratory.122 They draw on an extensive range of primary 
sources such as ethnographic observations, field notes from pro-vivisection conferences, 
historical work and media reports. 
 
Section one of the book addresses the contribution animals make to the process of 
scientific identity formation, and covers some historical ground here.123 However, the 
historical approach is rather superficial and lacks the use of primary sources, instead, the 
authors draw on existing secondary scholarship to sketch out the historical development 
of animal experimental science. Section two discusses how students are trained to 
become scientists and the educational programmes and culture surrounding such an 
endeavour. They use empirical evidence collected form Arluke’s previous ethnographic 
fieldwork in laboratories and American middle school science classes, as well as field 
notes from scientific conferences and interviews with laboratory workers.124 Birke et al in 
this section claim that ‘any student wanting to do science for its own sake, or as a 
prerequisite to doing medicine, must come to terms with practices such as dissection’.125 
Here the argument is about enculturation into science through scientific training. Section 																																																								
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three of the book addresses the broader structural concerns regarding animal 
experimentation such as government regulation in both the United States and Britain. 
The section also addresses the attitude formations of the general public, and 
antivivisection groups.   
 
The book concludes by saying that ‘we doubt we have done full justice to the complexity 
of “animals”, “scientists”, or “publics”, nor more importantly, to the interrelations 
between these’. This is a valid point, as this book undoubtedly furnishes the reader with 
an insight into identity formation in laboratory animal science, yet it appears to neglect 
the historical and gendered nature of science despite outlining a brief historical timeline 
at the beginning of the book. Nevertheless, the mid-twentieth century is left out of their 
benign historical overview, despite devoting an entire chapter to standardisation of 
laboratory animals – which as we shall see in the forthcoming chapters, began in the mid-
twentieth century in order to address issues of “animal welfare” in the laboratory. 
 
If not historical, Birke, Arnold’s and Michael’s work undoubtedly addresses some of the 
key issues raised in this thesis. Birke’s feminist work on the gendered nature of science, 
and her discussions concerning the methodological technique and epistemological 
premise of the sciences that use animals as experimental test subjects, are the key 
influential aspects for this work. 
 
Historical Work 
 
Whilst feminist animal studies and sociological approaches to laboratory animal science 
provide the analytical tools to aid understanding of human-animal relations in the 
laboratory, they lack historical depth and detail. There are very few studies concerned 
with mid-twentieth century British science.  Yet at the same time, animal history as whole 
is becoming more prominent, with a large collection of work emerging within this area in 
recent years.126  
 
In terms of histories of laboratory human-animal relations, there are extremely few. As 
we will see in the forthcoming chapters, studies concerned with vivisection and animal 																																																								
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experimentation is mainly devoted to the nineteenth century or before. As the animal 
historian Jonathan Burt argues: 
 
We have not to date been particularly well served by the history of animals in the 
twentieth century… [and] sometimes it seems as if there is a gap between the 
death of Queen Victoria and the arrival of Peter Singer…Key areas that redefine 
human-animal encounters in the twentieth century, are still underexplored.127 
 
It is pertinent to assume, following Burt, that the historiography of this particular period 
is sparse. Other than the extremely influential work of Donna Haraway (who will be 
discussed shortly), mid-twentieth century British animal experimentation science has not 
been the subject of much scrutiny. The scholarship which is relevant to this thesis, and is 
discussed in chapter five of this thesis, is of Robert Kirk.128 Kirk has addressed human-
animal relations in the laboratory in mid-twentieth century Britain, but he does not 
address issues of gender, that from my analysis of the primary source material, seem 
quite obvious and important to the structuring of relations in the laboratory during this 
period. His work lacks critical depth in terms of taking an intersectional approach, but 
nevertheless is pertinent to, and has informed, my research.  
 
On the American side, historian of science Karen Rader has written about the early to 
mid-twentieth century biological sciences in the United States, using mice as the major 
protagonists in the story. Her book Making Mice: Standardising Animals For American 
Biomedical Research, 1900-1955 contributes to this small field of early to mid-twentieth 
century animal histories.129 She focuses on major human actors in the field during this 
time, including the famous mouse geneticist and founder of the Jackson Memorial 																																																								
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Laboratory, C.C. Little and the role he played in promulgating mice as being the sin qua 
non of experimental “tools”.  
 
Rader documents the social, economic and political circumstances of the use of mice in 
biology laboratories across the United States saying: 
How researchers and their constituencies determine what scientific things – 
objects, methods, theories – can be taken for granted reveals something very 
important about the nature of their work, as well as about received cultural 
values. My hope is that by returning to a time when the existence and use of 
these creatures first took shape, especially to Little’s prescient vision of mouse 
use, we may learn more about how human agency shapes the course of science. 
In this way, we can better appreciate scientific knowledge obtained from mice for 
what it is (as well as what it is not) and perhaps even begin envisioning new ways 
to make biomedical science a liveable and workable space for all animals – 
human and nonhuman – to inhabit.130 
 
Evidently, Rader takes a methodological stance that is plural, with a focus on 
biographical, institutional and intellectual histories. She has visited laboratories as well as 
archives during the course of her research, as well as taking oral histories from those 
scientists who had contact with Little at the time. Yet, this prevents her ideas from 
having any form of political advocacy. She places to one side the question and condition of 
the nonhuman animal (mice) in her work, which most ecofeminists would address.  
 
Her writing is incredibly detailed, with a wealth of primary evidence to substantiate her 
claims. The narrative is enticing and systematically organised around time periods in the 
twentieth century. But one cannot help but feel that this is a safe piece of work, which 
lacks criticality, as she herself writes, ‘my interest in documenting how standardised 
laboratory animals came to be is both academic and political, but not condemnatory’.131 
Perhaps the most potent and politically critical aspect of her work is in the chapter on 
the use of mice and rodents as comparative organisms to the survivors of the nuclear 
bombing of Japan by the United States which brought an end to the Second World 
War.132 Here she makes international links with scientific nuclear endeavours in Britain 
and the political and institutional conjunctions of the United States government with 
Little’s mouse work in relation to radiation effects on male mice, the production of 
sperm and comparisons to male humans under such circumstances, namely Japanese 																																																								
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bomb survivors. Here mice were taken as a substitute for these survivors as ‘the “human 
experiment’ [atomic radiation] could not, practically and ethically, be repeated, and 
researchers had good dosimetry estimates for the amount of radiation received by 
Japanese survivors’.133 
 
At this point an intersectional analysis involving animals, race and gender may have been 
appropriate to emphasise post-war power relations. Nevertheless, Rader’s work is 
historically important for animal studies and for the history of science, as it focuses on a 
particular species of animal, rather than take a generalised purview of animal 
experimentation.  
 
As mid-twentieth century history and more specifically British animal history is rare, this 
section will instead discuss the broader historical studies. These, on the one hand, are 
influential to this work; on the other, I hope, with my work, to add to this body of 
existing knowledge by extending it to mid-twentieth century Britain. 
 
Broader Animal Histories 
 
There are a wealth of animal histories dedicated to addressing the nonhuman in history 
and more relevantly, animal experimentation in the nineteenth century. As previously 
stated, these are dealt with in the forthcoming chapters. The most prominent scholars 
with respect to this are Harriet Ritvo, Nicolas Rupke and Hilda Kean. On a more general 
level, and adding to the growing work of animal historians is Dorothee Brantz’s edited 
collection of animal histories covering topics such as wild animals, urban and rural 
animal histories and animals in ‘the service’ of society. Other edited historical collections 
include Linda Kalof’s Looking at Animals in Human History and Randy Malamud’s Cultural 
History of Animals in the Modern Age.134  The animal historian and literary scholar Erica 
Fudge is the most prominent scholar of British animal history, but her work focuses on 
																																																								
133 Ibid. p. 228. 
134 Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age (London, UK: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 1990), Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800 
(London, UK: Reaktion Books Ltd, 1998), Linda Kalof, Looking at Animals in Human History 
(London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2007), Dorothee Brantz, ed., Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and 
the Study of History (Virginia: Univeristy of Virginia Press, 2010), Randy Malamud, Volume 6: A 
Cultural History of Animals in the Modern Age (1920-2000), ed. Linda Kalof and Brigitte Resl, A 
Cultural History of Animlas (Oxford: Berg, 2011). 
	 48	
the Renaissance period and she has not undertaken historical work on the twentieth 
century, or the topic area of vivisection.135 
 
For an historical overview of Britain’s changing relations to nature in the early modern 
period, Keith Thomas’ book Man and The Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 
1500-1800 dedicates two chapters to human-animal relations, including the development 
of ideas of compassion rather than cruelty towards animals in this period.136 Thomas 
argues that major changes in the relationship between humans and animals occurred in 
England between 1500-1800. Attitudes towards animals, he contends, changed from 
being anthropomorphic and religiously informed, to a more sentimentalised view, which 
took hold in the late eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. The reason for this change in 
attitude was twofold: the Enlightenment and urbanisation. 137  One the one hand 
Enlightenment values undermined the theological and anthropocentric view of human 
beings being the centre of God’s creation.  And on the other, with the emergence of 
natural history, biology, geology etc, brought in classificatory theories between species 
that emphasised our differences and also highlighted, via Darwin’s theory on evolution, 
our similarities with other species:138 
 
What was important about the early modern naturalists was that they developed a 
novel way of looking at things, a new system of classification and one which was 
more detached, more objective, less man-centred than that of the past…By 1800 
it was possible to regard plants and animals in a light which was very different 
from the anthropocentric version of earlier times.139 
 
There is no doubt regarding Thomas’ claims about the changing views of the world 
during the course of the Enlightenment period. The advent of many of the sciences such 
as natural history and biology, undoubtedly changed the way humans came to view and 
treat nonhuman animals. However, Thomas’ work is a broad brush-stroke account 
detailing the entire period, where a focus on one particular aspect may have given his 
scholarship more depth, rather than breadth. Further, he lacks an analysis of the 																																																								
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relationship between the shifting power relations and their intersectional effect on certain 
groups of humans as well as nonhuman others.  
 
I would also challenge his claim that there was a historical abandonment of 
anthropomorphism. Despite changing attitudes to the natural world because of the 
emergence of the sciences and slow demise of the theological viewpoint, I would ask: is 
the turn to sentimentality in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century just another, 
more complex and many layered version of anthropomorphism? Even though the 
Enlightenment ushered in a new era of thinking about human beings’ relationships to 
human and nonhuman others, does that mean science can be left unquestioned, and seen 
as objective truth? As this thesis demonstrates, science is responsible for not only our 
current constructions of nonhuman animals but also how we behave towards them and 
treat them. Science is cultural. This is where we turn to the research of two historical 
sociologists who added to Thomas’ scholarship by theorising these changing attitudes to 
animals in two very different ways. Firstly, Keith Tester and his book Animals & Society: 
The Humanity of Animal Rights, and secondly, Adrian Franklin’s Animals & Modern Cultures: 
A Sociology of Human-Animal Relations in Modernity. 
 
For Tester, acknowledging the centrality of cultural and historical variations of attitudes 
towards animals is just as important as theorising these changing relations. Drawing on 
Foucault, he identifies the social context of human-animal relations in modernity and 
analyses power and discourse. Tester suggests that Western attitudes to animals are 
bifurcated into two different types of pro-animal discourse during the nineteenth 
century, by which Tester neglects to analyse gender in association with this growing 
concern for animals. And secondly, a rights-orientated discourse emerging at the end of 
the nineteenth century, but remaining dormant until the 1970s with the publication of 
Peter Singer’s book. 140  Moreover, he does not address any aspect of mid-twentieth 
century Britain, and claims that this this period was a time when concerns regarding 
nonhuman animals were marginal. 
 
Adrian Franklin follows on from the work of Thomas and Tester. Despite the title of his 
book, one should not be deceived, as the work neglects a huge swathe of mid-twentieth 																																																								
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century human-animal relations. It does not tackle the complex subject of animal 
experimentation at all. Rather, the book is divided into themes ranging from a broad 
discussion of human-animal relations in modernity to postmodernity, zoos, pets, sports, 
and agriculture, food and animal rights. 141  His work is highly theoretical, relying on 
Norbert Elias and his theoretical framework known as process sociology. This enables 
Franklin to theorise his historical study using the slippery concept of modernity. By 
drawing on Elias historical transformation of the concept of manners and taste over 
time, Franklin synthesises this idea to the emergence of a ‘growing set of doubts and 
worries about the violent and cruel treatment of animals by humans and the gradual 
containment and control of violence among citizens of the modern state’.142 Yet, despite 
this inventive use of Elias’ analytical framework, the work is heavily theoretical, which 
leads to an overall simplified conclusion regarding the state of human-animal relations in 
‘modernity’. Franklin concludes by saying: 
[I]n the twentieth century there have been significant qualitative and quantitative 
changes in human-animal relations: people now seek more time with 
animals…and the nature of these relationships has changed fundamentally. 
Second[ly], we can identify two paradigm states of human-animal relations in the 
twentieth century which correspond, approximately, to the social conditions of 
modernity and late or postmodernity.143 
 
Franklin goes on to assert that we have gone from a series of static relations with 
animals, with a relatively narrow range of species, for instance, animals were seen as 
objects in experiments, to postmodern relations, with nonhuman others. According to 
Franklin, in contemporary (postmodern) times, these relations are reversed and have 
dissolved the anthropomorphic treatment of animals, so characteristic of modernity.144 
For Franklin, the demarcation between modernity and postmodernity is ambiguous. He 
states that ‘there is no sudden switch from one to another so no date can describe the 
point of transformation, although most agree radical change took place in the 1970s’.145 
Using the writings of Giddens and his idea of late modernity’s turn to reflexivity and risk, 
he highlights how this had an impact on our changing human relations with animals.146  
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For me, this is problematic, as structural relations are highlighted more than discourse 
and power relations in the book. The more fluid and dynamic definition of modernity by 
Marshall Berman may have been more productive in his account of modern and 
postmodern relations. Berman highlighted the complex and inchoate nature of 
modernity, and with this Franklin may have been able to recognise that the descriptions 
of modernity and postmodernity help define each other rather than having any degree of 
historic linearity to them. This may have produced a more dynamic theorising of human-
animal relations, more dependent on inductively generated empirical evidence rather than 
his very deductive and theory-laden approach, which criticises the philosophical 
standpoint of social constructionism.147 
 
Science, Gender, Nature 
 
In order to remedy these shortcomings, one must turn to the creative endevours of social 
and cultural historians. For all the absences and gaps in knowledge regarding animal 
histories, particularly histories of human-animal relations in the laboratory, there are 
plenty of histories concerning science, nature and gender. Feminist historians of science 
include Carolyn Merchant, Londa Schiebinger and Ludmilla Jordanova.148 I also include 
in this section the research of Donna Haraway, as she is both an historian of science as 
well as a scientist, sociologist, psychologist, cultural studies scholar and many more! 
Moreover, she addresses the intersection of gender and animality from historical 
perspective.149  
 
The work of Merchant, Schiebinger and Jordanova, all have one thing in common: they 
are concerned with the masculine nature of science and its construction of gender over a 
certain period of time. Moreover, addressing the link between the denigration of nature 
and exploitation of women. Merchant’s book The Death of Nature can be seen as a 
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founding text of ecofeminist history. Merchant looked to the historical development of 
the sciences to formulate a radical critique of contemporary Western capitalist relations. 
Her intention in the book is to ‘examine the values associated with the images of women 
and nature as they relate to the formation of our modern world and their implications for 
our lives today’.150 Her focus remains firmly on the emergence of science as a hegemonic 
institution that shapes our perceptions of the natural world. She takes a broad synthesis 
of both ‘the natural and cultural environment of Western society’ at specific historical 
turning points such as the industrial revolution, mechanisation and conservation.151 
 
This anti-dualistic approach to the history of science and nature showed that both nature 
and the social could not be deemed as naturally separate entities. But, were in fact 
constructed over time via the ideologies of the very sciences and scientists that Merchant 
discusses. This was highly original at the time the book was first published, and paved 
the way for a host of other histories that documented the demise of nature and the 
exploitation of women at the hands of science. 
 
Yet, despite its commendable status, Merchant does have a tendency to universalise the 
impact of the scientific revolution on an infinite and static version of “nature”. 
Moreover, by generalising pre-modern society as one that was harmonious with nature, 
Merchant overlooks culturally specific aspects of the scientific revolution and its impact, 
instead opting for a simplified argument about the impact of science on women and 
nature. A more focused piece of work that acknowledges the cultural situatedness of the 
impact of gender on the construction of scientific knowledge would be Londa 
Schiebinger’s book Nature’s Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science. 
 
Schiebinger aims to ‘explore how gender [was] shaped by European science in the 
eighteenth century, and natural history in particular’.152 It is a book which tracks the 
history of the emergence of the biological sciences and how men such Francis Bacon and 
René Descartes participated in its construction, which consequently created a politics of 
scientific knowledge, that gave life to some living beings at the expense of others, namely 
women:153 																																																								
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Crucial to [the] story is that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
Europeans who described nature were almost exclusively male. Female naturalists 
were a rare breed, female taxonomists even rarer. Why were so few women?... 
Many have located the problem in women. Since the eighteenth century, 
conservatives focused on women’s smaller or less specialised brains, their raging 
hormones, or faulty genes. Liberals have wanted to improve women’s education 
and scientific self-esteem in an attempt to make them more “fit” for science.154 
 
Drawing on a wealth of primary sources, including the works of leading eighteenth 
century naturalists such as Linnaeus and Buffon, Schiebinger creates a series of narratives 
that explore the relationship between gender and nature, arguing that ‘gender was to 
become one potent principle organising eighteenth-century revolutions in views of 
nature’.155 Race also is a significant factor in Schiebinger’s analysis, and she presents her 
thesis by exploring a variety of sources from the time, demonstrating how race became a 
significant factor in scientists search for a distinction between people and “beasts”.156  
 
These taxonomies of gender and race are explored in depth and in detail, making the 
argument presented by Schiebinger incredibly cogent and powerful. What is missing 
from this work is the fact that she does not fully analyse the nonhuman animal in the 
shaping of gender by science. However, she does explore the emergence of the 
classification of ‘mammals”, and early primatology in chapter three, but the nonhuman is 
still rendered invisible in the work, as the focus remains firmly on the human. This is a 
prime example of feminist history writing, that explores the emergence of the 
construction of difference in humans via eighteenth century understandings of the world.  
 
This is also true about her second book The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of 
Modern Science. 157  The book address the role women have played in the creation of 
scientific knowledge and synthesising it with the broader social and cultural context of 
the time: the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.158 The book is separated into three 
parts.  The first examines the institutions of science and how these institutions acted as a 
conduit for the norms and values of society as a whole. The second part concentrates on 
‘women as historical actors manoeuvring within the gender boundaries prescribed by 																																																								
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society’.159 Thirdly, the book concludes with an examination of the biological sciences 
and how they have interpreted sex and gender, and how these scientific interpretations 
affected women’s professional entry into science.  
 
Her concluding chapter comments about the nature of femininity and more crucially 
addresses the role of power in shaping scientific knowledge, much to the detriment and 
exclusion of women. By addressing contemporary feminism, she manages to link the past 
to present day gender relations and notions of femininity and masculinity. Her 
concluding comments sum up the entire ethos of the book: 
We cannot give up a careful analysis of gender differences at least until they cease 
to plague us – inequalities between men and women (economic, political, 
ideological, and cultural) are still significant. I have emphasised the opposition 
between science and femininity because “femininity” represents a consistent set 
of values expelled from modern science. Science and femininity share an intimate 
history, shaped as they both have been by similar social, political, and economic 
forces. By burying gender in science, European culture lost part of its past. It is 
time to unearth that history; it is time to transform both science and society so 
that power and privilege no longer follow gender lines.160 
 
This may be so, but who else is bounded in these webs of power-knowledge? What other 
gendered beings need to be considered? The nonhuman animal needs to, and can be 
compared with that of women in science and “femininity”, as the opening quote of this 
introductory chapter demonstrates. Jordanova’s book Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in 
Science and Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries, is very similar to 
Schiebinger’s work, yet methodologically quite different.161 
 
Jordanova’s work is also concerned with the biological and medical sciences, but between 
the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather than focus on the professionalization of 
the fields, like Schiebinger, Jordanova focuses on the culture of science in relation to 
gender: 
The basic subject-matter of my work is twofold; first the extensive writings about 
and depictions of the differences between men and women, and of sexuality, in 
scientific and medical contexts; and second, the assumptions such writings 
contain about the gendered character of natural knowledge.162 																																																								
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 She explores the imagery of the specific sciences of the time, and discusses the broader 
social context that sustains the beliefs and ideas of such sciences. To augment this 
exploration into the culture of science, she uses a wide array of primary sources such as 
novels, poetry, magazines, advertisements and scientific and medical writings. 163  She 
seeks to analyse these primary sources using a Foucauldian methodology, studying 
discourses, rather than behavior. This enables a history to emerge that documents the 
power relations embodied in these discourses. Therefore, her work not only embraces 
historical storytelling but also is a cultural study, as much as a sociological endeavor. 
Jordanova is not ashamed to admit that her work, theoretically and methodologically, is 
interdisciplinary.164 And, it is this aspect of her history ‘of the body’ so to speak, which 
makes it particularly relevant to this thesis.  
 
Donna Haraway: Primates, Cyborgs and Dogs 
 
Haraway is one the most prominent scholars with regards to research into animals, 
women and the history of science. It is important then, to consider her contributions to 
the feminist study of the history of science and animal studies. She is one of the very few 
scholars who discusses mid-twentieth century science and its use/study of nonhuman 
animals. Her research spans three decades and she is one of the most prominent 
academics to emerge from the feminist movements of the 1970s. She has written a large 
number of papers and books, but the work that I am discussing here has been narrowed 
down to four significant bodies of work (chapter three discusses her methodological 
influence), Primate Visions: Gender Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science; Simians, 
Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, her book (shortened title, see footnotes for 
full title) Modest_Witness, and finally, When Species Meet.165 
 
In Primate Visions, Haraway pointed out the relationship between scientific humanism, 
the emerging field of primatology, gender and apes. Her grievance against humanism is 																																																								
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familiar territory for Haraway and through most of her work she tends to advocate 
feminist socialism.166 Yet, in Primate Visions, her main bone of contention is twentieth 
century primatology, addressing themes pertinent to this work, such as race, sexuality, 
gender, nation, family and class and how they have been ‘written into’ scientific 
understandings of nature in the western world. She writes: 
Monkeys and apes have a privileged relation to nature and culture for western 
people: simians occupy the border zones between those potent mythic poles. In 
the border zones, love and knowledge are richly ambiguous and productive of 
meanings in which many people have a stake. The commercial and scientific 
traffic in monkeys and apes is a traffic in meanings as well as animal lives. The 
sciences that tie monkeys, apes and people together in a Primate Order are built 
through disciplined practices deeply enmeshed in narrative, politics, myth, 
economics and technical possibilities.167  
 
And, it is through Haraway’s methodology and epistemological stance of science fiction, 
by using the SF signifier (narratives of speculative fiction, and scientific fact), that she 
treats scientific texts about the study of primates as narratives. These narratives reveal the 
intricate webs of power that people, monkeys and apes are enmeshed in:168  
In part, Primate Visions reads the primate text as science fiction, where possible 
worlds are constantly reinvented in the contest for very real, present worlds. The 
conclusion perversely reads an sf story about an alien species that intervenes in 
human reproductive politics as if it were a monograph from the primate field. 
Beginning with the myths, sciences, and historical social practices that places apes 
in Eden and apes in space, at the beginnings and ends of western culture, Primate 
Visions locates aliens in the text as a way to understand love and knowledge 
among the primates on a contemporary fragile earth.169 
 
Each chapter combines a history of science with a feminist exploration into the nature of 
the primate sciences and their development in the twentieth century. From the pre-
Second World War beginnings of the discipline to the advent of women primatologists in 
the 1960s and beyond, such as Jane Goodall and Diane Fossey, Haraway relates these 
scientific accounts of the ape to the broader political and cultural climate. By analysing 
the methodologies of the science of nature, she reveals to the reader a race, class and sex-
fuelled epistemology, which has implications for both nature and culture, animal and 
human. Her narrative at the end remains open, unfinished and multi-layered, for there is 
no teleological end point in the sf game of primatology.  																																																								
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Despite Haraway’s keen focus on primates, her later work shifts to the cyborg, which she 
already hinted at in Primate Visions.170 There, she discussed primates in space, and the 
American use of monkeys and chimpanzees during the space race of the 1950s and 
1960s.  Two particular chimps were her cyborg chimeras in that journey: Enos and 
HAM. Both named after the emerging military-technological complex of the post-war 
United States space era:171 
There could be no more iconic cyborg than a telemetrically implanted 
chimpanzee, understudy for “man”, launched from the earth in the space 
program, while his conspecific in the jungle, “in a spontaneous gesture of trust”, 
embraces the hand of a woman scientist named Jane in a Gulf Oil ad showing 
“man’s place in the ecological structure”172 
 
Haraway combined the cyborg space chimp with narratives of gender and science, that at 
the time were deeply entangled in Cold War politics and gendered advertising 
representations. Her next book thought was more of a celebration as well as a cautionary 
tale about the cyborg. 
 
Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature was first published in 1991, and 
seems more a manifesto for social change under Haraway’s feminist-socialist vision. 
Methodologically drawing on her sf narrative, she continues the history of the 
domination of nature theme in the twentieth century and explains in more detail what 
she means by a cyborg: 
A cyborg is a hybrid creature, composed of organism and machine. But, cyborgs 
are compounded of special kinds of machines and special kinds of organisms 
appropriate to the late twentieth century. Cyborgs are post-Second World War 
hybrid entities made of, first, ourselves and other organic creature in our 
unchosen ‘high-technological’ guise as information systems, texts, and 
ergonomically controlled labouring, desiring, and reproducing systems. The 
second essential ingredient in cyborgs is machines in their guise, also, as 
communication systems, texts, and self-acting, ergonomically designed 
apparatuses.173 
 
The book is comprised of a series of essays from 1978 to 1989, and in the first part of 
the book, she continues to draw on her work outlined in Primate Visions by discussing the 																																																								
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ways in which scientific knowledge is produced about the behaviour and social lives of 
monkeys and apes. The second part of the book address the many different ways of 
‘reading’ nature. From biological theory to classroom discussion on a women’s studies 
course, fact and fiction are entwined to demonstrate the inseparability of nature(s) and 
culture(s). Part three address the cyborg and a critical consideration of feminist 
conceptions of gender. Throughout her entire catalogue of work, Haraway rightly asserts 
that ‘this book treats constructions of nature as a crucial cultural process for people who 
need and hope to live in a world less riddled by the dominations of race, colonialism, 
class, gender, and sexuality’.174  
 
These two books by Haraway were clearly critical of patriarchy, anthropocentrism and 
the dualistic humanism that historically forms the bedrock of scientific discourse. To 
follow on from Cyborgs and to continue her opposition to this dualistic knowledge, 
Haraway now offers us dogs, or what she terms “companion species”. Both The 
Companion Species Manifesto and When Species Meet continue to challenge the patriarchal and 
anthropocentric epistemology she demonstrated about science in her previous two 
books.175  Cyborgs and companion species, she tells us, are not complete opposites, but 
rather they  
bring together the human, non-human, the organic and technological, carbon and 
silicon, freedom and structure, history and myth, the rich and the poor, the state 
and the subject, diversity and depletion, modernity and postmodernity, and 
nature and culture in unexpected ways.176 
 
In other words, Haraway is claiming that both cyborgs and companion species (namely 
dogs) represent complexity, ambiguity and contradiction, which in historical and 
contemporary dualistic frameworks are generally negated. 177  However, the main 
difference between cyborgs and canines is in the phenomenology of experience. Haraway 
emphasises the inter-relationality of experience between humans and nonhuman animals, 
dogs mainly in the Manifesto, and other animals in When Species Meet.  
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Haraway develops her version of inter-relationality through her appropriation of 
phenomenology and the work of Derrida.178 She explains that ‘companion species is a 
permanently undecidable category, a category-in-question that insists on the relation as 
the smallest unit of being and of analysis’.179 The emphasis is firmly placed on the idea of 
enmeshment between humans and nonhuman others and she gives stark examples to 
illustrate this point, ranging from dog genetics to dog agility and training. Yet, despite 
this and her following of Derrida in her refusal to place all nonhuman animals into the 
category “animal”, rather going for individual singularity, she still manages to 
instrumentalise certain human-animal relations.180 
 
It is the chapter on suffering in When Species Meet, which reveals the ethical shortcomings 
of Haraway’s potent philosophy of significant otherness.181 The narrative from Haraway 
is interesting, particularly in relation to this thesis. She discusses the subject of animal 
experimentation and here maybe even surprisingly for the reader, contradicts her idea of 
mutual ‘becoming with’, she writes: 
The animal caretaker [in the laboratory] is engaged not in the heroics of self-
experimentation (a common trope in tropical medicine histories) but in the 
practical and moral obligation to mitigate suffering among mortals – and not just 
human mortals – where possible and to share the conditions of work, including 
suffering, of the most vulnerable lab actors.182 
 
In the process of claiming that the laboratory worker shares the suffering of the 
experimental animal, she is actually denying? such suffering of the animal, and at the 
same time reinforcing the dominant trope (to use her word) of human superiority over 
animal others. Haraway is quick to point out that this sharing is in actuality an 
instrumental relationship done in the name of solidarity.183 She declares: 
[H]uman beings are not uniquely obligated to and gifted with the responsibility; 
animals as workers in labs, animals in all their worlds, are response-able in the 
same sense as people are; that is, responsibility is a relationship crafted in intra-
action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into 
being…Instrumental intra-action itself is not the enemy; indeed, I will argue that 
work, use, and instrumentality are intrinsic to bodily webbed mortal earthly being 
and becoming.184 																																																								
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This instrumentality defined by mutuality is not necessarily unethical, as she rightly 
asserts when she writes about relations of use to each other. 185  Yet, this argument 
becomes increasingly problematic as the symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships in 
the laboratory are difficult to disentangle. Ultimately, she suggests that any instrumental 
relation is unequal when it comes to animals and despite advocating mutuality, she still 
‘resist[s] the tendency to condemn all relations of instrumentality between animals and 
people as necessarily involving objectification and oppression of a kind similar to the 
objectifications and oppressions of sexism, colonialism, and racism’.186  For Haraway, 
therefore, laboratory animals are merely ‘tools of the trade’ whose suffering is, although 
not born symmetrically in the laboratory, still important for research. For Haraway this 
does not means that ‘people cannot ever engage in experimental animal lab practices, 
including causing pain and killing’.187  
 
Haraway then, reduces the animal, and human to instrumental relations. Yes, mutual and 
entangled ones, but the key is to recognise that ultimately instrumentalism is domination, 
hierarchy and control over others. Haraway’s analysis of animal experimentation falls 
short on critique compared to her earlier work on the history of science. She refuses to 
acknowledge the intersectional in the laboratory, and only does so in terms of utility. 
Despite this, her writings are incredibly significant for my thesis in terms of the historical 
location of her earlier ideas, and her sharp analysis of the social, cultural and political 
dimensions of scientific practice. However, much more is needed in terms of her latest 
ruminations on laboratory animals. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Several broad areas of literature have been discussed in this chapter. This includes the 
work of animal rights scholar Peter Singer and philosopher Jacques Derrida. Other broad 
areas of research include the contemporary ideas of feminist animal studies scholars 
namely Carol J. Adams and her research about the intersectionality of women and 
animals.  
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Even though literature concerned with human-animal relations in the laboratory is 
sparse, particularly in terms of histories concerned with this topic in mid-twentieth 
century Britain, and science more broadly, I have reviewed the current work related to 
this topic. This is mainly in the guise of sociological studies that embrace ethnographic 
methodologies. Animal histories that are relevant to this thesis include the work of 
Thomas, Franklin and Tester. However, the research here is either heavily theoretical or 
takes a broad-brush stroke approach. The forthcoming empirical chapters will deal with 
specifically relevant literature there, however, what I hoped to do with this chapter is give 
a comprehensive overview of the main influences on this work, whilst at the same time 
highlighting the gaps in the research.  
 
The next chapter focuses on the methodology of the thesis and pays attention to the 
interrelationship between epistemology, methodology and technique.  
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Chapter Three 
Methodology: Writing A History of Experimental Animals 
 
If we recall the quote by the animal historian Erica Fudge from the introduction of this 
thesis, the idea of writing a history of animals is one that should seek to ‘brush history 
against the grain’, in other words, to write against the human.188 Further, she argues that 
if we are to include animals in our writing of history, then we must question the 
construction of the categories human and animal. This is precisely what this thesis 
attempts to do, and it does so in a variety of ways: firstly drawing on the paradigms of 
social and cultural history (socio-cultural histories) with its Foucauldian inspired 
concepts; secondly, by looking at the work of feminist animal studies’ scholars; and 
thirdly, by drawing on feminist science studies scholars to articulate the gendered nature 
of scientific knowledge production. 
 
This chapter will outline and discuss the methodological implications of writing this 
piece of animal history. This is by no means an easy task, as the very discipline of history 
has always been firmly grounded in the human, and nonhuman animals have previously 
been perceived as being ahistorical entities, devoid of agency and therefore, not central to 
the study of history.189 Further, animals do not speak, they do not leave documents, and 
so the task of the animal historian is made even more complex. Yet the animal historian 
Hilda Kean succinctly addresses this issue, saying, ‘a different starting point might not be 
the subject matter, animals, per se but the historian’s intentions’.190  Rather, it is the 
choices that historians make when (re-)presenting the past lives of nonhuman animals, 
which makes their research animal-centred. It is not the case, as Kean goes on to state, to 
just ‘write in animals but to re-work given frameworks’ (my italics).191  
 
It is my purpose in this chapter to outline the methodological approach used in this 
thesis by following Kean, and re-working normative historical frameworks. Not only 																																																								
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that, I am arguing that the methodological imperatives of any research should not be 
mistaken for method. Rather, methodology is inextricably tied up with epistemology: 
what counts as knowledge, who produces that knowledge and how this informs one’s 
ontological and epistemological perspective. This has an impact on the outcomes of 
research, whether you are quantitative or qualitative in approach.  I am arguing therefore, 
that theory, concepts and method are bound together in mutually reinforcing ‘knots’, 
which presuppose how we, as researchers, write animal histories.  
 
But, this is novel terrain, as it is not common for historians to outline their methodology. 
As Simon Gunn and Lucy Faire state, research methodologies are not an essential 
component of the writing of history and ‘in large swathes of social, cultural and political 
history… dissertations, theses and books are written with barely a nod towards 
methodology’.192  However, Dorothee Brantz, animal historian and editor of the book 
Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History, exhorts historians to reveal their 
methodologies and notes:  
 
How we study them [animals] should reveal a variety of perspectives and 
methodological approaches. While that proposition sounds obvious, it is 
nevertheless worth noting because it has implications for both how we 
conceptualise animals and how we study history. With regard to animals, it means 
that we must always specify the sociocultural, economic, and political 
circumstances in which human-animal relations occur. We must also carefully 
chart the class, race, and gender relations that characterise human encounters 
with animals; and we must differentiate between diverse types of animals and 
their particular status within human societies.193  
 
Certainly, this chapter aims to answer Brantz’s proposition and outline one particular way 
of writing animal histories. Moreover, it is worth noting that there are several other 
scholars who have attempted to discuss the writing of nonhuman histories, most notably 
Erica Fudge in her methodological manifesto ‘A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History 
of Animals’. Here, she demarcates the writing of animal histories into three spheres, 
intellectual history, humane history and holistic history.194 All of these encompass a way 
of writing about the history of animals in Western cultures. From the way animals have 
been used to convey meaning, whether that is religious or scientific (intellectual), to an 																																																								
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analysis of the lived relation between humans and animals and their material significance, 
with the human remaining its focus (humane history). Fudge’s main argument, though, is 
for historians of human-animal relations to embrace the holistic approach to history, by 
which she means a focus on difference and how the categories of human and animal are 
the cornerstones to historical analysis.195    
 
Another animal historian, Jason Hribal, discusses the methodological complexities of 
writing animal histories in his paper ‘Animals, Agency, and Class: Writing the History of 
Animals From Below’. His work encompasses the methodologies espoused by social 
historians and takes a Marxist (materialist) approach to animal histories that reifies the 
more-than-human, class relations and their attendant power operations; and renders 
meaningless the question and condition of the animal, which is an important part of this 
research. 196   Other animal historians include Harriet Ritvo, Linda Kalof and Randy 
Malamud. However, these historians do not discuss methodological techniques in 
relation to their intellectually outstanding and relevant work, rather they unquestionably 
draw on the approaches of normative historical study.197  
 
This chapter will discuss the theoretical, methodological and conceptual techniques used 
in the writing of this thesis. The first section will outline the aims and research questions, 
the second section will discuss methodological pluralism by advocating an approach to 
the writing of nonhuman histories utilising the work of Donna Haraway and her notion 
of interpreting and analysing technoscience via a metaphorical game of “cats cradle”.198 
The third section will discuss the three main theories drawn on in this thesis. Firstly, a 
discussion on the use of social and cultural history approaches, particularly the work of 
Michel Foucault. Secondly, the use of the epistemologies of feminist animal studies in the 
writing of animal histories, centring the discussions on discourse and material-semiotic 
practices, and thirdly, the invaluable use of feminist science studies in analysing gendered 
human-animal relations in the laboratory. Method and sources will then be explained, 																																																								
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and finally, this chapter will discuss Erica Fudge’s notion of ‘historical empathy’ to argue 
for an ethics of animal history writing.199  
 
Aims and Questions 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the interaction between scientific 
experimentation on animals and the construction of gender in mid-twentieth century 
Britain. What I am proposing is a twofold analysis of the culture of science and its use of 
animals in its experimental techniques from historical perspective: firstly, how scientific 
research forms gendered power-knowledge relations through the use of nonhuman 
animals, creating subject-object binaries. Secondly, the idea is to analyse the 
intersectionality of animal use in science with that of the normative assumptions of 
women in this era, and consequently, the effects of this knowledge production onto 
animals and women.  
 
The questions being, not necessarily how animals are metaphorically positioned as 
women in scientific experimentation (although this is sometimes the case, see chapter 
four, and scholars Helen Longino, Carol J. Adams, Mary Mies and Vandana Shiva for 
example),200 rather I elaborate on and investigate the ontological and epistemological 
character of science, and the socio-cultural effects of this knowledge on both the animal 
and the human. In light of this, the research questions are as follows: 
 
• How is it that in both the theory and practice of science the nonhuman body is 
objectified, and how, as a result of this, does the animal body as object presuppose 
them as being useful for animal experiments? 
• What kinds of knowledge does laboratory animal science produce, under what 
circumstances and methodologies? Do the knowledges produced link to the 
exercise of power both within and without the laboratory? 
• Is the production of scientific knowledge through the use of animals gendered 
and what are the effects of such knowledge production? 
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Crucially then, these three questions aim to demonstrate power-knowledge relations 
between humans and animals in the laboratory, the gendered dimensions of these 
relations and the effects on animals and women as a consequence of this. It is here where 
we can turn to the overall methodological design and technique of this research. The 
emphasis is firmly placed on embracing the plural, in order to achieve a more holistic 
approach to animal histories. 
 
Methodological Pluralism: Playing Cat’s Cradle with Donna Haraway 
 
The methodological technique of this thesis is very much grounded in the qualitative 
research tradition through the use of historical documents. Qualitative research 
foregrounds the subjective experience of the researched and aims to generate in-depth, 
personal experiences and stories of the social world. This research strategy emphasises 
words rather than numbers and statistics, it is inductive in its approach and emphasises 
the experiential and reflexive. 201  With regards to the historical approach, documents 
become the central focus of concern, rather than individual research participants (see 
methods section below). Qualitative research does not usually use the deductive model, 
whereby there is an a priori dependence on theory and hypotheses testing.202 Quantitative 
historical methods usually use numbers and statistics to depict certain historical events;203 
this approach has been abjured in this research due to the nature of the topic, its aims 
and questions. Instead, the technique is firmly grounded in the qualitative and advocates 
methodological pluralism, drawing on the ideas promulgated Haraway in her 1994 paper 
‘A Game of Cat’s Cradle: Science Studies, Feminist Theory, Cultural Studies’.  
 
In this paper, Haraway argues for a plurality of approaches via the disciplines of science 
studies, feminism and cultural studies to analyse technoscience. By claiming that these 
three seemingly disparate approaches are interrelated and ‘nicely bounded’ together,204she 
hopes to create a methodological approach that is a ‘toolkit’ for a ‘constitutively 
interactive, collaborative process of trying to make sense of the natural worlds we inhabit 
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and that inhibits us’.205 Therefore, her aim is to ‘queer’ the natural in the hope to make 
liveable worlds. In other words, she aims for destabilising the normal. Her metaphor of 
the cat’s cradle helps to accentuate this notion of plurality, interrelationship and 
complexity:  
 
Cat’s cradle is about patterns and knots; the game takes great skill and can result 
in some serious surprises. One person can build up a large repertoire of string 
figures on a single pair of hands; but the cat’s cradle figures can be passed back 
and forth on hands of several players, who add new moves in the building of 
complex patterns.206 
 
For Haraway, the game of cat’s cradle is a metaphor for the use of more than one 
approach in research, to recognise the complexity of the worlds we inhabit and, as she 
says, those we ‘inhibit’.  To be able to do this, we must understand technoscience in order 
to change it and our relationship to the “natural”, and to do this is to embrace plurality 
and ‘knot’ together approaches in order to address the destructive impulses of 
technoscience.207 
 
 I follow Haraway in her call to dispense with the singularity of approach by eschewing 
the view that research should be definite and have a limited set of processes. Historically, 
nothing is linear, straightforward and clear. Rather, this thesis aims to highlight the 
complex entanglements between animals, science, gender and the broader socio-cultural 
milieu. The stories told in this thesis will not be distinct or clear cut, but rather 
kaleidoscopic, diffuse and unspecific. I am not expecting single answers but hope to 
capture the textured world of animal experimentation in mid-twentieth century Britain. 
This ‘messy’ approach abjures the linear and teleological, and by drawing on a variety of 
approaches, I argue, can enable a more holistically grounded thesis to emerge. Following 
Haraway, each seemingly disparate approach can contribute to a more thorough analysis 
as ‘each of them does indispensable work for the project of dealing with sites of 
transformation, heterogeneous complexity, and complex objects’.208 This is particularly so 
in relation to rendering visible the nonhuman animal, so that one can attend: 
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[T]o the differently situated human and nonhuman actors and actants that 
encounter each other in interactions that materialise worlds in some forms rather 
than others… These are the worlds in which the axes of the technical, organic, 
mythic, political, economic, and textual intersect in optically and gravitationally 
dense nodes that function like wormholes to cast us into the turbulent and barely 
charted territories of technoscience.209  
 
This “messy” approach advocated by Haraway is used as a model in this research, and 
hopes to show forms of entanglements and co-constitutive relationships between 
disciplines in order to explain and analyse the sources. My intention is that these three 
approaches mark a collaborative process of trying to make sense of the interactions 
between animals, science and gender in mid-twentieth century Britain.  
  
 
 
Making Visible the More-Than-Human: A Triangulated Approach To Animal 
Histories  
 
As discussed above, in order to write a history that makes the presence of the nonhuman 
animal its focus, I have embraced Haraway’s version of methodological pluralism. As she 
argues, ‘what counts as human and as nonhuman is not given by definition, but only by 
relation, by engagement in situated, worldly encounters, where boundaries take shape 
and categories sediment’.210 If then, we are to rewrite historical frameworks, as Kean 
would have it, in order to do animal history (see above),211 then it means we have to draw 
on past approaches if we are to situate animal histories within a broader political context.  
 
This very postmodern approach to historical methodology can be seen to provide a more 
comprehensive historical analysis of a given phenomenon.212 Further, these approaches, 
(or paradigms) for studying historical phenomenon are inextricably tied to the theoretical 
structuring of ways of constructing narratives of the past.213 Paradigms, theories and 
concepts are mutually reinforcing and provide us with a ‘roadmap’ to answer the research 
questions posed. The three approaches are used, not as a means of refining a theory or 
set of concepts about a past event, but rather deployed when and where appropriate, in 																																																								
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order to illuminate a particular event or context in animal experimentation history. 
Firstly, we turn to social and cultural history as a way of situating this thesis. These 
provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for representing the nonhuman animal 
in history. 
 
Social and Cultural History 
 
The methodological premise of social history is to write a ‘history from below’. David 
Hitchcock outlines what a ‘history from below’ is: 
 
‘[H]istory from below’ is history which preserves, and which foregrounds, the 
marginalised stories and experiences of people who, all else being equal, did not 
get chance to author their own story. History from below tries to redress that 
most final, and brutal, of life’s inequalities: whether or not you are forgotten.214 
 
Where Hitchcock outlined the necessity of doing a history from below for human 
animals, I am advocating a social and cultural history of the nonhuman and its many 
intersections of oppressions. These collective tales of animal experimentation aim to 
describe and explain these often-missed actors in history, and their usefulness in 
developing and contributing to the emergence of gendered norms and values in society. 
Previously, the scholarship emerging from social and cultural histories used gender, race 
and/or class as key conceptual forms of analysis;215 this thesis extends the work of social 
and cultural histories as such, to include nonhuman animals as an important dimension 
to the study of history.  
 
It seems appropriate then, at this point, to describe what I mean by a social and cultural 
history, and its relationship to this thesis. It has been argued by many historians that 
social and cultural histories have always been related to each other, whilst emphasising 
different elements of the historical world in different ways.216In fact, the two can be 
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combined to form ‘socio-cultural histories’.217Accordingly, social histories describe the 
structural/material dimension of the past, that which informs class relations and focus 
on the description of the behavioural characteristics of different social groups.218 One of 
the most famous social historians was E.P. Thompson; his book The Making of the English 
Working Class, documented the economic, political and cultural processes necessary for 
the formation of social class.219  On the other hand, cultural history deals with what 
historian Paula Fass calls the ‘liminal experiences’ of people, and unlike social history, 
focuses on describing the uniqueness of individuals.220  
 
Cultural historians’ epistemology is very much within the postmodern/post-structuralist 
camp, with its emphasis on language, deconstruction and the fluidity rather than fixity of 
experience.221 In other words, social history is the materialist approach to a ‘history from 
below’ and draws heavily on Marxian concepts to elucidate patterns of working class 
social life. Cultural history, on the other hand, deals with power, discourses and 
representations.222 In this thesis I am avoiding the fixity of the social and the individual 
that is implied in the writing of a social history and drawing on cultural historical 
methodologies in order to write a history from below that negates social history’s 
(original) humanist intentions.223 In order to do this I have turned to the work of Michel 
Foucault and his ideas about the relationship between power and knowledge. 
 
Michel Foucault, Animals and Power  
 
This thesis will show that historical records exist which document different ways of 
knowing about the nonhuman animal. Acknowledging that animals are part and parcel of 
history, can challenge conventional ways of not only doing history but also disrupt 
normative ways of seeing the world.224 This research does not aim for generalisation, nor 
presume that the past is inherently connected to the scientific use of animals in the 
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present. It rather, problematizes the idea of ‘truth’ about animals, and recognises that 
there are different ways of knowing about animals, which are all historically, socially and 
culturally specific. 
 
Michel Foucault’s scholarship fits neatly within the socio-cultural history paradigm, for it 
eschews the fixity of the human and nonhuman relations, and acknowledges the 
instability of such a category, while addressing power-knowledge claims.225 With this in 
mind, Foucault has informed this research in three ways. Firstly, with his ideas about 
control over bodies by various social institutions, 226 this is especially pertinent to the 
concepts used in this thesis to discuss human-animal relations in the laboratory. In 
Discipline and Punish Foucault outlines this idea of control over bodies. He claimed that 
social institutions such as the schools, prisons, factories and hospitals were all similar in 
their production of ‘docile bodies’. This was through both the spatial organization of the 
institution and through means of surveillance. 227   Secondly, Foucault historically 
addressed systems of classifications, through his idea of ‘regimes of truth’. In The Order of 
Things he dealt with categories and principles organizing knowledge creation in a given 
period, which he dubbed discourse.228 Foucault suggests that these discourses should be 
the object of study.229 Finally, this thesis draws on his concept of power-knowledge. 
 
To examine power-knowledge relations is to question the nature of ‘truth’ and 
knowledge production in specific scientific practices that use animals.  This thesis 
examines the power-knowledge that came to be understood as true in specific circles in 
Britain, at a particular point in time. What then, does Foucault mean by power and 
knowledge? It is worth quoting Foucault at length here: 
 
Power produces knowledge… power and knowledge directly imply one 
another;… there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not on the basis of a subject of 
knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but on the 
contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of 
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental 
implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformation. In short, it 																																																								
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is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of 
knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power knowledge, the processes and 
struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms 
and possible domains of knowledge.230 
 
 
Power in this thesis, draws on the Foucauldian idea of its inseparability with knowledge 
and notions of what counts as ‘truth’. This research aims to highlight the delicate 
interplay between power in a given society and the production of forms of knowledge 
through the use of nonhuman animals in scientific research. This is done by applying and 
extending the work of Michel Foucault’s theory of power.  
 
As Foucault does not refer to nonhuman animals in any of his work, the extension of 
Foucault’s conceptual apparatus comes in the guise of Lisa Johnson and her book Power, 
Knowledge, Animals. 231  Johnson uses the Foucauldian method of archaeology to place 
formerly subjugated knowledges into a Foucauldian framework of analysis. Using key 
concepts such as power, knowledge, and discourse Johnson analyses the use and 
regulation of animals in the western world, drawing on historical and contemporary 
examples. Further, she draws comparisons between the treatment of animals in western 
societies to other subjugated groups in history, such as slaves and women. 
 
This means that the research not only is a collection of tales about animal 
experimentation, which emphasises narrativity, but also identifies collections of 
discourses, which inform how we see the world. For Foucault, discourses are collections 
of words, which hold authority about what counts as ‘true’. The idea is to question the 
power of these words, and the rules by which such words are judged to be true or 
false.232 These discourses also relate to positions of power-knowledge, and which people 
have the authority to speak on behalf of others. As Johnson affirms, discourse and its 
processes of power ‘allows us to delimit the structure of conceptual space that is – or has 
been – our understanding of animals’. 233  This process is highlighted throughout this 
thesis, where discussions about the nature of experimental animals are emphasised, and 
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the similarities between institutional ways of knowing about the use of animals in 
scientific experimentation are observed.  
 
If, then, I am talking about how animals were broadly constructed in experimental 
research, and why they were, then one also must address the effects these discourses of 
power-knowledge had on nonhuman animals and if there are parallels that can be made 
between other subjugated groups at the time. In this research, I have addressed the 
gendered nature of scientific knowledge production and its implications for both animals 
and women. For this, Foucauldian inspired social and cultural historical epistemologies 
will not suffice, instead, feminist science and feminist animal studies have also informed 
the categories of social analysis in this thesis. 
 
 
Feminism 
 
The vertical relationship between researcher and ‘research objects’, the view from 
above, must be replaced by the view from below. This is the necessary consequence 
of the demands of conscious partiality and reciprocity. Research, which so far has 
been largely an instrument of dominance and legitimation of power elites, must 
be brought to serve the interests of dominated, exploited and oppressed groups234 
 
The basic premise of all feminist research is to give voice to marginalised and oppressed 
groups in society, with a specific focus on women. As the quote above by ecofeminists 
Mary Mies and Vandana Shiva testifies, the practice of research is inherently political and 
should take the ‘view from below’. This is closely linked to the epistemological stance of 
social historical approaches detailed above. Therefore, it is no surprise that the work of 
feminists especially in relation to animals and gender have greatly my ideas. This section 
will discuss the role that feminist animal studies and feminist science studies have played. 
 
Feminist Animal Studies 
 
Feminist animal studies are often seen as a branch of ecofeminism. Ecofeminism 
addresses ‘the various ways that sexism, heteronormativity, racism, colonialism, and 
ableism are informed by and support speciesism’.235 The aim of feminist animal studies is 																																																								
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to analyse how and why these social categories intersect, in order to ‘produce less violent, 
more just practices’.236 This makes the discipline inherently political, intersectional and 
animal-centred.  This thesis has drawn on many ecofeminists’ work, most notably Carol 
J. Adams, Josephine Donovan, Richard Twine, Carolyn Merchant and Lynda Birke.237  
What binds these scholars together and separates them from “traditional” feminisms of 
the past is the use of the concept of intersectionality.  This thesis uses the concept of 
intersectionality put forward by feminist animal studies scholars to account for and 
analyse the historical parallels between animals and women in mid-twentieth century 
Britain. 
 
Intersectionality 
 
Intersectionality’s emergence as a category of analysis can be traced back to the 
feminisms of the 1980s and early 1990s, as the consequence of an attempt to theorise the 
different ways in which the lived experiences of gender and race interacted to help shape 
each other.238 The term was first coined by Kimberle Crenshaw and appeared in the 
Stanford Law Review in 1991 in her article ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color’, which argued that being a Black woman 
cannot be independently understood in terms of being black or a woman but rather the 
two must be considered together and seen as mutually reinforcing.239 As feminist Ann 
Garry avers, intersectionality holds ‘that oppressions by race, ethnicity, gender and class 
etc., do not act independently of one another in our lives, instead each is shaped and 
works through others’. 240  It also incorporates not only axes of oppression but also 
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privilege. 241  It helps to develop strategies to deal with differences and connections 
between analytic categories and the lived experience of humans and animals.242  
 
This original strand of intersectionality remains firmly within the human domain, but I 
follow the work of the feminist animal studies scholars mentioned above such as Adams, 
Donovan and Twine; and extend the intersectional approach to the more-than-human.243 
By taking this animal studies approach it is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the 
developing body of work which helps to highlight the many ways dualism operates to 
form categories of difference between the humans and animals, as Twine states:244 
 
The animal studies approach to intersectionality, which is essentially to target the 
workings of human-animal dualism as part of a broader dualistic formation, 
argues against simply seeing various forms of oppression as forms of 
dehumanization. This points to a short-sightedness in simply aspiring for ‘human 
citizenship’ and instead advocates pursuing a more systematic questioning of the 
historically, culturally, economically and politically situatedness of the ‘human’.245 
 
By studying not only the various forms of intersecting oppression between animals and 
women, it also highlights the intersectional privileges of the ruling groups and hence, this 
thesis’ focus on animals and gender. As Critical Animal Studies scholar Jess Gröling argues 
that feminists ought to focus on the people and institutions ‘they don’t like’, in other 
words studying ‘up’ as opposed to ‘down’. This in turn has led to a paucity of research in 
the domain of the privileged, 246  which this thesis aims to highlight in terms of the 
laboratory practices in certain areas of science, as well as channel and give voice to those 
who can’t speak, the nonhuman animal and their histories. Thus, the concept of 
intersectionality in my research enables a space to be opened up from which subjugated 
knowledges emerge on the one hand, and on the other emphasizes the practices of the 
powerful. Therefore, the emphasis is on deconstructing power relations between groups 
in society.  
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Clearly then, feminist animal studies scholars advocate the intersectional approach to 
human-animal studies. Although I am discussing feminist animal studies and science 
studies separately, it is worth noting, before we move onto to the next section, that the 
two are epistemologically and ontologically linked. Yet, at face value, feminist animal and 
feminist science studies seem to be two discrete disciplines, the work of two major 
feminists, Haraway and Birke seem to co-opt both areas in their work on nonhuman 
animals (Haraway will be discussed in more detail below).247 Historiographically, feminist 
science studies have seemingly neglected to focus on the important role animals have 
made in the construction of gendered scientific knowledge. As Lynda Birke, Mette Bryld 
and Nina Lykke argue, and I quote at length: 
 
Three decades ago feminist work on science concentrated on women’s health 
and on critiques of biological determinism. Among other things, this determinism 
typically relied on parallels drawn between stories of animals behaving in 
particular (instinctive) ways, and gender-stereotypic behaviour in humans. 
Repudiating these claims inevitably meant that feminists tended to avoid speaking 
about nonhuman animals, while emphasising the social construction of gender, 
and human uniqueness. Meanwhile, the biological sciences have been a key focus 
for feminist science studies – the very areas of science which not only help to 
define what animals are, but also use nonhuman species extensively in the 
creation of biological knowledge. In that sense, then, animals have been central 
to how we have analysed science, yet, covertly so.248 
 
Birke et al argue that feminist science studies should take animals seriously. To do this 
they draw on Judith Butler’s notion of performativity for analysing interactions between 
humans and animals.249Birke et al emphasise the discursive repertoires that delimit the 
human from the animal, and how it relates to socio-cultural power relations.250 They use 
the term ‘animaling’, analogous to Butler’s ‘queering’, to suggest the linguistic structures 
and discourses, which enable  ‘the word ‘animal’ in its specific sense of being 
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oppositional to human’. 251  The key to this epistemology lies in its emphasis upon 
discourse and power: 
Linguistic boundaries can be maintained by humans in relation to animals…like 
queering, ‘animaling’ is a discursive process, operating between these 
human/animal conjunctions…This could matter in the case of disputed politics, 
such as disagreements between antivivisectionists, opposed to use of any living 
animal in research, and those who seek legislative reform, for whom definitions 
of ‘animals’ may be contested.252 
 
Therefore discourse and power are integral to problematizing the animal in the same way 
that gender has been by feminists in previous decades. Epistemologically speaking, the 
two feminisms interact and can be, if used appropriately, mutually reinforcing and 
productive. The two provide an intersectional methodology in order to help analyse 
intersectional social relations of the nonhuman and human.  
 
Feminist Science Studies 
 
Where feminist animal studies have been used to highlight intersections of oppression 
between animals and women in this thesis, feminist science studies helps to problematize 
gender as an historical category. Underpinning the intersectional approach is the 
willingness to acknowledge gender, race, class and species as social constructs but with 
very real material implications.253 As noted by Bike et al above, there are epistemological 
links between feminist animal and science studies, and this thesis draws on these webs of 
connection when discussing scientific experiments on animals and the gendered 
dimensions of such.  
 
Feminist science studies explores at the relationship between science, gender and women 
(race too has been added as a category of analysis), as Muriel Lederman and Ingrid 
Bartsch note, feminist science studies look at three aspects of the relationship between 
science and gender: 
 
[firstly in its] socially defined, gender role of women in society that impacts their 
access to a life in science, the socially defined role of women in science , and the 
gendered norms within the culture of science… Gender and science (in contrast 
to women in science) refers to the culture of science and social situatedness of 																																																								
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women, through which girls and women receive incompatible cultural messages. 
On the one hand, society has normalized women’s roles as females, with the 
nurturing and cooperative behaviors that his entails. On the other hand, scientists 
are expected to be rational, unemotional and, driven by funding and 
recognition… The associations between gender, science and women are 
complex, but their examination is crucial254 
 
The idea in this thesis is to acknowledge the work of feminist science studies scholars’ 
arguments about the nature of science and its practices and use these to inform my 
analysis of animal experimentation.  Feminist analyses of science address the broader 
socio-cultural milieu as well as analysing scientific institutions, the language of science, its 
methods and interpretations in order to render visible the masculine nature of it.255 This 
thesis will draw on a variety of scholars from this area including Ruth Hubbard, Evelyn 
Fox-Keller, Ann Fausto-Sterling, Helen Longino, Carolyn Merchant, Lynda Birke and 
Donna Haraway. 256   However, it is the work of Haraway that is prominent here, 
providing this thesis with more than merely the methodological tools to analyse historical 
human-animal relations. 
 
Haraway and the Material-Semiotic  
 
Donna Haraway has a ubiquitous presence in this research. Her work has been used as 
both a methodological framework, as well as providing me with useful conceptual tools 
for analysis of historical materials. She is a historian of science, a scholar of animal 
studies, a researcher within the discipline of feminist science studies; she is an academic 
of cultural studies, anthropology, sociology and even psychology. Donna Haraway’s work 
is everything and something specific at the same time. She refutes categorization and is 
most certainly an advocate of interdisciplinarity. In this thesis she has informed my work 
from the feminist animal and science studies perspective, especially in terms of my own 
epistemological and ontological stance in this research.  
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In her paper ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d 
Others’, she discusses the necessity of accounting for the materiality of discourse. 
Haraway calls this epistemological approach the material-semiotic, and she uses it: 
[T]o highlight the object of knowledge as an active part of the apparatus of 
bodily production, without ever implying immediate presence of such objects or, 
what is the same thing, their final or unique determination of what can count as 
objective knowledge of a biological body at a particular historical juncture. 
…"Objects" like bodies do not pre-exist as such. Similarly, "nature" cannot pre-
exist as such, but neither is its existence ideological. Nature is a commonplace 
and a powerful discursive construction, effected in the interactions among 
material-semiotic actors, human and not. The siting/sighting of such entities is 
not about disengaged discovery, but about mutual and usually unequal 
structuring, about taking risks, about delegating competences.257 
  
Here, Haraway questions the idea of objectivity and calls for recognition of the discursive 
construction of nature (objects of knowledge), coupled with an acknowledgement of the 
material realm. Like Judith Butler, Haraway denotes the material and intimately links it to 
the discursive. In other words, there is no pre-discursive ‘body’ existing independently 
from language, but rather the material and semiotic are bound together in powerful ways: 
it is materialization through discourse, without breaking away from acknowledging the 
social construction of “nature” and/or objects of knowledge.258As Haraway puts it in her 
book Modest Witness…:  
Objects like the fetus, chip/computer, gene, race, ecosystem, brain, database, and 
bomb are stem cells of the technoscientific body. Each of these curious objects is 
a recent construct or material-semiotic “object of knowledge”, forged by 
heterogeneous practices in the furnaces of technoscience. To be a construct does 
NOT mean to be unreal or made up; quite the opposite. Out of these nodes or 
stem cells, sticky threads lead to every nook and cranny of the world. Which of 
these threads to follow is an analytical, imaginative, physical, and political 
choice.259 
 
In this thesis, I am committed to showing how animals, science and gender as objects 
and bodies, are tied together in knots of ‘knowledge-making practice… bodily histories, 
human and nonhuman actions… inherited narratives… [and]... cultural processes’.260 But 
how do I construct such narratives and tell such stories about these material-semiotic 
entanglements? For this I turn to archival documents.  																																																								
257 Donna Haraway, "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/D 
Others," in Cultural Studies ed. Lawrence Grossberg & Cary Nelson (London: Routledge, 1992  
). 
258 Ibid.P.  See also: Butler, Bodies That Matter. pp. xiv-xx. 
259 Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.Femaleman_Meets_Oncomouse: Feminism and 
Technoscience. p.129. 
260 Ibid. 
	 80	
 
Documenting Experience: Digging Deep for the Animal in the Archives 
 
How exactly can the nonhuman animal be written into the study of history? As Dorothee 
Brantz says, ‘writing the history of animals demands negotiating our desire to recover the 
historical lives of animals vis-à-vis the fact that all of the available records of those lives 
of animals have been produced by humans’.261 If Brantz is right, and we are then talking 
about representation, can this work politically recognize the nonhuman animal only 
through representation? If I am embracing the material as well as the socially constructed 
in this history, the material-semiotic, how do I account for the material presence of the 
animal in the documents and consequently this research as a whole? Erica Fudge 
provides us with an answer to this quandary, and it has echoes of Haraway’s notion of 
the material-semiotic: 
Animals are present in most Western cultures for practical use, and it is in use – 
in the material relation with the animal – that representation must be grounded. 
Concentration on pure representation (if such a thing were possible) would miss 
this, and it is the job – perhaps even the duty – of the historian of animals to 
understand and analyse the uses to which animals were put. If we ignore the very 
real impact of human dominion… we are ignoring the fundamental role animals 
have played in the past.262 
 
Therefore, the responsibility lies firmly with the human who has written about the 
animal, this then renders the past lives of animals historical and facilitates the writing of an 
animal history.263 The documents I have chosen and the re-framing of these into an 
historical narrative about nonhuman laboratory animals has meant that the material and 
representational (semiotic) lives of experimental animals have been made visible. As 
Kean notes: 
 
When social historians such as E. P. Thompson and [feminist historian] Sheila 
Rowbotham… chose to write politically engaged histories about working class 
women and men, they were not deterred from doing so by what was often 
regarded as a comparative lack of material written by the protagonists 
themselves. They were clear about their own role in writing new histories.264 
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It is here then that we can turn to the kinds of sources used to write this research, what 
archives were consulted and how I chose to interpret these documents. Furthermore, to 
respond to Kean’s idea of accounting for the role of the historian in embracing the 
animal in historical research, I will end with a discussion on research ethics in the guise 
of Fudge’s notion of ‘Historical Empathy’.265 
 
Sources Used 
 
The table below shows the archives and databases used and the collections looked at in 
this thesis: 
 
Archive/Database Collection 
Hull History Centre, Hull, Yorkshire The British Union for the Abolition of 
Vivisection (BUAV) 
The Wellcome Library, London The Research Defence Society (pro-
vivisection group),  
The National Archives, London War Office, Cabinet Office, Home Office 
Hansard, online Debates in Parliament and the House of 
Lords 
Primary Sources: Journal articles published 
in the time period covered 
British Medical Journal 
 
 
Other Primary Sources: Books UFAW handbook on the Care and Management 
of Laboratory Animals (1st and 2nd edition), 
Hans Selye books, The Stress of Life, 
Conference publications: Stress and 
Psychiatric Disorder, The Assessment of 
Pain in Man and Animals, UFAW 
pamphlets, UFAW The Principles of 
Humane Experimental Technique 
 
Effective research requires significant use of primary sources. 266  The archives and 
collections listed above comprise of a wide variety of documents that contributed to the 
shaping of the stories told in chapters three to five. Secondary sources have been used to 
aid contextualisation of the primary sources and help to answer the research questions.267 
I have drawn on government documents, social movements’ and medical bodies’ 
documents, books, pamphlets, conference papers, journal articles, as well as newspaper 
sources from both the broadsheet and tabloid press (these are used sparingly).  																																																								
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Regular trips were made to these archives. It is important to note that my initial ideas on 
the topic of animal experimentation soon took shape and became more focused once I 
had visited the archives. As historian Michelle King observes: 
We go to the archives not to find answers, but to articulate a better set of 
questions. Answers in the archives – in the form of documents – always abound; 
the real difficulty lies in figuring out what questions to ask of them.268 
 
My own encounter with the archives and the documents they yielded brought me to the 
realisation that how the information presented within them, particularly the government 
documents from The National Archives, was just as important as their content. I soon 
became interested in other documents that were linked to the initial ones I was viewing; 
this is what King calls the ‘archival matrix’.269 For instance, my initial foray into the 
archives was to look at Home Office files regarding the 1965 Littlewood Report (see 
chapter five), this soon led me to files connected to this one, where names, dates and 
places of apparent incidence or a particular event occurred, such as documents from the 
War Office and Cabinet Office. Subsequently, this then gave me a trajectory to follow 
concerning animals and war (chapter three). Once this occurred I set my limits through 
the scouring of the archives, and this was done via the topics that emerged from my 
‘fieldwork’. As King notes, ‘out of sheer necessity, we narrow our searches by using 
topical or other indices, or by selecting a series of chronological files to consult’.270 
Documents that mentioned specific named events such as ‘Operation Cauldron’, ‘The 
1876 Cruelty to Animals Act’, ‘The Medical Research Council: Animal Experiments’, 
gave me areas to start digging, shaping and focussing my research. Again, I quote King in 
saying ‘identifying one relevant archival document often lead back to a string of others, 
embedded as they were into existing bureaucratic paper trials at the moment of their 
creation’.271 
 
My trips to archives across the UK helped to shape my thesis, its time period and a series 
of focused topics to write about. It is the primary source that is considered to be the sin 
qua non of historical research, and for those historians who are ‘archive positivists’;272 they 																																																								
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are the places where ‘historical facts’ can be revealed to the historian.273 However, with 
the advent of postmodernism, the sources themselves have been brought into question, 
regarding their validity and credibility.274 This is called ‘source criticism’, and involves 
assessing the sources for their integrity, asking questions concerning the authors of the 
texts, who the texts were written for, their implicit biases, and the date and context it was 
written.275 Most of the time the actual archive determines the validity of the source, in my 
case The archives, and the archivists themselves have adjudged the authenticity of the 
documents they catalogue. 276  Secondly, to validate the sources I have used, I have 
introduced them in my chapters, including who wrote them, where they were from (i.e. 
Home Office), and the positions of those who wrote the file.277 Further in order to allow 
for ‘source transparency’, I have made extensive use of footnotes in each chapter, this 
helps with ‘linking claims and evidence back to specific sources and documents’.278 In the 
footnotes I have described the source, including the name of the person/institution who 
has written the document, the date it was written, the name of the persons/organisation 
it was intended for. Also, I have noted the name of the archive, the box number (if 
appropriate), the name of the file and its number.279 
 
However, there is more to ‘source criticism’ and the historical method, than the 
abovementioned, and the key lies in the interpretation and re-presentation of the sources. 
There are two points which I shall discuss in the next section regarding sources and the 
nonhuman animal. Firstly, the idea of the ‘indeterminacy’ of meaning; in other words, 
who says our interpretation is better and more ‘right’ than others?280 This involves a 
discussion about how to go about representing (re-presenting even) the past, and 
imposing some sort of narrative order on it. Secondly, how events discovered in the 
sources are presented as a story about the past,281particularly in relation to histories of the 
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nonhuman. This is discussed in light of the narrative approach and periodisation of the 
thesis. 
 
Analysis and Interpretation 
 
For me, to write a history of animals is to acknowledge the role of postmodernism in 
historical story making. The idea is to read for the animal. For instance, in my focus on 
biological warfare trials, to read for the animal I had to alternatively focus on specific 
incidences concerning experimental animals written in the documents provided. Other 
historians who have focused on the same biological warfare trials have not done this, 
instead, drawing on the normative reading of the documents and not the ‘alternative’ 
ones. I had to pay attention to what postmodernists call ‘ruptures’ and ‘absences’ in the 
texts in order to seek out the animal where they had burst forth into existence (see 
chapter three for an example of this concerning scientists’ disdain for the use of sheep as 
experimental animals), and where previously they had been made invisible in historical 
research.  
 
It is no surprise then that this reading for the animal in the sources means paying 
attention to discourse.282 As Fulbrook argues, we can’t escape from paradigms or our 
own implicit theoretical frameworks.283 Sources do not ‘speak for themselves’ but are 
rather coming from a ‘pre-interpreted reality’ that is based on the researcher’s own 
philosophical, theoretical and conceptual assumptions. 284  But, my postmodern ‘cat’s 
cradle’ of theoretical influence does not mean that I am purely viewing the animal as 
textual, and claiming that they did not undergo these experiments because, as a true 
postmodernist would say, nothing is ‘historical fact’. Rather, by embracing the material-
semiotic, being cautious of the role of the researcher and their implicit/explicit 
theoretical framework, the centring of the animal in historical research can open-up the 
discipline to new and multiple ways of viewing the past, as Fulbrook argues: 
 
Conceding that there is no single, unified ‘past as such’, and that many stories are 
possible, does not logically entail accepting that there is no way of saying whether 
or not some stories are more plausible than other, or that all ‘readings’ may be 
equally valid. Clearly there are issues of indeterminacy here; the historian plays an 																																																								
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active role in shaping, interpretation, contextualising, and even ultimately 
‘emplotting’ the story: but this story is developed as a series of answers to specific 
questions…which [in the end] allows the development of bridges between lost 
aspect of the past and diverse accounts in the present.285 
 
Animal historians, as noted previously, have also argued for the recognition of the 
importance of the role of the historian in animal-human historiography.286 This means 
paying attention to our intentions, and the choices we make during the course of our 
research, and more importantly in the sources’ interpretation and (re-)presentation. I 
hope that my intentions have been made clear, with regards to the ‘cats cradle’ of 
theoretical frameworks I have adopted in this research.  
 
The three theoretical frameworks; socio-cultural histories, feminist animal studies, and 
feminist science studies, have informed my research in term of the interpretation of the 
sources. However, how did I get from sources to a theoretical informed interpretation of 
them? This is more about modes of representation or form rather than content.  My 
procedure for re-presentation/analysis was similar to that of coding for qualitative 
interviews: identifying prominent themes in the texts and making connections between 
the events recorded in the documents.287  Moreover, presenting these themes derived 
from the sources in a coherent manner meant attending to narrativity i.e. addressing the 
form not content of the thesis. 
 
By attending to narrativity or story telling has meant paying attention to several aspects 
of representing the past, most importantly the ability to contextualise the themes and 
specific incidences collated from my archival research. As Fulbrook pertinently puts it 
‘the most tedious histories are perhaps those which make no effort to evoke a sense of 
context’. 288  By attending to the broader social and cultural context of the animal 
experiments discussed in this thesis, it not only provides atmosphere but helps to ‘set the 
scene’ and gives reasons as to why these experiments were being done in the first place, 
and therefore making the whole project more meaningful and significant.289 This further 
helps to avoid ‘the dangers of anachronism’ in the application of the theories and 																																																								
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concepts used to analyse human-animal laboratory relations.290 To do this, Fudge argues 
we have to keep the historical ‘worldview’, as she terms it (or broader context), our 
research is situated ‘to the fore in our analyses even as we acknowledge the nature of the 
worldviews we are using to help us to interpret them’.291 
 
Secondly, is the idea of ‘emplotment’, or the organisation of the narrative to aide 
contextualisation and delineate the major protagonists of the story. 292  Historians re-
present the past, and transfer the sources researched into viable stories for analysis, 
therefore, to ‘emplot’ or characterise the history as a form of literary genre (tragedy, 
theatrical horror even!) while not taking away its historical significance, has been one of 
the major aims of this thesis in terms of its shaping and form (not content).  
 
This idea of narrative form fits in with the overall methodological aims of the thesis (its 
content), as it does not only relate to my imposition of a story about the past using the 
sources garnered about my particular topic; but it also it has a great deal to do with 
paradigms and the theoretical frameworks drawn on. 293  Narrative re-presentation of 
sources reflect the ideals of socio-cultural histories and feminist approaches to research, 
as it allows for the details of experience of a particular group of people, and animals in 
my case, to be exposed.294 Moreover, it reveals the stories that scientists have told each 
other, and to members of the public, about animal experimentation to be revealed in 
what are called ‘narrative practices’ of that particular time period, and cultural context.295  
 
In other words it makes visible the stories people ‘tell themselves about themselves’ in 
relation to animals and their use in scientific research. This reveals more about the 
behaviour and characteristics of the nonhuman than just simply attending to a discursive 
representation. Fudge argues for a turn to the work of scientists and more specifically 
ethologists to help with representing the nonhuman in history, however this is inflected 
by the social and cultural values of the present, and contradicts her cautionary advice 
concerning anachronism (see above). 296 It is through emplotment and paying attention 																																																								
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to form as well as content that I am able to detail the experiences of the nonhuman 
animal, and re-present them as such.  This then enabled me to analyse the narratives for 
discourses of power-knowledge, and the intersectional nature of animal experimentation. 
 
Moreover, when paying attention to form as much as content, we have to pay attention 
to time period and chronology of the thesis. How to re-present the past meant attending 
to the chronological parameters of the thesis. In order to form a narrative out of the 
sources used, I had to focus my research over a particular time period. This is discussed 
below. 
 
 
Periodisation 
 
We have not to date been particularly well served by the history of animals in the 
twentieth century… [and] sometimes it seems as if there is a gap between the 
death of Queen Victoria and the arrival of Peter Singer…Key areas that redefine 
human-animal encounters in the twentieth century, are still underexplored.297 
 
As Jonathan Burt rightly points out, animal histories written about the twentieth century 
are particularly few and far between. The dates for this piece of historical story-telling, 
may seem at first glance to be somewhat random. However, as stated previously, my 
methodological standpoint is firmly placed in the inductive realm of the conduct of 
research. These specific dates, 1947-1965, emerged from my immersion in the historical 
sources. Initially I read through newspaper databases to get a glimpse into the popular 
stories surrounding animals of the day. I found the most interesting stories were on 
animal experimentation, and cases in the press about the USA and USSR space race.  
 
The representations in the British press surrounding the use of animals in space lead me 
on to reports in the press about the Littlewood Inquiry and the review of the 1876 Act. 
This then lead me to The National Archives, where I consulted government sources 
related to the Review, which in turn further lead me to Porton Down (chapter four) and 
the Medical Research Council (chapter five) and the Research Defence Society (at the 
Wellcome Library, London).  
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Furthermore, in terms of this chronological framing of starting in 1947 and ending in 
1965 as being guided by the sources, it should be noted that the date of 1947 was chosen 
for a particular historical reason. It was in 1947 that the first biological warfare sea trails 
got underway by Porton Down microbiological research scientists (see chapter four). 
This was the beginning of a whole new era of military research and scientific endeavor298 
through the use of animals. Britain was at the time still engaged in military combat 
abroad in Indo-China (Indonesia), and propping up the dictatorship of the Sultan of 
Oman.299 The Cold War was just about to begin with tensions raising between the USA 
and former USSR with the resultant threat of imminent nuclear fallout. Britain was losing 
its grip on Empire, including the newly independent country of India, and the spectre of 
the Second World War still haunted the corridors of Whitehall and its associated military 
departments and personnel.  I end in 1965 after the conclusion of the review of the 1876 
Cruelty to Animals Act, as it brings to a suitable close an important juncture in animal 
history. That of the review of the law and the precursors to the rise of the Animal Rights 
movement in the 1970s (which incidentally is beyond the scope of this thesis – see 
introduction for limitations). 
 
Therefore, it can be stated that I chose these dates for two reasons; my inductive 
research strategy, with the historical primary sources guiding my time period. And, the 
social and political processes of the day. This may be not a ‘traditional’ methodological 
strategy in the discipline of history, but this is not a ‘traditional’ thesis. And, it is 
important to consider at this point the role feminism has had in influencing the 
justification for the periodization of this thesis.  
 
Feminist Histories and Periodisation 
 
 It was feminist historians who first problematized the concept of time in historical 
research. The feminist Joan Kelly-Gadol discusses this in her 1987 paper The Social 
Relations of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of Women's History. She troubles the concept 
of periodization by arguing for the inclusion of gender as a category of analysis in 
historical research.  She contends that if one writes a history that focuses on the 																																																								
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positions women hold in society, and the status thus ascribed to them, this will transform 
the chronological purview of historical research,300 and the period being studied ‘takes on 
a wholly different character or meaning from the normally accepted one’. 301  This 
unsettling of historical periods challenges the fundamental way historians write about 
historical periods, although Kelly-Gadol does not include other differences such as 
species difference, she contributed to the decentering of fixed historical periods in 
normative historical research, which she claims is fundamental androcentric. 
 
This idea of feminist periodization chimes with Fudge’s concern regarding the writing of 
animal histories, as she claims that ‘animals have no sense of periodization’, therefore the 
writing of a history centred around the animal needs a very different way of organizing 
the structure of time.302 In that way, Hilda Kean argues, we are not just “writing in” the 
history of animals into existing frameworks, but rather the particular historical 
periodization, once centred around the animal, contributes to acknowledging the ‘animal 
presence’ so as to ‘disrupt and challenge conventional ways of seeing’.303 This thesis 
follows the lead of animal historians, Fudge and Kean. It is centred on nonhuman 
experimental animals, starting in 1947 when the first biological weapons testing was 
undertaken and finishing in 1965 with the publication of the Littlewood Report, the 
review of the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act. This periodization is grounded in the events 
that had an impact on the nonhuman animal; hence this history stems directly from, and 
is shaped by, the very evidence collected about animal experiments in mid-twentieth 
century Britain. It is with this structure of periodization, generated from the archival 
evidence itself, that allows for ‘dramatic new perspectives [to] unfold from [this] shift of 
vantage point’:304 
 
What feminist historiography has done is to unsettle such accepted evaluations of 
historical periods. It has disabused us of the notion that the history of women is 
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the same as the history of men and that significant turning points in history have 
the same impact for one sex as for the other.305 
 
Where Kelly-Gadol spoke about the role of feminism in historical writing and its 
periodization, this idea has been extended in this thesis to account for nonhuman 
animals as well as gender relations in a certain historical time period. 
 
Historical Empathy 
 
The final aspect of re-presenting the past through the sources I have used in this thesis 
relates to the role of the researcher. This is clearly not a history that rests on the 
assumptions laid out by positivists, their belief in objectivity and historical fact (naive 
realism). Rather, my research is firmly within the domain of the political and hopes to 
evoke empathy. This makes the practice of history ethical and the theoretical paradigms 
used in this thesis are used as political tools to (hopefully) help render visible the lives of 
more-than-human actors in scientific research. As Fulbrook explains: 
 
all historical writing is necessarily implicated, if not explicitly laden with issues 
concerning values, emotions, symbolisation, evocation; historians choose 
whether or not to write in terms of heroes and villains; they choose whether or 
not their characterisations should evoke sympathies for one side or another, [or] 
empathise better with certain viewpoints than others.306 
 
All research is affected by the values and emotions of the researcher. How I have chosen 
to re-represent this aspect of the past is as much tied up with my feelings and ethical 
beliefs towards nonhuman animals as a scientist writing a similar history to me would 
inflect it with their values concerning the use of animal in experiment. This isn’t a perfect 
history, as it certainly does not capture the full experiences of the more-than human 
world in the laboratory. Rather, as Fudge argues: 
Acknowledging the persistence of the human perspective, having an 
understanding, however limited, of the animals’ engagement with the world, and 
from that position continuing to write animal history…may seem like the best 
that we can do: after all, an imperfect history is better than no history at all.307 
 
This creates historical empathy, not detachment from the stories re-presented by the 
historian. To engage with the more-than-human in these anthropocentric texts, can be 																																																								
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achieved by using a plurality of approaches to help understand the experiences of them. 
Centring the history around the animal changes the narrative and its major protagonists, 
and further, allows the research to attend to the asymmetric power relations which have 
denigrated the experiences of the nonhuman and have previously escaped the writings of 
history. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has advocated the pluralistic approach to the writing of animal histories and 
the interdependce of theory, epistemology and method. Under the rubric of Donna 
Haraway’s ‘Cat’s Cradle’ approach I have promulgated the idea of the use of several 
approaches: socio-cultural histories, feminist animal studies and feminist science studies, 
and their associated concepts, to write a history that is animal-centred. These three 
approaches are the theoretical framework of my thesis. They form the methodological 
backdrop to the research. The technique, then, is firmly grounded in the use of a variety 
of historical sources, which have been re-presented in narrative form by the author. 
Narrativity has been used to facilitate the analysis of the documents for historic power-
knowledge relations concerning nonhuman and human animals in the laboratory. The 
next three chapters display this methodological approach. We start with the story of 
animal experimental science in Britain, 1947-1965, with an examination of the secret 
biological warfare trials that took place at Porton Down military research establishment 
in the late 1940’s to the mid-1950s. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Animal Experimentation at Porton Down: Britain’s Military-Animal-Industrial 
Complex, 1948-1955 
 
The funniest thing, according to J. D Morton, the scientific trials officer at Porton Down 
Chemical and Biological Defence Research Establishment in 1952, was the fact that 
monkeys could possibly have rights. In his narration over a grainy 1952 film about a 
secret experiment conducted off the coast of Scotland, Morten joked about the 
experimental monkeys. He highlighted the behaviour of one particular monkey in the 
film who was seen to be moving frantically about in his cage, and wryly exclaimed: ‘He’s 
obviously a political agitator, haranguing the rest about the rights of monkeys, though 
they're only paying casual attention to him!’308 This passing comment, made with a sense 
of humour, may seem odd to the contemporary reader. Where is the humor in expressing 
that monkeys may possible have rights? As the noted cultural historian Robert Darnton309 
claims, ‘[w]hen we cannot get a proverb, or a joke, or a ritual, or a poem, we know we are 
on to something’310. The perception of this event from a distance might serve as a 
starting point in understanding the culture of military animal experimentation in Britain 
at this point in time.  
 
Overall, this chapter is indicative of the broader aim of this thesis, as it explores the 
tenets of science in terms of the material practices in the laboratory and philosophical 
underpinnings of its methodologies. In this chapter I take one important but neglected 
facet of mid-twentieth century British science, that of military science and animal 
experiments. I want to explore this seemingly trivial and humour-filled relationship 
between the human and nonhuman, by focusing on the use of nonhuman animals in 
British biological warfare trials. Here, I shall argue that not only was Britain creating an 
immense military-industrial complex in this era in order to compensate for its loss of 
Empire and steady economic decline since the Second World War, but it was also 
creating a military-animal industrial complex311. This term is a composite of the military-
industrial complex, a term that has become popular in academic literature since its use by 
former US President, Dwight Eisenhower in 1961, and Barbara Noske’s animal-industrial 																																																								
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complex in 1989312.  To help elucidate this concept, I will be drawing on the work of Lisa 
Johnson and her Foucauldian inspired book Power, Knowledge, Animals.313 Here, Johnson, 
analyses power-knowledge relations in light of contemporary approaches to nonhuman 
animals through what she terms the discourse of law and the discourse of lines.314 I will 
be using this conceptual apparatus to illustrate Britain’s emerging military-animal-
industrial complex via the work of the Porton Down scientists and their experiments on 
animals.  
 
Sources and Archives: Britain’s Secret Military History 
 
I would like to make a brief note at the start of this chapter to signify the complexity of 
uncovering the primary source material used in the construction of this chapter. Not 
surprisingly many of these documents about the biological warfare trials were once 
considered to be Top Secret or Secret. The documents used and looked at, at The 
National Archives tended to be single government files containing several documents 
amongst other sources that were irrelevant. Or, they were a short series of documents, 
each containing particular incidents such as accidents or policy disputes.  
 
The policies, plans, reports, memoranda, minutes and correspondence in the documents 
used in this chapter were all written at the time under the auspices of The Official Secrets 
Act 1911, and produced at a time when a culture of secrecy permeated Whitehall and its 
associated departments and personnel.315 This made it illegal, until now, for government 
workers to communicate this information to the outside world. Yet, as historical 
sociologist Brian Balmer points out, the sources are still extremely insightful but they: 
Must be read and interpreted as official sources, frequently performing a 
rhetorical function within Whitehall, such as recording ‘in stone’ the final 
outcome of a more submerged and uncertain process of negotiation and 
decision-making, or trying to persuade colleagues of a point of view or course of 
action.316 
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So, reflexively speaking, my account itself becomes a form of revealing the secret or 
‘hidden’ histories of biological warfare and the British state. I have pieced together this 
story from a huge number of archival documents, many of which were closed until 
recently and not written specifically to create a historical record (for instance the detailed 
expositions on animal post-mortems after infection with a biological agent). Therefore, 
this account is just one window of transparency through which we can understand the 
previously withheld (Top Secret) activities of the British government.  
 
Legal and Linear Discourses 
 
The discourse of law outlines the notion of that which is socially, culturally and politically 
permitted in terms of animal experimentation, and helps create a reality within which 
animals become objects of scientific enquiry. Johnson asserts that the discourse of law 
conveys a language imbued with meanings that attribute a property status to animals, 
rather than constructing the nonhuman as a living being.317 It is this language that carries 
authority and power, and the people who convey this knowledge hold powerful positions 
that ascribe status and truth to their practices within the confines of law. 318  Law, 
government and military science in mid-twentieth century Britain were intricately bound 
together in networks of power-knowledge which sanctioned the practice of animal 
experimentation through the support of the law. It is this understanding of animal 
experiment law that leads to my next conceptual undertaking, that of Johnson’s discourse 
of lines. 319  Lines split the nonhuman body into parts, and this demarcation of the 
physical body of the nonhuman into specific parts constructs what is understood to be 
knowledge and truth about animal bodies (see figure one for example).  
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Figure 1: detailed cow butcher diagram showing the imposition of “lines” onto the animal body, ready for 
it to be cut into pieces.320 
 
The lines are abstractly placed upon the whole of the nonhuman body by the human, 
whether scientist or butcher, in order to dissemble it: 
While language itself partitions, the discourse of lines is a discourse comprised of 
linear objects superimposed upon abstract representations of a physical object or 
event. Lines themselves are not words. Words are used to describe lines, but lines 
are not words. The discourse of lines is one that conveys knowledge through the 
use of lines.321 
 
This conceptualization wrought by the discourse of lines is useful when analyzing the 
way that the Porton Down scientists created knowledge about the nonhuman through 
their post-mortem examinations, which will be explored further on in the chapter. This is 
also true when considering parallel discourse about the role of women at the time. The 
law positioned women as objects and, like the nonhuman, had the status of property, 
rather than as active agents in their own right (also see chapter six). 322  Scientific 
methodologies and the discourse of lines helped strengthen this normative construction 
of women, and as we shall see, the philosophy of science contributed to a discriminatory 
form of practice that subjugated women and animals, and which placed them in 
entangled ‘Otherness’. 																																																								
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This argument is explored in three parts, beginning with an analysis of the major 
biological warfare trials led by British scientists in the late 1940s to the mid-1950s in 
relation to debates about law. These trials were conducted at sea but in areas close to 
human populations. Thousands of nonhuman animals were used, infected with deadly 
pathogens, and killed in order for Britain to produce weapons of mass destruction. The 
second section shows how these trials reproduced discourses of power over the life and 
death of nonhuman animals, with a focus on the precise methodologies used for carrying 
out post-mortems on infected animal corpses. Moreover, I will be highlighting the 
intricate networks of power embedded in the very methodologies of biological warfare 
research practices. Finally, this chapter will end with a discussion about the philosophical 
underpinnings of the scientific methodologies associated with biological warfare 
research. I will be drawing on the work of ecofeminists such as Val Plumwood and 
Donna Haraway, and feminist science studies scholars, Sandra Harding and Evelyn Fox-
Keller, to elucidate the intricate and covert webs of power, which underpinned scientific 
practice in mid-twentieth century Britain.  
 
Previous literature 
 
Not many scholars have attempted to address the issue of animal experimentation in, the 
Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) at Porton Down, Wiltshire, 
one of Britain’s most noted (albeit ‘top secret’) military establishments. There are a 
number of scholars who have addressed biological and chemical weapons research at 
Porton Down but in the area of ethics and human experimentation, led by the work of 
Ulf Schmidt and Brian Balmer, and policy and politics of the CBDE and chemical and 
biological warfare more broadly323 with Brain Balmer, Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa and 																																																								
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Malcolm Dando taking the lead in this respect. The problem with this is that the focus is 
very much placed on the human experiments that took place there, with the very 
significant use of animals in the development of weapons of mass destruction mentioned 
only occasionally. For instance, although Ulf Schmidt dedicates two pages, two 
photographs and a graph to demonstrate the significance nonhuman animals had for 
Porton Down and their use in chemical weapons testing,324 he in no way addresses the 
social construction of animals within this complex and often contradictory terrain of 
military science. In fact, he insists that ‘in the immediate postwar period concern about 
animal welfare was regarded as of low priority, given the existential pressures to rebuild 
war-torn towns and lives’.325 However, as we shall see in the next two chapters, concern 
for animal welfare both publically, via the newspaper press and campaign organisations 
such as the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, and privately within the 
scientific research world, was substantial, with the likes of organisations such as the 
Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW) publishing key textbooks and 
papers on the welfare and housing of experimental animals in the immediate period after 
the Second World War.326  Furthermore, Schmidt’s work is ultimately very politically 
benign and fails to substantially challenge the historicity of power and politics, and more 
importantly, the power-saturated forms of scientific knowledge that led to the formation 
of the military-animal-industrial complex in Britain.  
 
The only attempt made by an academic to address the importance of research animals in 
the development of biological weapons is Elizabeth Willis.327 Willis’ paper covers the 
major sea trials in the postwar period that took place off the coast of Scotland and later, 
in the Caribbean. But, her work lacks much needed focus, critical insight and still 
positions nonhuman animals as secondary to the overriding narrative of the 
correspondence between scientists and various associated government departments. 
Therefore, this begs the question as to why military scholars fail to consider the essential 
role played by nonhuman animals in the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction 																																																																																																																																																														
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(WMD). Further, why is it that historians neglect and are reluctant to explore the very 
ideologies used by military scientists to justify their research on animals?  
 
In addition to this scholarly work there is a body of journalistic and popular science 
literature.  Much of this writing also focuses on the contentious and unethical human 
experiments that took place there during the inter- and post-war years.328 Furthermore, 
these works express animal experimentation as a necessary part of biological and 
chemical warfare testing. In addition, they fail to address concerns about the perceptions 
and use of the many different species of animals within the context of British chemical 
and biological defence experiments in this era.  
 
It is obvious then that most scholars and/or journalists will focus their writings on the 
human experiments that took place at this establishment. This included experiments 
conducted on humans for the testing of nerve gases and the hallucinogenic drug LSD.329 
Yet, until recently, the use of animals for and in war has been paid scant attention nor 
been systematically analysed.330 In contrast to the current academic and popular literature 
regarding CBDE, this chapter focuses on the biological warfare animal experiments that 
took place there from 1948-1955. It was during this time that policy-making decisions in 
government were made through the co-option of scientists and ‘experts’ in the fields of 
business and the military.331 They acted as key advisors to politicians in areas pertaining 
to the military, industry and medicine. Amongst those approached by the government 
department the Ministry of Supply (MoS) was Lovatt Evans, a physiologist and very 
vocal opponent of the anti-vivisection movement. Other prominent people who were 
Fellows of the Royal Society, such as Paul Gordon Fildes and David W. W. 
Henderson.332  Therefore, the state had intimate links with business and science,333 and 																																																								
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scientists became complicit in the decisions affecting the nation. With this in mind, 
money not only was directed into the welfare state, but also, into the creation of a vast 
military-industrial complex.334 Military science received very large sums of money that 
increased exponentially in the post-war period, with warfare spending accounting for 
over 30% of public expenditure in the early 1950s.335 Military spending needed large-scale 
investment into research and development (R&D) programmes.  This amounted to a 
£250 million investment into defensive and offensive scientific and technological 
research during wartime.336  Britain was spending a higher proportion of their material 
and financial assets in defence R&D than anywhere else in the world at this time.337  
Animals played a significant role in this and animal experimentation for biological 
warfare flourished. As shall be shown, the state and scientists worked together to 
compete in a bipolar world of ever advancing technologies that enhanced human health 
and welfare338 but which also threatened our existence.339 In this context, Britain created 
its very own military-animal-industrial complex. 
 
The Military-Animal-Industrial Complex 
 
The military-industrial complex comprises a partially impervious set of networks between 
the economic sector (industrial bases that support the military), governments and 
scientific domains in a given society.340 This relationship includes political contributions 
and approval for military spending.341  The term originated as a reference to the US 
military system, but as we shall see is equally applicable to Britain.342 With regards to this, 
David Edgerton’s account of the British warfare state, 1920-1970, is relevant. 343 
According to Edgerton, the historiography of the development of state militarism in 																																																																																																																																																														
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Britain remains sparse. Furthermore, ‘in all the vast commentary on the British state, 
there is hardly even an allusion to the ‘military-industrial complex’344. I posit, alongside 
Edgerton, that Britain in this period developed a vast military-industrial complex, albeit 
one that involved the use of nonhuman animals for the development of biological 
warfare. 
 
The concept of the animal-industrial complex invoked by Barbara Noske345 is used in this 
chapter to suggest that Britain created a military-animal industrial complex. It suggests 
that the ‘exploitation of nonhuman animals is natural, ethical and appropriate’346 and is 
central to the ‘total commodification of the natural world’ in the modern industrial 
system347. Noske identifies the roots of this complex in the ‘hyper-reductionism’348 of the 
modern (capitalist) agricultural labour force alongside ‘the mechanized and routinized 
slaughter of nonhuman animals, and the nonhuman animals themselves’.349 As a result of 
Noske’s analysis of the agricultural labour force, Nocella et al postulate the foundations 
of a theory in the guise of the military-animal-industrial complex.350 This includes the 
mass production of various weapons of war not favorable to human and animal 
wellbeing, but are nevertheless pursued and exploited in order to persist with economic 
interests in this area.351  The use of animals in warfare has a long history but one that has 
not been analysed from the perspective of the British warfare state. Firstly, I would like 
to outline the context of British warfare policy and research. 
 
British science and the State 
 
From the interwar to the post-Second World War years Britain became a nation that 
invested heavily in military science and technology352 . This increase in funding was 
twentyfold from the period 1938-9, to its peak during the Second World War. In relation 																																																								
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to gross domestic product, defence spending was three times greater in the 1950s than in 
the 1930s.353 This resulted in a science of war that encompassed the development of 
chemical and biological weapons, as well as the newfound atomic science in the form of 
the nuclear bomb.354 The Cold War ‘military-industrial complex’ became the new context 
for British science to develop in. As Edgerton has argued, not only was Britain entering 
into an era of state control over the welfare of its population, but was also entering into 
an era that focused on the development of a ‘warfare state’.355 
 
At this time warfare spending grew a great deal more than welfare spending, comprising 
over 30% of public expenditure in the early 1950s.356 This implied that military spending 
needed large-scale investment into research and development (R&D) programmes.  
Accordingly, this amounted to a £250 million investment into defensive and offensive 
scientific and technological research during wartime. 357   Incidentally, Britain was 
spending a higher proportion of their material and financial assets in defence R&D than 
anywhere else in the world at this time.358  
 
Specialist departments were created and these required more technical experts in place of 
the bureaucrats and politicians that existed in previous governments.359  At the most 
senior managerial levels military men had roles in controlling the funding allocation of 
R&D, as well as in supply of weapons, via the newly created Ministry of Supply (MoS) in 
1939 by the Chamberlain government. 360  These important changes gave the new 
‘technical’ experts greater power and influence at many levels of government; 
consequently many were appointed important ministerial positions. 361  Moreover, 
scientific state workers multiplied more than three times between 1931-1951.362  And 
scientists were called upon by the British government to provide advice on biological, 
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chemical and atomic warfare policy.363 This was an era where the role of the scientific 
expert shaped the development of biological warfare policy in Britain.364 From 1940-
1961, biological warfare research became one of the top priorities for the government 
and this led to the establishment of specific state controlled scientific institutions to 
develop WMD that could be deployed at short notice.365  
 
 
 
Biological Warfare and the State 
 
It was not until the 1930s that scientific concern about the dangers of biological warfare 
(B.W.) became a focus of attention in the corridors of Whitehall.366 It was in this period 
that the Government created a Sub-Committee on Bacteriological Warfare of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence to discuss policy formulations and military strategies of 
a biological warfare nature. 367  In October 1940, a British research programme was 
launched at Porton Down led by Dr Paul Fildes, a bacteriologist from the Medical 
Research Council (MRC).368 Fildes was given orders to develop a biological bomb that 
could be used instantaneously if and when the country was attacked.369 During the war, 
scientists at Porton Down designed and produced two key biological weapons: an anti-
personnel anthrax bomb370 and five million cattle cakes laced with anthrax to drop on 
livestock in Germany.371 After the war, the B.W. programme was expanded and the B.W. 
department at Porton Down was re-named the Microbiological Research Department 
(MRD).  
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In the post-war period state approval ensured the continuation of research into B.W. in 
peacetime, and more formalised advisory committees were established to supervise B.W. 
research and policy. One of these was the Biological Research Advisory Board (BRAB) 
of the MoS, who provided scientific advice on researchable biological problems in 
relation to weapons development. BRAB were accountable to the Advisory Council on 
Scientific Research and Technical Development of the MoS, and provided technical 
advice to the Chiefs of Staff Biological Weapons Subcommittee. This board consisted of 
a variety of experts from various government departments including people from the 
MoS, the Home Office and Ministry of Health, as well as independent scientists, the 
Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry staff.372 This subcommittee worked with the 
Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) on the strategy and technical aspects of 
biological warfare research.373  B.W. policy became a top priority and the DRPC soon 
came up with a set of objectives for R&D in this area including research into defensive 
aspects of war, how to store and produce B.W., and defensive measures to protect the 
population at large.374 
 
In 1946 Dr David Henderson replaced Fildes as superintendent. 375  And as a 
consequence, the research broadened considerably and ranged from basic experiments in 
laboratories, to open air trials of dangerous pathogens on land and at sea. 376 . The 
experiments conducted by Porton Down scientists included the use of thousands of 
animals and they even had their own farm, Allington Farm, which bred and provided 
experimental animals for the scientists for their B.W. trials.377 Most often these were 
guinea pigs, mice, rats, cats and monkeys.378 In terms of the B.W. trials, dangerous viruses 
would be released in order to purposely infect the animals and test their immune 
response to such pathogenic organisms as the plague virus and anthrax. These 
experiments were an indicator not only towards the thinking that surrounded biological 
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weapons and its position in the development of policies379, but also, as we shall see, in 
the development of the military-animal-industrial complex. 
 
 
Secret Science and the Mysterious Case of “Operation X” 
 
The testing of dangerous pathogens for potential military use had to be kept top secret. 
Only key Government advisors and military personnel could know about them. The very 
first post-war biological weapons trial was conducted from December 1948 to February 
1949 and codenamed ‘Operation Harness’.380 The experiments were to be carried out in 
the Caribbean, and dangerous pathogens, such as the anthrax and Brucella viruses, were to 
be tested on sheep, guinea pigs and monkeys.381 Despite the MoS and Porton scientists 
being sworn to secrecy, the British press soon became aware of this top-secret operation, 
and speculation about the secret experiments permeated the newspapers. Incidentally, 
the press did not suspect the testing of biological weapons at all, but rather, the focus, 
and concern was of atomic weapon testing. Even though the British press may have been 
wrong about the prospect of nuclear trials, they still developed dramatic narratives about 
animal testing.382 The weekly illustrated newspaper the Daily Graphic ran an article about 
‘Operation X, the Royal Navy’s first big exercise to discover the effect of atomic 
weapons’.383 Other newspapers were also misconceived in their notion that the Royal 
Navy was testing atomic weaponry; ‘Two warships are being fitted out as floating 
laboratories for Britain’s first atomic weapon experiments’384 exclaimed the Daily Express, 
‘The tests are to be held before the end of this year’.385 
 
Despite the journalists’ conjecture about atomic weaponry, they were accurate about one 
thing – the use of animals for scientific experimentation on board the Royal Navy 																																																								
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vessels. As reported by The Daily Graphic; ‘[P]ens have been fitted for rabbits, pigs and 
goats to be used for tests of the extent of radiation danger after atomic explosions’.386  
Consequently, as a result of the press coverage about the forthcoming animal 
experiments, the National Antivivisection Society, The British Anti-Vivisection Society 
and The National Canine Defence League wrote to senior government officials in the 
hope of preventing these tests being carried out. The British Antivivisection Society sent 
a letter addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty that made reference to the press 
coverage of the impending trials and the “animal complement”387 that would be used 
during the course of them. The letter condemned the use of animals in atomic 
experiments and compared the forthcoming experiments to those conducted by the U.S. 
during the Bikini Atoll trials on the Marshall Islands in 1946 and expressed the hope that 
‘[Y]our department will seek, by every possible means to find a method by which the use 
of animals can be dispensed with.388 Mr Tyldesley, the head of the British Antivivisection 
Society, concluded the letter to the Secretary of State (SoS) by referring to the 
experiments as a precursor to ‘this new kind of warfare’ in which he and his society 
hoped for some assurance that the ‘animals used… will not be used in such a way as to 
involve suffering’389. Following this, another letter was soon sent to the Secretary of State 
from R. Fielding-Ould of the National Antivivisection Society about the reports in the 
press of the proposed sea trials. Fielding-Ould made several points about the law and 
vivisection, requested a response from the SoS asking if the experiments were bound by 
law under the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 and asked that, if the trials were to go ahead, 
to ensure that the experimenters would uphold the “pain condition”. 390  The ‘pain 
condition’ formed a crucial part of the 1876 Act and guaranteed that animals that were 
used in experiments would not suffer unnecessary pain. The Act 391 was a vital piece of 
legal regulation that would guarantee that the experiments could be carried out lawfully 
despite protests by the public.  
 
As a result of the press coverage and the public becoming increasingly aware of the 
forthcoming trials, the issue of law and the military’s commitment to the Act was raised 																																																								
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in Parliament, asking Mr Dugdale MP, then the Parliamentary Secretary ‘whether he will 
give an assurance that any animals used for this purpose will have to suffer no cruelty’.392 
The kind of animals to be used and the number involved in the experiments were also 
questioned several times by separate Members of Parliament. 393  Yet, his reply was 
somewhat oblique as he argued that it was ‘not in the public interest to give details of 
experimental work which may be carried out to meet defence requirements’ and further 
claiming that all animals taking part in the ‘work’ will be bound by law under the 1876 
Act.394 However, behind the public display of lawful obedience lay a sea of confusion 
regarding the Cruelty to Animals Act and the obligations of Porton Down scientists 
when it came to animal experiments and the law. Did the Crown bind Porton scientists, 
or could they flout the law when it came research in the military domain? 
 
Power, Knowledge and Crown Immunity 
 
Clearly, the press had been mistaken in their atomic assumptions, but correct in their 
prediction of animal experimentation. The ‘expedition’ was indeed Operation Harness, 
and this was made clear in a letter to L. J. H. Naylor Esq. of the Ministry of Supply, from 
R.A. McCarthy of the Home Office. McCarthy stressed that Naylor should have been 
‘well aware of the implications of Operation Harness’ because of the ‘press statements 
and the questions raised in the House of Commons about the ‘putting out of certain 
landing craft as laboratories and the use of animals therewith’.395 The main concern of 
the Home Office was not the inferences of the press, but rather the concern that they 
were ‘not yet in possession of legal confirmation that the Act [1876] covers any activities 
outside of the United Kingdom’.396 Despite this doubt, replies to the anti-vivisection 
bodies assured them that these experiments were indeed governed by the Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1876 and ‘that the animals shall not be subjugated to unnecessary suffering’ 
as ‘all experiments carried out by my Department for Defence research purposes the 
safeguards of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876 are applied’.397 
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So, as it was, the Home Office were unclear about the legal position but still persisted in 
telling the public that this law would govern any experiments conducted by the state. It 
was behind the scenes that officials corresponded with legal representatives about the 
forthcoming experiments and their right to test on animals. In a series of memorandums 
directed to and from the Government’s solicitors, an in-depth discussion ensued about 
the Cruelty to Animals Act and its applicability to these forthcoming B.W. trials. Broadly 
speaking, the memos discussed the experiments in light of prospective publicity.  And it 
was due to this anticipated public pressure that Government bureaucrats asserted that 
‘there would now seem to be a case for seeking the opinion of Legal Advisors’.398 This 
was so the experiments could be lawfully conducted. The general line taken was that ‘the 
provisions of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, should be applied to the experiments ’399. 
Yet, what was actually the case was far more complex and convoluted. The point at issue 
was discussed in light of the Act applying to ships in both British and foreign waters, as 
well as ‘on the high seas’.400  Whether or not ships that were the property of “the Crown” 
or outside of territorial waters, the Act still created an opportunity for the government to 
carry out biological warfare testing on animals. Not only that, because these experiments 
were state implemented, ministers began to question whether the ‘Crown is bound’.401 
With the general view from lawyers being that the Crown is not bound by the Cruelty to 
Animals Act, but stating that ‘it is however, often inexpedient to claim Crown immunity: 
in practice immunity has not been claimed in the past case of the Act, and it is 
administratively agreed – in which I concur – that it would be a mistake to claim it’. 402 
 
It was asserted that it was not practicable to claim immunity under the aegis of the 
Monarch. This could have been for a number of reasons. Most obvious though, would 
be the fear of public retribution if it was to become known that animals were tested on 
because of a loophole in the law. Hence, it was asserted in the memorandums that, the 
Home Office ‘would be embarrassed to bring to light the fact that the Crown is not 
bound by this statute’,403 and of course this would trigger public outcry. One way the 
experiments could go ahead would be through the licencing of individual scientists 																																																								
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	 108	
conducting the experiments, as they would be bound by the Act.404 This would help 
generate a more positive public image about the trials in their responses to the anti-
vivisection societies.  
 
Not only that, in anticipation of the resultant press furore concerning the experiments, it 
seemed expedient for the Ministers of the Home Office to point out to the Porton 
Down scientists ‘that any work carried out… should be performed under the provisions 
of the Cruelty to Animals Act’.405 So the responsibility of following the letter of the law 
was very much placed upon the individual scientists. Not only that, further down the 
line, it came to light that the Act: 
  
[E]xtends to British ships, at any rate for some purposes, and Royal Navy ships 
would appear to be a case a fortiori (pace the Crown immunity questions). … 
Accordingly though the whole subject is somewhat obscure and very lacking in 
authority, it would appear that the Act, again pace Crown immunity, applies to 
acts done on board His Majesty’s Ships whether on the high sea or in territorial 
waters.406 
 
It became apparent that it was important to emphasise that the Royal Navy was a ‘strong 
case’ (case a fortiori) for having permission from the Crown (‘pace’ by permission of the 
Crown) not to be immune from the legalities of the Act. However, the case was complex 
and demonstrated that the discourse of law in respect of the forthcoming biological 
weapons trials was obscure and unreliable in this respect. Yet, it was essential for the 
Home Office to be seen to have their scientists licenced and noteworthy to suggest that 
the law should be followed despite any suggestion of Crown Immunity.  
 
It is here that we can see that the discourses about the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, 
created a permissive reality about animals and their use in experimentation.407 What I 
mean by this is that the law was a legitimising apparatus for the biological warfare trials. 
It seems that Whitehall did everything it could to make sure these trials went ahead, but 
at the same time, made sure the politicians and scientists involved, upheld their public 
image in terms of being seen to be morally committed to the Act.  
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Despite the complexities of the law, the law still enabled Operation Harness to go ahead. 
This was because the knowledge conveyed by law was deemed as “true”, and because the 
Act originated from people who held ‘an office of authority to speak’.408 These people 
who made the law held positions of power, had the status of someone who can make 
truth claims about animals and their right to be experimented on. This is even so despite 
the original 1876 Act being initially brought into being through early nineteenth century 
social movements such as the Antivivisection groups, lead by people such as Francis 
Power Cobb (see chapter six).409 Animals under the statute were deemed objects. The 
words that emanated from the Act held the mantle of power-knowledge. Thus, the Act 
contained ‘paradoxical truths’410 that protected animals from “unnecessary suffering” but 
at the same time conceptualised them as objects. 
 
No Peace for Animals: The Search for a Biological Weapon 
 
For Operation Harness to go ahead as it did, a set of inwardly directed narratives 
circulated within the chambers of Government in defence of B.W. research and the use 
of animals in such experiments. These appeasing narratives empowered the scientists and 
permitted the use of nonhuman animals in experiments under the aegis of law. But what 
were these experiments? What did they involve? Who did they involve? Beginning in 
1948 with Harness and through to 1955, Britain alongside Canada and the U.S. colluded 
in a series of sea trials aimed at developing biological weapons for offensive measures. 
Despite the circulation of narratives about the role of the experiments in the creation of 
suitable defensive operations, what becomes clear is that these experiments were part of a 
strategic plan to build biological weapons of mass destruction in the Cold War era.411 
Nonhuman animals played a huge part in this and became constructed by scientists as 
living objects to be used in assessing the effect dangerous pathogens had on a living 
body. These nonhumans were not living beings, but living matter that could provide 
“suitable” physiological comparisons when it came to measuring decline of living tissue 
once affected by biological agents.  
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Operation Harness 
 
A biological bomb that could reap wanton destruction became the central goal of the 
Tripartite nations in a post-Second World War world.412 It became the rhetoric of B.W. 
scientists that outdoor trials were of the upmost importance in supplementing ‘data 
obtained in the laboratory’ of the testing of B.W. agents and to ‘augment the scanty 
evidence obtained during the war concerning the effectiveness of certain biological 
warfare agents under field conditions’.413 Therefore, a suitable testing site was located in 
the Caribbean, off Antigua between December 1948 and February 1949.414 ‘Operation 
Harness’ became the first of a series of trials to test dangerous pathogens on nonhuman 
animals in order to assess their effectiveness in creating a biological bomb. 
 
The technique was simple; two landing ship tanks (L.S.T’s) were to be fitted out with a 
series of sampling points ‘each consisting of a rubber dinghy carrying an animal and 
sampling apparatus’.415 The sampling points were placed on the surface of the water in an 
arc formation and clouds of biological agents would be released from a bomb or spray 
device upwind of the nonhumans. 416  The scientists would watch the release of the 
pathogens from H.M.S. Ben Lomond – designated as the laboratory ship for the 
exercise. Once the animals became infected, they would be transferred to one of the 
L.S.T’s… removed to storage space… and the dinghy’s and gear sterilized’ 417 . The 
animals used in the trials consisted of sheep, guinea-pigs and monkeys, who were 
systematically exposed to a range of pathogens including anthrax, brucellosis, and 
tularemia.418 Once infected with the pathogenic organisms, the animals were transported 
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and sent to an onshore ‘isolation farm where [the] infected animals could be kept under 
observation’.419 The corpses of the infected animals were then cast away into the sea.420  
 
In all, twenty-two trials were conducted on nonhuman animals, and not all were 
successful. Seven of the trials were either a ‘complete failure’ or only ‘partially 
successful’.421 Despite the lack of viable evidence produced by the elaborate scheme, and 
the hundreds of animals used in the trials, scientists from Porton Down did justify their 
work and claimed that the trials; 
 
(i) Confirm and augment the wartime findings in respect of two agents, (ii) Show 
that a third agent can infect animals in the field, (iii) Confirm the toxicity of those 
three agents is many times greater than that of any chemical agent, (iv) Support 
previous laboratory work which had shown improvement between ten and 
twenty fold in the effectiveness of one agent as the result of a modification.422 
 
In general, notwithstanding the lack of positive results the Harness team supplemented 
this lack with the necessity of continuing B.W. trials in the open. Proposals were made 
for future trials as ‘it was the opinion… that field trials are an essential complement to 
research in the laboratory.423 During a conference between the tripartite nations, there 
was… unanimous agreement that the ultimate objective should be full-scale field trials of 
toxic agents and weapons’. 424 However, it was subsequently thought that only a couple 
of species of animals were up to the task of being experimental “subjects” and that 
Harness: 
 
Has provided information regarding the behaviour of new types of bacterial 
suspensions which contain experimental animals, and brought out the value of 
monkeys in this type of research. It will be unnecessary, in future, to rely on such 
clumsy animals as sheep in trials with bacterial clouds. 425 
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Only certain kinds of nonhuman animal were considered to be appropriate for 
subsequent operations. With the sheep being labelled as “clumsy”, signifying their 
awkwardness when it came to their use for B.W. trials. Nevertheless, implicit in this 
account of Harness is the idea that nonhuman animals are essential in the creation of 
Britain and allied nations’ military capabilities. It was towards the end of Harness that 
plans by Porton Down scientists were being made to follow up these trials with further 
experiments at sea in the next operation, Operation Cauldron. 
 
Hubble Bubble, Toil and Trouble: From Operation Cauldron to Operation 
Negation, 1952-1955. 
 
With the conduct and responsibility of sea trials firmly placed in the hands of the British 
scientists of Porton,426 the Conservative governments of the 1950s (1951- 1964) gave 
their approval and financial backing for further B.W. trials. A suitable site for the next 
two operations was found off the coast of Scotland near the Isle of Lewis. Similar to 
Operation Harness, these trials involved the testing of pathogens, Brucella suis (which 
causes ‘abortion’ in pigs and flu-like symptoms in humans) and Pasteurella Pestis (a 
variant of the plague virus), for offensive reasons. The technique of the trials differed 
slightly from Harness as it was thought that the previous operation had ‘certain 
disadvantages; it required a large number of men and a great deal of equipment, and 
accurate control of trial conditions could not be exercised’. 427  Rather, the aim for 
Cauldron was to reduce the number of men and amount of equipment used and this was 
done through a variety of ways. Firstly, the floating pontoon containing the experimental 
animals remained anchored at sea rather than having to be towed away by dinghy after 
each trial. These provided such advantages that ‘the animals and sampling devices could 
be brought to the layout and taken away after a trial’.428 The infected animals were then 
transferred to the “dirty” hold of H.M.S. Ben Lomond. 
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In Operation Cauldron and in the subsequent trials after Harness,Ben Lomond acted as 
both the laboratory ship complete with ‘clean’ hold (for holding uninfected animals) and 
the ‘dirty’ hold (for holding infected animals, (see figure two).429 Secondly, the pontoon 
for holding the animals during testing measured 200ft by 60ft in an arc of twenty-five 
yards radius. This had been modified since Operation Harness, so that no tow dinghy 
was necessary as the ‘use of compartments below deck meant that several trials could be 
done in succession and men and animals could remain there during the trials’.430 The 
pontoon was ‘little more than a floating box with 24 compartments, 9 of which had to be 
converted to house diesel generators, pumps, “clean” and “dirty” animal stowage, change 
rooms etc’.431  
 
The third difference between Harness and Cauldron was the number of staff involved; 
‘our determination to reduce to an absolute minimum the number of men directly 
involved, meant that each individual was charged with a fairly complex series of jobs that 
had to interlock with the other men’s duties’.432 The officer in charge of the operation 
was Commander Cowgill of the Admiralty who accordingly made an ‘invaluable 
contribution as “stage director” with infinite patience and an exact eye for detail’,433, 
naturally. With the reduction in the number of staff, J.D. Morton made it perfectly clear 
in the report that these trials were not grounded in welfarist doctrines of rights of the 
working man, and this meant that ‘there was no place for a strict “Trades Union” 
attitude.’ There were seven men on the pontoon during trials; the officer joined the three 
vets in the ship for stowing of exposed animals – a total of only 12 men in full protective 
rig.434 Modern military science clearly did not have time for left-wing labour sentiments 
when it came to fulfilling British hopes of achieving the construction a powerful weapon 
of mass destruction.  
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Figure two: TNA War Office [WO 195] WO 195/12213, Chiefs of Staff Committee: Biological Warfare 
Sub-Committee, Ministry of Supply, B.R.A.B., Operation Cauldron 1952, Scientific Report by the 
Microbiological Research Department, Porton and Naval Report by the Naval Commander. 
 
With the techniques for the trials in place, the scientists, vets from the Royal Air Force 
Veterinary Core (R.A.V.C.) and Admiralty staff sailed from Chatham docks on the 5th 
May 1952 and arrived on site on the 8th May to conduct the Cauldron trials. The first 
trials using the pathogens were not done until six weeks after arrival due to terrible 
weather conditions. The trials used Br.suis on guinea-pigs and monkeys.  They gave the 
scientists ‘reasonable good answers about the efficacy’ of the diseases on such nonhuman 
animals. 435  The experiments of course were in the name of offense and testing of 
potential weapons to be used against opponents. With Br.suis 436  proving successful 
because ‘data supporting this were provided by sampling devices used in the trials and it 
is satisfactory to note that of a large number of guinea-pigs exposed, a small bomb filling 
was capable of infecting nearly every one.’437 Pasteurella Pestis (or virulent plague) was 
not as great a success with the experimenters, with the B.W. Sub-Committee remarking 
that the evidence obtained signified ‘that it is not an agent of striking potentialities’. 
Having said this, the percentage infected with plague was 12% (guinea-pigs) and 38% 
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(monkeys), with Br.suis, 85% of guinea-pigs were infected and 59% of monkeys.438 All in 
all, 36 toxic trials were done using 3,500 guinea-pigs and 84 monkeys, all of whom were 
exposed to plague and Br.suis. 
 
Operation Hesperus in 1953 continued in the same vein as Cauldron and in the same 
location. The same techniques, methods, and species of animals were used. However, 
Hesperus not only tested Br.suis on hundreds of nonhuman animals but also Bacterium 
tularense. 439  Yet, it was clear that despite the claims coming from the Conservative 
government about B.W. research for defensive purposes, it is obvious that the Porton 
scientists in these trials were testing bombs, and the viability of bacterium in certain types 
of bomb, with the scientific report clearly stating that ‘Experiments with these two 
agents in British and American experimental bombs showed very clearly the superiority 
of one agent in one weapon, and the other in the other’ by outlining how biological agent 
and weapon cannot be treated as separate entities.440  
 
Rather contrarily to the results of the Cauldron and Hesperus trials, the Porton scientists 
claimed that they had gathered ‘convincing evidence with Br.suis and Bact.tularense,’441 
advancing the argument that it was therefore necessary to continue B.W. research in this 
area. At the request of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, Operation Ozone 
was carried out during February-May 1954 followed by Operation Negation in 1955, in 
the waters of the Bahamas.442  
 
Operation Ozone and Operation Negation: 1954-1955 
 
Operation Ozone, followed in 1954-5 by Operation Negation, also provided the 
opportunity to test an even more dangerous pathogen, Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalomyelitis (a progressive disease in horses that effects the central nervous 
system. In humans, flu-like systems appear which can eventually lead to death).443In 
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Negation, an additional pathogen was added, Vaccinia Virus (a variant of small pox).444 
Another addition to the programmes that differed from the previous operations was the 
fact that it was deemed necessary to assess the behaviour of pathogens in ‘natural 
conditions’ using aerosol sprays, and how ultraviolet light effected the decay of bacterial 
and viral agents.445  Alongside this, the team hoped to; ‘[S]tudy the influence of various 
methods of dispersal (high explosive and propellant explosive, compared with spray) on 
one or two well-known pathogens.’446 Operation Ozone conducted trials in the daylight, 
whereas Negation took the opportunity to test infectious diseases at nightfall.447 The 
animals used in these two studies were primarily guinea-pigs and mice, with fertilised 
chicken eggs being added to the mixture in Operation Negation. Incidentally, the 
fertilised eggs were not considered to be ‘alive’ as such.448 To transport the animals from 
Allington Farm – Porton Down’s own animal farm used for the purpose of breeding 
large quantities of experimental animals – a link by air was necessitated for Ozone, with 
transport by sea for Negation.449  
 
The transport of the nonhuman animals to the British colony proved difficult and 
contentious at times. The intention of the British and Commonwealth Governments was 
to keep the trials as secret as possible and away from the public gaze. Therefore, once the 
animals had arrived in the Bahamas in the town of Nassau, every effort was made so that 
the ‘animals were specially handled to conceal their presence’.450  This was indicative of 
the broader concerns about secrecy which surrounded all of these trials at the time: the 
use of live dangerous infective agents were to be kept hidden from the public. Concerns  
regarding press intrusion about the use of animals in these experiments were lso evident. 
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As noted by the Ministry of Supply in a letter addressed to the Prime Minster about 
undesirable publicity because of: 
 
…The fact that we are experimenting with animals, a subject which the British 
public in general, and the Anti-vivisection Society in particular, are especially 
sensitive. The fitting out of Ben Lomond with animal cages is known to a wide 
circle of Dockyard Workmen at Chatham, naval ratings and some 
subcontractors. Replacements of animals arrive by air […] and this cannot help 
being known to a number of civilians.[…] The danger of leakage is clear, but in 
view of the decisions last year the question of publicity has not been raised again 
at Ministerial level for this year’s trial, and the position remains that there is a 
dormant statement in existence for the Chiefs of Staff to being up to the Minister 
of Defence if circumstances require451 
  
 To compensate for this, the Ministry of Supply drafted a press statement to release to 
journalists if certain events were suspected and eventually became public.452 Even though 
the draft press release was written for Operation Cauldron and Hesperus, it was never 
released to the newspapers, but was kept until the government thought it may be needed, 
in 1954, at the time of the Bahaman trials453: 
  
In order that effective means of defence may be developed every possibility must 
be studied, not only in the laboratory but in the field. To this end, for example, 
highly specialised laboratory apparatus has been developed for the study of the 
mode of infection of many forms of respiratory disease. Furthermore, the results 
so obtained are to be tested this year by experiments in the open; for safety 
reasons this experiments will be carried out at sea. Only by such means can the 
risk from biological warfare attack be adequately assessed and specific defence 
measures perfected.454 
 
This very bland statement from the Ministry of Supply, clearly aims to misguide the 
public in matters of the types of bacterium and viruses used in the experiments and that 
the nature of the trials were in fact for offensive reasons, not defensive measures. Not 
only that, by locating the trials within the broader social context of the Cold War and the 
heightened state of paranoia within Britain, the Ministry of Supply could hope to 
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persuade the public of the necessity of the trials and the use of animals therein. In the 
Bahamas, news of the press release reached J. D. Morton who wrote: 
  
Our reaction [to the press release] was satisfaction at the easing of our problems 
at Nassau, tempered only by anxiety about the local feeling. There proved to be 
no very serious interest in our activities, though the Tourist Board declared, 
without evidence, that we would be bad for trade: mostly, there was welcome 
relief from ‘you’re from the Mystery ship, aren’t you?’ followed by curiosity as to 
our business, to a cheerful ‘how are the germs today?’ and a change of subject to 
something more interesting.455 
 
Clearly, the press release had worked and the general public were unperturbed by the 
experiments. The nonhuman animals involved in the experiments were clearly and most 
‘officially’ downplayed - not even mentioned. This allowed for the continuation of the 
use of hundreds of guinea-pigs and mice in Ozone and Negation.  
 
With the public led astray about the nature and content of the experiments the trials of 
infective agents could continue as normal. For the scientists working on Ozone, the 
results were satisfactory. A total of eighty-four experiments were conducted for 
Operation Ozone; twenty-seven with Brucella suis, thirty-two with Bacterium tularense 
and eighteen with Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis. The rest were “unaccounted” 
for. 456  Operation Ozone demonstrated that ultraviolet light could rapidly decay the 
pathogenic organism and decrease the infection rate caused by the diseases when 
released through an aerosol spray, so; ‘their offensive use in such conditions would lose a 
great deal of its potential effect’.457  Hence, Operation Negation aimed at testing the 
pathogenic agents in both sunlight and twilight in order to compare infection rates and 
decay of the organisms.458  
 
Despite the use of even more guinea-pigs for trials in Negation, the results were seen as 
lacking validity and were particularly ‘ill-fated’ when it came to the testing of Venezuelan 
Equine Encephalomyelitis.459 Yet, 880 guinea-pigs were used in the experiments and 380 
in laboratory tests. Mice were also bred and used on site, and rabbits were considered too 																																																								
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but were not used because a batch of fertilised eggs could not be sourced on the town of 
Nassau: 
 
We took 24 rabbits so that at least a rough assessment of the vaccinia might be 
made by injection in the depilated skin: one rabbit would carry a day’s 
assessment, so with a precautionary duplication each time we had enough for 12 
days – more than we expected to do. One of the rabbits was injured on arrival in 
“Ben Lomond” and was destroyed.… There was no need for the remainder to be 
used. They were kept however, mainly because they had acquired names, 
developed personalities, and became the cherished pets of the RAVC party. After 
six months of this idle luxury they were as large, sleek and contented as any 
rabbit could wish to be.460 
 
As the rabbits were not needed for experimental purposes, they seemingly became 
doted-upon pets of the very staff who were using the nonhuman animals for testing. The 
incongruous and ambivalent nature of the treatment of nonhumans in these series of 
experiments acts as an analytical point of departure in this chapter. Animals were at once 
used as objects of study, but also treated with care and concern over their welfare. It is 
here where I will discuss the power-knowledge relationship embedded within these 
scientific discourses about the animals used in the Operations. Nonhumans were 
considered to be parts, not wholes, and kept healthy and well-fed, in order to infect them 
with virulent diseases so that the scientists could assess their decline in health and 
resultant physiological deterioration. A discourse of lines is proposed, in order to 
understand the connection between scientific statements of ‘truth’ about biological 
weapons and the treatment of nonhuman animals in the trials. 
 
Power in the Making: Animal Experiments and the Production of Knowledge 
 
Within these series of trials lays a succession of discourses that hid behind a veil of 
purported scientific ‘truth’.  Michel Foucault asserts that the gaze of the scientific 
observer produces a knowledge which is based on the perceptual (what can be seen).461 
The focus on what can be observed excludes the other senses of touch, taste and smell; 
sight becomes the ‘sense by which we perceive, extend and establish proof’.462 The gaze 
beholding the infected nonhuman body enabled the scientists to categorise and 
generalise their experiments in terms of the effect dangerous pathogens had on parts of 																																																								
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the nonhuman body. They did this through vivisection and the dissection of the animal 
into parts, or what Johnson, calls the ‘discourse of lines’.463 
 
Contained within the scientific reports, are precise details about the method employed to 
assess, analyse and recognise the uncontaminated nonhuman from the contaminated. 
Turning to Foucault,464 the nonhuman animals used in the trials can be constituted by 
four historically contingent categories: the form of the elements, the quantity of those 
elements, the manner in which they are distributed in space in relation to each other, and 
the relative magnitude of each element.465 For example, the scientific reports describe in 
detail the effect of B.W. on animals, post-mortems were conducted, in order to 
enumerate the effect pathogens had on the different parts of an animal i.e. their liver, 
spleen, reproductive system etc.466 Alongside this was the ability to identify and define 
the effect and where the effect is distributed in the body.  
 
The Infected: The Post-Mortem as an Exercise of Power Over the Nonhuman 
 
In order to determine the effect of dangerous pathogens on the body of the nonhuman, 
a rigorous post-mortem methodology was utilised, which was outlined in the report on 
Operation Cauldron. This technique was used throughout the series of trials, ending with 
Operation Negation. As will be shown, the nature and style of the conduct of the post-
mortems became a site where the investigative and explanatory power of the human is 
exercised over the nonhuman. Furthermore, examining the manner in which vivisection 
was performed demonstrates how the interests of the scientists are interrelated with the 
concerns of the wider ‘politico-technological’ system in Britain at the time,467 or what I 
would term the birth of the military-animal-industrial complex. In other words, the 
investigative approaches to post-mortems were grounded in the socio-political apparatus 
rather than the biological. This was undergirded by a discourse of pathology468 within 
which the animal body became a Cartesian material entity devoid of life; because the 																																																								
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nonhuman ‘cadaver [became] an object, a repository of disease and infection. It [was] a 
container, a shell; at once a solution to a riddle, and an obstacle to knowledge’:469 
The object of post mortem examination of trials animals… is to determine 
whether the animal is “infected” with the specific organism … We have selected 
arbitrary conditions of examination which maybe expected to demonstrate 
invasion and substantial multiplication in the host. 470  
 
Hence, the visualisation of disease was imperative to determine infection. This was 
evident in the criteria chosen to determine abnormality; in terms of what was 
characteristic of infection with a specific disease and what was ‘abnormal but not 
characteristic’. 471  The visual coalesced with the theoretical aspect of pathology. 
Consequently, the animals became objects of knowledge, and through the observational 
power of the scientists’ gaze during post-mortems, the true nature of the efficacy of 
biological weapons could be determined: 
 
After exposure to a toxic agent all animals from trials and spray runs were held in 
the dirty hold for a period of observation. When the results of the laboratory 
assessment had been calculated, some of the animals which had obviously been 
outside the cloud [of released toxic agent] were killed off without post-mortem 
examination. The principle was to retain for further observations all animals at 
points whose…samples showed an even trace of agent and the animals from four 
further points, two right and two left of the cloud. The holding periods were 28 
days for the animals exposed to US [Brucella suis] and 14 days for animals 
exposed to L [tularaemia]. Animals dying during the holding period were post-
mortemed by the casual PM team.472 
 
Clearly the animals were made to live after attempted infection by a toxic bacterial agent. 
This was so deterioration of the physiology of the monkeys and guinea-pigs could be 
observed, and the intensity of the effect of the pathogen could be measured after the 
holding period. The autopsies were divided into two different kinds: ‘casual autopsies’ 
for animals that died during the holding period, and ‘mass autopsies’,473 where a team of 
six laboratory staff scientists and two veterinary staff engaged in the slicing and dicing of 
the body parts of guinea-pigs, monkeys and mice. All monkeys were post-mortemed, and 
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most guinea-pigs, if they had survived the holding period. 474  In preparation for ‘mass 
post-mortems’, there was, of course, a series of steps to follow to prepare the nonhuman 
animals: 
 
Two RAVC staff and one lab man enter the dirty hold and commence killing 
about one hour before the arrival of the post-mortem party. (Time adjusted 
according to number to be killed). Groups of 100-250 have been dealt with. The 
killed animals are placed in trays: each tray contains the group of animals from 
the cages which were exposed to the B. W. agent at a particular point of the 
layout [pontoon], or in a particular laboratory spray experiment. A label 
indicating Trial Number and exposure point is attached to each tray of dead 
animals.475  
 
The bodies were quantified, but not only that, storage spaces were also to be referenced 
quantitatively, as well as an accurate time recorded for the euthanasia to happen prior to 
the post-mortem. The animals coalesced with the storage to become a “thing” or object 
of the scientific enquiry: 
 
Monkeys are dealt with in a similar manner. A member of the laboratory staff 
kills the monkeys by an intraperitoneal injection [injection into the body cavity] 
of 10-20ml of 6.5 per cent Nembutal solution [a barbiturate drug which slows 
down the activity of the brain and nervous system]. They are injected 2-3 hours 
prior to the actual time scheduled for the commencement of post-mortems. For 
killing, a two vet party remove the animal from the cage (a four vet party if any 
large numbers of monkeys are required to be examined for a post-mortem); the 
animal is held extended so that the abdomen is fairly taut. After the injections the 
animal is returned to the cage and left until dead. The animals are inspected 
within 3-40 minutes after the Nembutal injection.476   
 
The normativity of killing the nonhuman, by which these procedures are embedded in 
the daily practice of these series of Operations, enabled a language of “distance” and a 
sense of ambivalence towards nonhuman animals in the B.W. trials.477 The monkeys, 
guinea-pigs and mice became part of a ‘generalised Other’ – at once different from 
humans, but all of the same ‘kind’ when it came to the scientific observations and 
descriptions. The nonhumans were devoid of agency and individuality and were 
frequently referred to as an ‘it’, or generally speaking ‘the animals’. By deploying this 
discourse, the scientists held the mantle of neutrality and objectivity - they immediately 																																																								
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became distanced observers, unattached and value-free: ‘the object [became] 
objectified’478 through the acts of killing, observation and reporting. The animals became 
numbers or ‘tools of the trade’ even. 479  
 
Once the killing was over, the autopsies used a ‘mass production’ style approach to 
enquiry.480 The animals were labelled and passed from the ‘dirty hold’ in Ben Lomond to 
the post-mortem room. The rigour of the post-mortem methodology was the ultimate of 
capitalist production line techniques, one that mimicked the ‘factory floor’ approach: that 
of Taylorism. The bodies of the nonhumans were passed from one scientist to the next, 
round a rotating table, in what was described by Morten as the ‘travelling Circus’:481 
  
The team prepare the post mortem table, a round revolving stainless steel table. 
Clips and chains are attached, beakers containing acetone or Lysol are placed in 
appropriate positions and instruments prepared… The two fixers (vet staff) who 
lay out the animal on the numbered towel on the tray in front of them and clip 
the animal out by its four limbs. Each animal thoroughly wetted with Lysol 
before the table is revolved to bring it in front of the skinner who opens the 
animal up from pubes to jaw, laying the skin back on each side. The animal is 
now moved round to the Exposer who removes the anterior portion of the 
thoracic cage, laying bare the heart and lungs, and opens up the abdominal cavity 
exposing the spleen for the spleen plater who removes a small portion of the spleen 
and smears its cut surface on the half of a plate labelled “S”, handed to him by 
the plate handler who after marking the plate with the animal’s number holds it for 
the pathologist who removes a portion of the lymphatic gland and smears it over 
the unmarked half of the plate. The pathologist reports to the recorder on the 
condition of the spleen, liver, cervical and bronchial glands in this order. A 
typically positive is plus, a typical negative –, E indicates enlarged, and A 
abnormal482  
 
Sounding rather like something out of a horror story, the dead animal is at first clipped 
to the table in ‘chains’, with an identification number on the paper underneath them. The 
body is then rotated round and passed to the first man who peels back the skin of the 
animal. The second man exposes the organs and the third takes a sample of one 
particular organ depending on the disease they were looking for483. All the scientists 																																																								
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present are given names to assume their role, characters in a tragicomedy; they know 
their place and part, whether you become the “skinner” or the “exposer”, one assumes 
their role with utmost scientific authority and neutrality.  Once the dissection is 
complete, the bodies of the nonhuman animals are then removed from the table, put into 
a dustbin, taken to an incinerator and burned.484  
 
The autopsies not only vivisected the physical body of the nonhuman; they also acted as 
a process of scientific ideology. In this methodology of death is the discourse of 
pathology. Here, there are two aspects of dissection: the physical, as described above, 
and the ideological – that which is a priori to the evidence – the theoretical aspect.485 Both 
facets rely on the gaze of the scientists and the ability to ‘know’ about nonhuman bodies. 
This is done through superimposing ‘lines’ upon the body, 486 to enable disassembly of 
whole living beings, and then to be categorised as ‘abnormal’ by a pathologist. The 
discourse of lines when taken in the context of the series of Operations lead by the 
Porton scientists, gave the experiments the mantle of ‘truth-telling power’487 as it came 
from an ‘office of authority to speak’488 that of military science and the state: 
 
US [Brucella Suis] guinea-pigs were held at least 21 days: any dying during the 
holding period were examined, but results were accepted only from the 18th day 
onwards. Examination was normally confined to gross pathology of spleen and 
liver, and culture of spleen by smearing a cut surface over fortified tryptose agar 
containing methyl violet. The criterion normally adopted was positive or negative 
culture, except for one period when a batch of plates gave negative results from 
the animals indisputably positive. Having confirmed that the cultures were 
misleading, […] we had to interpret these trials another way: animals giving a 
visually positive spleen were taken as positive; animals giving liver only, or 
neither liver nor spleen, were taken as negative489 
 
Here, the guinea-pigs were divided into parts according to their organs, and how their 
organs looked according to the scientist’s gaze upon the animal. The whole being of the 
guinea-pigs became obsolete; the organs became the important objects for discovery in 
the process. The pathologist’s gaze was integral to assure the validity of the results for 
the trials conducted in the Operations: one must see in order to understand and produce 																																																								
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“knowledge”. The results were negligible, but with the observation of specific parts of 
the animals, the scientists could acknowledge the nonhuman as being abnormal and 
contaminated with viruses. This developed into a methodology that was historically 
contingent upon the laws of science, as ‘each visibly distinct part of… an animal is thus 
describable’.490 In fact, the very act of seeing is built into the definition of autopsy: to 
examine, to see.491 
 
 The Power of Language: Animals, Gender and Biological Warfare Research 
 
With the advent of the Cold War, the role of B.W. research and the purported practice of 
B.W. during the Korean War (1950-1953) meant that the British and U.S. biological 
warfare programmes had to be kept top secret.492 Any publicity about the experiments 
using ‘live germs’ would have been disastrous for the Conservative government and 
would have provoked even more paranoia about the prospect of a ‘hot’ war in Europe.493 
Nevertheless, the Korean War strengthened the relationship between military science and 
the state in the U.S., which were conspiring partners in Britain’s biological weapons 
research programme.494 It was not only the U.S. that was secretly endowing the military 
with increasing funds for their R & D programmes, but Britain too. Britain’s defence 
expenditure increased significantly from 5.9% of the gross national income in 1950 to 
9.3% in 1952. In comparison, spending on social services (welfare such as health and 
education) in this period decreased from 6% in 1950, to 5.6% in 1952.495  From this time 
onwards, up until the late 1950s, Britain invested quite substantially in the area of 
biological warfare research496. Nonhuman animals became the essential component of 
this science of destruction, and in the conversion of the nonhuman from that of the 
‘naturalistic animal’ (the nonhuman as seen as part of nature), to that of the ‘analytic 
animal’497 - an animal which becomes objectified in the name of science, and constructed 
as a part rather than a ‘whole’ living being.  
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The gaze of the scientist over the nonhuman body in these trials was essential to 
ascertain the efficacy the pathogens had under experimental conditions and the effect 
these diseases had on the body. Furthermore, it was the very method itself that determined 
the outcomes of these experiments. This experimental approach was rooted in a 
philosophy that presented a particular way of understanding and seeing the world. It was 
grounded in an epistemology that dates back to seventeenth century scientists, Rene 
Descartes and Francis Bacon.498 The “way to knowledge” is labelled, in this sense, as 
“objective”, the observers (scientists) are distinct from the known (the body of the 
nonhuman that has to be dissected in order to produce facts). This scientific approach is 
historically dependent upon binary categories that separate nature from culture, animal 
from human, and male from female (see table one).499  These binary categories leave 
traces of gender labels that produce a powerful hierarchal structure linked to the social 
relations occurring in Britain at the time, as well as the contemporary understandings of 
human-animal relationships.   
 
Dominant Oppositional 
Male Female 
Subject Object 
(hu)man Animal 
Culture  Nature 
Science (Objectivity) Emotion (Subjectivity) 
Table one: Binary Oppositions.500 
 
Scientific research (in general) has been said to be identified as ‘masculine’, with 
emotional and embodied ways of knowing about the world, labelled ‘subjective’ and 
‘feminine’, and ‘because the Western world-view values objectivity over subjectivity and 
men’s knowledge over women’s, ‘feminine’ ways to know are by their nature [seen as] 
inferior’. 501  Therefore, in historical terms, the biological warfare trials conducted by 
Porton Down scientists could arguably been seen as firmly entrenched within the domain 
of the masculine, because of their adherence to the strict rules governing scientific 
methodological techniques. 																																																								
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Consequently, the series of B.W. trials were at once a product of culture and politics as 
they were a product of the very domain of knowledge that underpinned the research. 
Incidentally, none of the Operations explicitly raised any issues of gender. However, the 
omnipresent influence of gender played out in these experiments on a number of levels. 
Firstly, in terms of the socio-political relations of the trials: the world of B.W. research at 
the time was an entirely male world, no female staff were present. This reflected 
contemporary gender relations occurring in broader society, for instance, the desire to 
get women to return to the role of being a housewife and mother following the 
mobilisation of British women during the Second World War, and the contemporary 
biological reductionist arguments regarding the limitations which women’s biology 
imposed upon their ability to be in education and work.502  
 
Secondly, the language and format of the reports employed the scientific philosophy of 
‘positivism’, an ontological standpoint which stipulates that reality is ‘out there’ to be 
observed, captured and understood. This, a priori, is what directed the gaze of the 
observer and determined the totality of experience within biological weapons research; 
i.e. what counted as ‘valid’ knowledge and which facilitated the formation of a discourse 
of ‘things’ that could be recognised as true.503  This was in part evident in the analysis of 
the results: the nonhuman animals were transformed into quantitative data. Guinea-pigs 
were noted for their ‘important contribution to the quantitative value of the work’.504 It 
was also observed that in the past they had been wasted due to their health, which 
incidentally made ‘calculations of infectivity practically valueless’, 505  whereas ‘on 
Cauldron, nearly all the animals exposed contributed to the final answers’.506 The animals 
who were less susceptible to infectivity were constructed in terms of their ability to 
generate mathematical data. For instance, once again on Cauldron: 
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Two groups of three trials each with undiluted suspensions of Br.suis in the 
B/E.1 bomb were done with monkeys and guinea-pigs. The monkey was 
believed to be less susceptible (though there were no good quantitative data) [my 
emphasis]. So a layout of monkeys flanked by a few guinea-pig points were 
employed. The intention was to expose monkeys to the heavier dosages and 
guinea-pigs to the fringes of the clouds (to check against earlier guinea-pig 
results), this worked very well.507 
 
In order to test biological bombs, monkeys had to be given higher dosages, as previous 
statistics were seen as invalid. Guinea-pigs were used alongside the monkeys in order to 
compare earlier work. The monkeys and guinea-pigs in Cauldron were transformed into 
statistical assemblages: mere numbers in the name of war, and this formed an important 
part of B.W. research.  In Hesperus, Ozone and Negation, once again the animals are 
collapsed into single entities of numbers. For example, in Negation: 
 
Guinea-pigs were exposed in a number of trials in an attempt to determine any 
loss of virulence, i.e. whether the number of viable cells required for a given 
degree of infection was greater after downwind travel. … For infectivity 
calculations it is of course essential to get results in the range of partial infection: 
that is, between one to four animals in a group five. Points with 0-5 infected are 
of practically no use. … It will be seen  that the UL (Bacterium Tularense] trials 
were particularly ill-fated, for only one point gave a dosage that was in the 
measurable range (and that too high_, and only 3 points gave other than none or 
all guinea-pigs infected. We must rely on results from previous trials to support 
the belief that virulence is not lost in downwind travel.508 
 
Calculations of infectivity rates seemed to be disappointing, but all were collated in 
numerical format. Hence, the language of mathematics in this case was important to 
convey the objectivity of the experiments in terms of the viability of biological agents. 
This was essential to be able to order the world in such a way so as to produce results 
that displayed a ‘most gratifying linearity’.509 In all the reports of the operations, these 
results were also coupled with graphs, charts and tables. The nonhuman animal in these 
statistics disappeared, became “data” so as to absolve the experimenters from the ethical 
dilemmas of using animals in the experiments. This too emphasises the experimenters’ 
distance and scientific ‘objectivity’.510 Additionally, the use of mathematical analyses in 
these trials seemingly generated an ideology of value-freedom where the experimental 																																																								
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results were apparently free from social influence and grounded in rationality. However, 
these assumptions about the objectivity of statistics and the use of them in this research 
are based in the very binary oppositions mentioned in table one. The results display a 
hidden bias, and an underlying set of assumptions that were grounded in the 
androcentric. Hence, this in turn corresponds to the ‘masculine’ but not the ‘feminine’ 
way of knowing about the world.511 
 
Likewise, the focus on statistical averages reinforces the illusion of objectivity because it 
obliquely denies the nonhuman individual as being an active agent. Another example of 
the kind of objectification of the nonhuman that denies their agency, and is considered a 
part of scientific objectivity, is through the language employed to describe the animals in 
all of the reports. The language of objectivity denies individual agency of the nonhuman 
animals, and transforms the animal body into objects: words such as ‘batch’ and 
‘consignment’, further, if an animal had to be euthanized, they were systematically 
‘destroyed’. 512  All signify an objectification of them grounded in the language of 
positivism, that gave the reports a … language of depersonalised authority’.513  
 
This depersonalised authority can be used here to draw on parallels with constructions of 
women at the time. During the 1950s, a proliferation of scientific studies about women 
and their capabilities in terms of their ‘biological nature’ were widely circulated in popular 
culture. In these, women were often seen as objects, and descriptions permeated the 
public milieu about the science behind women’s ‘natural’ disposition to motherhood, 
housework and marriage (to the opposite sex of course).514 Consequently, scientists also 
had an important role to play in defining what it means to be a woman, and hence, 
‘feminine’. This was in terms of defining what is ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ for women to do, 
and how this related to their ‘innate biological propensities.’515 It was also around this 
time that women were taking up part-time work, as well as remaining at home to look 
after their husband and children. This dual-role also facilitated an increase in women 
attending higher education institutions. However, government researchers still depended 																																																								
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on moral and eugenicist arguments to assert women’s propensity for motherhood despite 
their desire to work.516 For instance, the Standing Joint Committee of Working Women’s 
Organisations, which incidentally argued for women to be able to work outside the 
home, was actually still morally conservative in approach. The group publicly expressed 
the idea that women attending institutions of education ran the risk of it affecting their 
biology, as it would lead to a ‘weakening of the biological urge and the desire for 
children’.517 Accordingly, there was no increase of women being recruited onto science, 
technology and medicine courses in the late 1940s and 1950s: the notoriously 
masculinised subject of science was firmly entrenched to the exclusion of women.518  
 
Science in post-war Britain remained firmly located within the domain of the masculine 
and the warfare state wanted to attract male science graduates into the post-war scientific 
officer classes of government.519 Britain was becoming a society that developed a strong 
scientific culture; it became, ‘the direct generator of economic, political, and social 
accumulation and control520, through the state’s appointment of scientific experts in the 
field of warfare and welfare. 521  No longer was the scientist seen as marginal to the 
shaping of society – instead they became a workforce trained in the art of objectivity and 
value-neutrality, for a career in government laboratories. 522  These government 
laboratories included Porton Down Microbiological Research Department, although 
funding tapered off for B.W. research from the mid-1950s onwards, and instead went 
into nuclear investigations; the Porton scientists and their experiments were still essential 
to the generation of Britain’s military-animal-industrial complex. 
  
Coda 
This chapter ends at 1955, after the completion of the last sea trials conducted in the 
Caribbean. As will be noted, the other chapters in this history begin in 1947 and end in 
1965. I have done this for two reasons; firstly, following Foucault, to denounce the 
‘universalising’ tendency of normative histories. Foucault argues that traditional historical 
practices have totalising assumptions, whereby particular events are inserted into a 																																																								
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unifying and total explanatory schema. This deprives specific events of the impact of 
their significance: ‘the world as we know is not this ultimately simple configuration where 
events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial 
and final value. On the contrary it’s a profusion of entangled events’.523  
 
Rather than falsely celebrate ‘great moments’ in history, this one highlights specific 
events, in detail. Secondly, and relatedly, by shifting the history away from the human 
(male) and centring it around the nonhuman animal changes how we do history. Chapter 
three outlines why the periodization of this thesis has been set as such. This 
epistemological positioning of the thesis eschews the fixity of historical events, which 
traditionally focus around the human. The series of sea trials discussed above re-writes 
contemporary historical methodologies in terms of periodization (again, see chapter 
three), as it centralises the events that had a huge impact on the nonhuman animal in 
Britain at this point in time. 
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Chapter Five 
 
‘Stress Without Distress’: British Medical Research, Animal Stress and Gender, 
1946-1965 
 
‘The main features of… successful rat colonies’, it was observed in the Universities 
Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW) handbook for the care and treatment of 
laboratory animals, ‘are scrupulous cleanliness, strict attention to environmental 
temperature… adequate nutrition, and painstaking care in general management’. Further 
on, emphasis was laid upon the personnel who maintain and look after the rats, stating 
clearly that, preferably, these technical assistants should be female.524 In highlighting this I 
am arguing from the outset that the historical continuity of medicine is inherently 
cultural, with the values of biomedicine thus being shared with wider society, despite 
scientists’ claims for its objectivity.525  Furthermore, medical research into preventative 
treatments for disease uses a variety of nonhuman animals. Animal experiments were and 
still are, the gold standard as to which to judge the efficacy of biomedical cures. But, 
what does this actually mean? What are the implicit historical forces associated with this 
intersection?  
 
Carol J. Adams highlights this intersection of the laboratory animal and women astutely 
in her book Neither Man Nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals.526 It is through the 
male gaze, or as she puts it, ‘the arrogant eye’, that the intersection of woman and animal 
becomes an aspect of subject-object relations in the practice of animal 
experimentation.527  If we refer back to the opening statement to this chapter, we can 
discern how, through this discussion on keeping a successful breeding stock of rats for 
experimental purposes, the rat and the woman become constituted as a scientific 
representation – the human technical assistant who cares for the animal must be female, 
the rat an experimental object – this, in Adams’s terms confirms ‘the cultural role of the 
human male gaze that looks at women and animals’. 528  Hence, it is through such 
historical representations that women and animals’ status as an object intersects and the 
two buttress each other within the discourses of science.  
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In this chapter, I want to go further than Adams’s subject-object status and consider a 
different representation of the animal and woman pervading the scientific discourse of 
the time. I shall argue that during this period members of the scientific community 
modified their views about the nonhuman as a ‘passive object’ of manipulation, to one of 
an ‘active object’. This indicated an internalisation of discourses of ‘care’ towards 
nonhumans under experiment. The argument is explored in three parts, beginning with 
an analysis of Hans Selye’s concept of stress and its permeation into British animal-
dependent medical research. Here it is shown how Selye’s concept invoked discourses of 
care and welfare towards the laboratory animal, which altered historical notions of the 
human-animal, subject-object, binary. This was most clearly demonstrated in The UFAW 
Handbook: The Care And Management of Laboratory Animals.529 
 
The second section unpacks the implications of this ‘scientific welfarist’ approach to 
laboratory animals, and will show how the idea of the “stressed animal”530 within the 
laboratory revolved around ideas about appropriate scientific methodologies. In the 
1950s, Selye’s idea of stress contributed towards the understanding that laboratory 
animals’ living conditions interacted with their physiology and affected scientists’ 
experimental methods. Hence, this concept provided an example through which an 
‘ethical’ framework of practice could be convened. Although somewhat ineffective at 
first, this was the founding moment of an ethical framework that is still in place today, 
called the 3Rs. The 3R’s are: reduction, replacement and refinement. This code of conduct was 
first legislated in the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, which was first outlined in a 
book written by biological and zoological scientists Russell and Burch in 1959 called the 
The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique.531  
 
Finally, this idea of stress in the nonhuman animal will be related to broader social and 
cultural representations of women at the time. Even though scientists were embracing 
the idea of ethical practice towards their laboratory animals, they were still conceived of 
as machine-like and reducible to their component parts. This idea of stress - the 
physiological and hormonal models of science that emphasized this concept - interrelated 																																																								
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with contemporary cultural ideals of sex, gender and women. Consequently this chapter 
argues that even though medical science embraced discourses of stress and affect in 
nonhuman animals, through no longer constructing the nonhuman as a passive object of 
manipulation, medical science still held true to the Cartesian divide of the subject-object, 
henceforth constructing animals as ‘active-objects’ in the world. This anthropomorphised 
agency reflected the broader socio-cultural climate associated with women at the time. 
The subject-object, animal-human, man-women binary was still very much a part of 
scientific and British culture. Therefore, I want to extend Carol J. Adam’s concept of the 
‘arrogant eye’ and I hope to show how these entanglements of speciesism and sexism 
were a lot more complex and historically significant than Adams’ work suggests. 
 
Previous Literature 
Not many scholars have addressed mid-twentieth century British science in quite this 
manner. In terms of animal histories and experiment, there is a wealth of literature that 
focuses on the vivisection-antivivisection debates in nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century science. Further, there is a wide range of literature that features discussions on 
the laws associated with the regulation of animal experiment in this period. Notable 
historians include Hilda Kean, Harriet Ritvo, Nicolaas Rupke, James Turner, Keith 
Tester, Susan Hamilton, Richard French and Joanna Bourke,532 all of who focus on the 
contemporary political debates of the period between pro-and-antivivisectionists.  
 
However, the most prominent historian of mid-twentieth century British science who 
has looked at animal experimentation and scientific research in the period circa 1948-1965 
is Robert Kirk. Kirk discusses the standardisation of laboratory animals, the influence of 
ethology on the practices of laboratory scientists and the emergence of a welfarist 
perspective towards laboratory animals in this period.533 As he observes, there is a wide 																																																								
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literature devoted to the social history of the ethical debates surrounding vivisection but 
no interrogation into the relationship between the social history of vivisection and 
scientific histories of the laboratory animal. Consequently, as Kirk has rightly asserted, 
‘there has been no historical analysis of the role of animal welfare in the material practice 
of animal dependent laboratory science’.534 
 
In this chapter, I draw on Kirk’s paper ‘The Invention of the “Stressed Animal” and the 
Development of a Science of Animal Welfare, 1947-1986’, to elucidate further his idea of 
stress and the relationship between the laboratory animal and scientists. However, I seek 
to highlight the entanglement of discourses of stress between the animal and women in 
this period. Kirk argues that the idea of stress facilitated a fifth aspect of change in the 
regulation of vivisection: that of the ethical aspect of scientist, animal and knowledge 
generated from experiments, as situated within interdependent networks of 
relationships.535 Additionally, Kirk argues that the concept of stress ‘provided a language 
by which traditional moral notions such as “well-being” could be reconfigured from a 
political rhetoric to become objects of scientific and economic knowledge materialised in 
physical spaces, scientific practices and legal regulations’. 536  
 
However, despite Kirk’s novelty and initial foray into this area, his work lacks a much-
needed critical focus. Current scholars within the discipline of Critical Animal Studies 
(for example Lynda Birke) and Feminist Science studies (Donna Haraway, Anne Fausto-
Sterling and Helen Longino) can contribute towards, and enhance, the histories of 
laboratory animal science in mid-twentieth century Britain. Whilst these conceptual 
dimensions seem absent in Kirk’s work, I wish to add a much-needed feminist/critical 																																																																																																																																																														
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animal studies presence to it. It is my intention to draw on feminist science studies 
scholars to ‘fill in the gaps’ of Kirk’s work and contribute to expanding the current state 
of knowledge in this area, by relating historical narratives on the laboratory animal in 
medical science to broader social and cultural values of the time.  
 
 
British Medical Science and the State 
 
The two World Wars propelled British medical research into a new era and the state 
increasingly turned to science in the search for medical cures. For instance the typically 
“feminine” disease of hysteria was acknowledged as one that also manifested in men, and 
was coined as “Shell-Shock” (a form of post-traumatic stress as a result of soldiers’ 
experiences on the battlefield). 537  Hence, there was a revival of interest in the 
psychological dimensions of ill health. In 1950s Britain it became commonplace to 
declare that there was an increase in mental health issues due to the changes in living 
conditions bought about by war, economic conditions and contemporary technological 
advances.538  
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth there was a 
transformation in biomedical science and the use of the animal body. Discoveries were 
made of a multitude of substances that contributed to the function of the human body, 
most notably, insulin, vitamins and hormones.539  There was an exponential increase in 
the number of animals used for experimentation in this period, from 270 in 1879 to 
958,761 in 1939.540 As a result of this, the nonhuman animal became essential to the 
experimental scientist, and thus, became embedded in a series of networks that not only 
included the laboratory, but also the hospital, farm, slaughterhouse and government.541 
These networks of ‘supply and demand’ became more formalised in 1947 with the 
creation of the Laboratory Animals Bureau (L.A.B.) by the Medical Research Council 																																																								
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(MRC).542 This was coupled with the emergence of an ethics of scientist-animal relations 
in the laboratory with the publication of The UFAW’s Handbook on the Care and 
Management of Laboratory Animals.543  
 
The creation of the L.A.B. and the resultant publications it inspired came at a crucial 
juncture in the advent of post-war British modernity. It was at this time, as noted in the 
previous chapter, that scientists began to assume powerful positions within state 
departments. Scientists became key advisers to politicians with regards to the funding of 
scientific endeavours and in the formation of science policy.544  It was the Second World 
War that provided the crucial turning point for the generation of science-government 
relations in Britain. Scientists amongst other specialists were integrated into the civil 
service in a way they had not been previously.545 This is most clearly evidenced by the 
work performed by scientists at Porton Down and the creation of a specific research 
committee, the DRPC.546 Paralleling this was the creation of the Advisory Council on 
Scientific Policy (ASCP), which had the function of advising high-ranking politicians on 
devising and implementing civil scientific policy, such as plans concerning contemporary 
medical research. 547  Accordingly, there was considerable overlap between the two 
committees. For instance, the Royal British Air Force requested a considerable amount 
of medical research to be conducted on the usefulness of amphetamines in enhancing 
the performance of its pilots in the mid- to late 1940s.548  
 
Clearly, then, after the Second World War, the place of science and technology in 
government was becoming increasingly important.549 In the middle of the century, British 																																																								
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government was more technocratic and hence science and technology was becoming 
woven into the very fabric of the nation.550 Eminent scientists ascended to high-ranking 
positions in the previously mentioned committees and, consequently, the corridors of 
Whitehall. Several figures, such as Henry Tizard, a prominent chemist, Sir John 
Cockcroft (Director of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell), Sir 
Frederick Brundrett, chief government scientist, who was later replaced by Solly 
Zuckerman, a zoologist, in 1960, 551 became the most prominent and influential of 
government advisors during this time.  
 
After the Second World War, a political system was introduced that was radically 
different from previous ones. The Labour Party, led by Clement Attlee, won the 1945 
General Election with a dramatic victory over the Conservatives. 552  The party had 
promised the electorate a free health service, full employment and a welfare state, and 
they did this by embracing Keynesian economics. Consequently, in the March of 1946 
the National Health Services Bill (NHS) was published.553 The NHS bill aimed to give 
access to free healthcare for all, regardless of social class. This pivotal moment in British 
politics became the driving force for an increase in funding in medical research and its 
allied services. 
 
 
Overall, while the majority of government funds were going on defence R&D554 there 
was also an increase in government expenditure on civil R&D between 1945-1965. Part 
of this funding towards civil R&D went to the Medical Research Council (MRC), the 
leading organisation overseeing scientific endeavours in medicine. The funding the MRC 
received increased exponentially between the years 1945-1965, rising from £0.3m in 
1945-6 to £7m in 1963-4.555  It was partly a result of this increase of influence from 
scientists upon government and the funding from government to the civil science sector 
that determined the requirement that scientists should consider the ethical role of the 
experimental animal more in their research. It was the work of Hans Selye, a biochemist 																																																								
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at McGill University in Canada that assisted in raising awareness in British medical 
science of the need for a form of welfare in terms of the care and treatment of laboratory 
animals. Hans Selye, therefore, created conditions of possibility for the increase in the 
use of animals in medical experimentation. A shift in the construction of the nonhuman 
under dissection and a consideration of them as active agents in the world helped mark a 
turning point in the treatment of nonhuman laboratory animals. 
 
Hans Selye and the General Adaptation Syndrome 
 
What is this one mysterious condition that the most different kinds of people 
have in common with the animals and even with individual cells, at times when 
much – much of anything – happens to them? What is the nature of stress?556 
 
In the early twentieth century a small circle of Anglo-American medical scientists 
published papers concerning emotions in laboratory animals.557 This in turn influenced 
the work of a hitherto unknown Hungarian physiologist called Hans Selye, whose 
account of stress in the mid-twentieth century followed on from the influential work of 
Walter B. Cannon, particularly his 1915 book, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and 
Rage: An Account of Recent Researches into the Function of Emotional Excitement.558 Cannon’s 
work influenced other scientists in the area of animal emotions. As a result, a small 
community of researchers cohered in the interwar years, dedicated to emotional 
disturbances in the nonhuman.559 However, it was Selye’s work on stress and adaptation 
that provided the turning point for recognition of a need for a science of laboratory 
animal welfare in mid-twentieth century Britain.  
 
The first wide-ranging (and scientifically accepted) recognition that a sentient being could 
suffer from both physical and psychological ‘stress’ came in a short article published in 
Nature in 1936 by Hans Selye. It made reference to a host of external and internal 
‘nocuous agents’ that caused a change in the living being’s body and mind.560 As a result 
of these various harmful agents, the article claimed, the living body responded in three 
stages. Firstly, the response is the ‘general alarm reaction’ then resistance to ‘invasions’ 																																																								
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and the final stage being adaptation. Towards the end of the article, Selye notes how 
‘since the syndrome as a whole seems to represent a generalised effort of the organism to 
adapt itself to new conditions, it might be termed the general adaptation syndrome’.561 
This short and subdued article did not mention the word ‘stress’ at all. However, despite 
its cautious tone, it was to trigger a paradigmatic change in British scientists attitudes 
towards the nonhumans in their service as laboratory animals.  
 
In 1907, after completing his medical degree and doctorate in organic chemistry, Hans 
Selye later settled in the Department of Biochemistry at McGill University.562 It was here 
that his earlier experiments on female rats - analysing ovarian hormones - paved the way 
for his development of the concept of the General Adaptation Syndrome.563  Selye’s 
most explicit description of his theory was in 1946 in a comprehensive article published 
in the Journal of Endocrinology.564 Over one hundred pages long and featuring diagrams, 
photographs and charts, this article facilitated the general acceptance and use of the term 
‘stress’ within medical circles and eventually in wider society, in the 1950s. It was his use 
and extension of contemporary hormonal and physiological theories that formed the 
bedrock of his General Adaptation Syndrome concept. Stress was seen as an acute 
reaction to external and internal incompatibilities with the body and Selye claimed it 
could be anything from ‘diet, temperature [and] light’ to ‘heredity’ and  general 
‘constitution’. 565  He named these causes ‘conditioning factors’ and claimed that the 
adaptation syndrome was an ‘indispensible physiologic defense reaction to damage’.566 
Influenced by Cannon’s concept of homeostasis567 and popular hormonal theories of the 
body,568 Selye’s concept of stress not only influenced intellectual discussion on mental 
illness but also (and somewhat ironically) the care and treatment of laboratory animals.  
 
																																																								
561 Ibid.  
562 Mark Jackson, Evaluating the Role of Hans Selye in the Modern History of Stress, in David Cantor and 
Edmund Ramsden, ed., Stress, Shock and Adaptation in the Twentieth Century (Rochester, USA: 
University of Rochester Press, 2014). pp.23-24. 
563 Ibid.  
564 Hans Selye, Hans Selye, "The General Adaptation Syndrome and the Diseases of Adaptation," 
Journal of Clinical Endocrinology 6, no. 2 (1946). 
565 Hans Selye, The Story of the Adaptation Syndrome Told in the Form of Informal, Illustrated Lectures 
(Montreal Canada: Acta Inc, Medical Publishers, 1952). P. Leitmotiv. 
566 Ibid. 
567 "Stress and the General Adaptation Syndrome," British Medical Journal, no. 4667 (1950). 
568 Mark Jackson, The Age of Stress: Science and the Search for Stability (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). p. 82-83. 
	 141	
In his writings, Selye was a passionate advocate of the use of animals for experimentation 
(rats, and later monkeys, were an integral part to his laboratory modus operandi throughout 
his entire career). He certainly did not question the use of them in his pursuit of 
professional recognition. In lectures given to medical audiences around the world at the 
height of his fame, and collected in and published as a book entitled The Story of the 
Adaptation Syndrome, Selye’s description of the relationship of science to nature (and thus 
the nonhuman) was elaborated, and was reminiscent of Francis Bacon’s treatise on the 
philosophy of science. His passion for science was communicated most clearly when he 
exclaimed that he derived great ‘intellectual satisfaction… from forcing one’s way, step 
by step, into the confidence of Nature’ in order to ‘understand her’.569 This ‘forcing one’s 
way’ into nature was via the use of animals. In his 1956 book, The Stress of Life, he came 
across as a zealous advocate of the use of the nonhuman in experiment: 
 
If we want to learn something about any aspect of life, we first need a sample of 
its pattern as expressed in the body of an animal or man. The structural 
organisation of living beings can often be studied by dissection after death, but 
vital processes can only be explored during life. Since it is not justified to 
perform dangerous operations on man, experimental animals are quite 
indispensible for such studies.570 
 
Selye’s position on animal use in science is clear. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
scientists studying the effects of chemical and biological weapons on the body had power 
over the animal in death. On the contrary, the medical science of stress exercised power 
over the living animal body. With Selye’s impassioned opinions on the matter, he went on 
further to outline why the use of the nonhuman was important for medicine. Over two 
pages he described the medical breakthroughs made over the past one hundred years 
from using animals in experiments, claiming that ‘a major step of progress in medicine 
has been based, at least partly, on animal experiments’.571 He ended with a personal 
pronouncement on the matter: 
 
The better one understands the nature of life, disease and suffering, the more one 
becomes incapable of brutality. This thought was not the least important among 
the motives which led me to write a book on the nature of disease for those who 
are not professionally concerned with medicine. In our Institute last year, we 
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used about 1400 rats a week for research, but not one of them exposed to 
unnecessary pain because of carelessness.572 
 
Animals were integral to Selye’s theories on stress, and gave him the capacity to question 
nature. For Selye “nature” was ‘the source of all knowledge – [and] rarely replies to 
questions unless they are put to her in the form of experiments to which she can say 
“yes” or “no”. She is not loquacious; she merely nods in the affirmative or in the 
negative’.573 In Selye’s eyes, nature was female and science there to uncover the secrets 
that she beholds. Passive and shy, ‘she will silently show us a picture’574 of the world at 
large. And, it was through this perception of the natural world and his experiments on 
rats, that he could establish his theory on stress and the general adaptation syndrome, 
catapulting him to scientific fame in mid-twentieth century Britain.  
 
The UFAW Handbook: New Beginnings in Animal Welfare 
 
The publications of Selye’s 1946 article was a watershed moment in accepting that 
physiological disturbances in the body caused both psychological shock and stress to a 
living organism. It was this that consequently acted as the impetus behind the UFAW’s 
handbook for the care and treatment of laboratory animals in the late forties. Alastair 
Worden, Professor and Director of research in animal health at the University College of 
Wales compiled and edited the Handbook, which was published by the UFAW. Chaired 
by Major C.W. Hume and with Professor Edward Hindle of the Zoological Society of 
London as its President, the UFAW sought to approach the nonhuman in ways that 
absented the ‘emotional or sentimental’ yet served the interests of science by building a 
‘realistically humane policy based on objective fact.’575  
 
Formed in 1926 by Major C Hume, 576 the UFAW had a series of key objectives. One of 
the organisation’s main objectives was to enlist the support of scientists in the ‘subject of 
animal welfare, and to show that it has aspects which should appeal to them’.577 Hence, 
the book provided guidance and advice on a variety of laboratory practices and animal 
husbandry, including; food preparation, cages and cage-equipment, experimental 																																																								
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techniques, as well as information regarding a host of experimental animals from rabbits, 
guinea pigs, rats and mice, to pigeons, fish and ferrets. 578  This was followed up in 
chapters devoted to the perfect laboratory conditions and clear instructions for animal 
technicians and assistants. It was here that the gendered division of labour within the 
laboratory was explicitly highlighted, as ‘many workers prefer women to men as animal 
assistants’ (See figure one).579  
 
 
Figure one: Female laboratory assistant with female rat, in Worden p. 127. 
 
Laboratory Spaces and Gendered Places 
 
Coupled with its acknowledgment that female animal assistants were preferable to the 
care and welfare of the laboratory animals, the Handbook devoted an entire chapter to the 
‘design and management’ of the animal laboratory. 580  To envisage and advocate a 
standardisation of research laboratories went hand-in-hand with the advent of the 
standardisation of laboratory animals. 581  Uniformity was essential to post-war British 
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medical science so that bodily processes of the nonhuman could be investigated and act 
as models for human diseases.582  
 
Therefore, to standardise scientific medical research and its ‘apparatuses’ meant that the 
results of experiments could be generalised to wider populations – both human and 
nonhuman.583 What emerges in the Handbook is a method to acquire and create particular 
kinds of scientific knowledge through ‘careful and considerate management’ 584  of 
laboratory spaces, the keeping of animals, how the animals are tested and the gendered 
divisions of labour within the laboratory.585 By neglecting to do this it would: 
 
[S]eem futile to expect reliable results from the use of animals of mixed or 
unknown origin… housed in inadequate, dirty, parasite-infested, unevenly heated, 
badly ventilated, draughty, noisy or otherwise unsuitable surroundings, handled 
with fear or distaste and fed irregularly on diets containing bulky or rapidly 
spoiling foods of which the nutritive value has never been ascertained.586 
 
Highly structured and sterile spaces were advocated as they were considered to facilitate 
valid experiments. But nevertheless, these spaces sought to constrain the behaviours of 
the nonhumans living in them. The ‘animal house’ was an area of the laboratory that kept 
the nonhumans prior to and (if they were not euthanized) after the experiments. The 
chapter details the requirements for the animal house, from the appropriate material 
required for construction, to the actual dimensions and sizes of cages. Cages were 
advised to be stored in racks – piled high on top of each other - and numbered so as to 
identify the individuals living in them (see figure two).587  
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Figure two: Cage rack design in Worden p. 24. 
 
Both apparatus and the nonhuman in the experimental laboratories were undergoing a 
transformation in terms of scientific practice. In effect, this was another way for 
scientists to control ‘nature’ by the use of technocratic management techniques, and 
preventing variation and individual difference amongst animals through standardisation 
and numbering. 588  Furthermore, the book advised that the animals be segregated 
according to sex and kept in small groups such as ‘mothers with litters’.589 The book 
asserts the fact that in rabbits ‘unless the sexes are separated when 3 ½ to 4 months old, 
fighting and unwanted matings occur.590 For guinea-pigs, ‘the sexes may be mixed in the 
proportion of one male to five females.’ 591  To segregate animals according to sex 
reflected the social assumptions of the time in relation to gender differences. These 
assumptions determined the very way that laboratory animals were to be kept and tested. 
Thus, the advice in the handbook was replete with social and cultural values that the 
authors were trying to obviate in the first place. The limited housing conditions and 
laboratory spaces, how and by whom they were handled would have affected the 
nonhumans’ behaviour and physiology. Thus, the constrained laboratory animal became 
a distortion and re-construction of their actual behaviour in the wild. The information 
given in the handbook is itself a distortion of the nonhuman, alongside the very 																																																								
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behaviour the book was trying to categorise – the use of reductionist logic, binary 
divisions and gender-specific practices.592 Consequently, it was the very precisely defined 
physical spaces set out in the Handbook, which led the nonhuman to become the very 
embodiment of a fixed and particular array of conventions that sought to give credibility 
to the idea of animal experimental science in medicine. 
 
Animal Experimentation and the Human Male Gaze: The Disciplinary 
Techniques of Laboratory Relations. 
 
Through these specifically designed, managed and standardised laboratory spaces, came 
the development of gendered and species-segregated hierarchies of power. The 
manifestation of power in the laboratory, as discussed above, was highly gendered, and 
rested upon the dominance of the male gaze to aid this standardisation. The gaze then, 
was not simply neutral; there was a gender dimension to the authority of the gaze. For 
instance, a fundamental part of how women are positioned in society is through, what 
Laura Mulvey terms, the male gaze: 
In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split 
between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its 
phantasy onto the female figure which is styled accordingly. In their traditional 
exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their 
appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to 
connote to-be-looked-at-ness. 593 
 
The male gaze establishes a hierarchy of power, whereby reality and therefore vision, is 
constructed via the [human] man’s view of the world, this in turn negates women’s views 
of the world, and women become objectified and positioned as ‘Other’, alongside 
animals. The application of Mulvey’s male gaze here, fits well the idea of a masculine 
science, using the methodological tools of observation to account for and control 
nonhuman bodies. This is akin to the idea of ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ stipulated by Mulvey. 
Furthermore, this idea of the male gaze can be linked to the notion of disciplining bodies 
and regulating their behaviour. 
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One of the ways to manage bodies and behaviours is through surveillance, and it was in 
Foucault’s work on the penal system that he alluded to the ‘Panoptican’. 594  Jeremy 
Bentham, an eighteenth century utilitarian, designed the panoptican, a type of prison 
building, which ensured guards could view the cells and all the prisoners from a centrally 
positioned tower on the jail’s site.595 The prisoners would not know if they were being 
observed and hence, adjust their behaviour accordingly.596  Foucault sees the logic of the 
Panoptican as an example of disciplinary forces acting on the body.597 In other words, the 
best way to enable prisoners to behave was through the operation of power over them 
which made them think they were constantly being observed, and were the targets of the 
authority’s gaze at all times.  
 
The disciplinary gaze was not confined to the prison, but moved throughout the various 
institutions of society such as the factory and school. Nor did it reside in one particular 
person, but formed part of the very institutions themselves. 598  It is this concept of the 
disciplinary gaze that can be applied to understand the ideals set out in the Handbook for 
laboratory spaces. A disciplinary male gaze over the laboratory was constituted through 
the work of the UFAW and Laboratory Animals Bureau. Laboratories and nonhuman 
animals became standardised in mid-twentieth century Britain via the dissemination of 
the UFAW’s discourses of care towards the laboratory nonhuman.  The gendered, male 
gaze over the nonhuman animals’ living bodies became essential in order to postulate the 
very symptoms of the condition of stress. As Foucault describes: 
The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it 
down, and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of 
power’, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, 
not only so that they may do what one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and 
the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and 
practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.599  
 
This creation of docile nonhuman bodies echoes Foucault’s analysis of disciplining 
human bodies from the eighteenth century onwards. The techniques of welfare were 
promulgated by the UFAW in the name of creating an economics of efficiency in 
laboratory human-animal relations: reducing wastage of animals, improving their physical 																																																								
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and psychological health in order to make experiments more valid and housing animals 
in clean conditions so as to reduce the occurrence of extraneous variables such as certain 
diseases that were not part of the experimental procedure. Again, like Foucault, through 
the mechanisms of laboratory human-animal relations in mid-twentieth century Britain, 
this idea of welfare increased the animal body’s utility and therefore increased the power 
the human [male] had over the nonhuman body, establishing ‘in the body the 
constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination’.600 In other 
words, scientific welfarism created healthier animals but in doing so, increased regulation, 
control and domination over the nonhuman body to ensure their healthiness was fit-for-
purpose. 
 
Constructed through the discourse of stress, the actual material spaces of the laboratory, 
as we saw above, became gendered and heavily disciplined spaces of care and welfare. 
The laboratory and animal house that accompanied it had a specific design and layout 
reminiscent of Foucault’s allusions to Bentham’s panoptican.  Figure three shows a 
design of an animal house to be used by laboratories for experimental purposes. It is 
taken from the second edition of the UFAW Handbook601 edited by Dr Lane-Petter, of 
the Laboratory Animals Bureau, and member of the Research Defence Society (see 
chapter six). 
 
Figure three: UFAW Handbook (1957:18) ‘Scheme of Animal House’. 
 																																																								
600 Ibid.p.138. 
601 Alastair Wordern and W. Lane-Petter, ed., The Ufaw Handbook on the Care and Management of 
Laboratory Animals, 2nd Edition ed. (London: UFAW, 1957). p.18. 
	 149	
The design of the animal house is very much from the perspective of the human [male] 
gaze. A corridor runs between rooms that contain rows and racks of cages piled on top 
of each other, this allowed for full visibility of the animal, at all times. Rooms (9,10,12) 
were areas for post-mortems, cage washing rooms, a store for clean cages. Animals were 
segregated according to their purpose, rooms 1-3 for experimental animals, 4-5 for newly 
purchased guinea-pigs and rabbits, and 6-7 for the breeding of rats and mice, so that the 
experimenters’ ‘stock’ would not diminish.602 This segregation aided the experimenters by 
sight; visually mapping the animal house enabled the gaze over the nonhuman body to 
become permanent, even in death, through the construction of a post-mortem room: 
 
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals 
are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in 
which all events are recorded, in which power is exercised without division, 
according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is 
constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings, the sick 
and the dead – all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary 
mechanism.603 
 
This disciplinary male gaze over the nonhuman animal not only entrenched a 
standardised view of the nonhuman but also created a body that was docile, yet still 
objectified. It was only through the gaze of the scientist that the status of nonhuman 
animals changed, and a whole set of discourses and practices surrounding laboratory 
animals became established via the principles advocated in the Handbook. 
 
And, indeed, the UFAW Handbook was praised for its insight and its philosophical 
approach to the science of animal welfare. A review in the British Medical Journal by A. L. 
Bacharach praised Worden for his ‘common sense’ approach towards animals and their 
use for experiments.604 Bacharach hailed the book as ‘indispensible’ due to its ‘practical 
blend of economics and humanitarianism’.605 Emphasis was placed upon the economic 
rewards that would be reaped by scientists if they treated their laboratory species’ with 
‘kindness’. A sly dig was also directed at the antivivisectionists: the ‘common sense’ 
approach to animals, as opposed to the ‘sentimental’ one, meant that ‘healthy contented 
animals’ would provide ‘more information… than… sick and miserable animals’. This 
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book therefore had hidden depths, as behind the technical descriptions of keeping 
animals, lay ‘shrewd tactics’ utilised by the book’s ‘level-headed planners, who are willing 
to run with the laboratory hares in the most friendly association, provided they are not 
also expected to hunt with the anti-vivisectionist hounds’. 606  Sentimentality was too 
feminine and qualitative to enter into the science of animal welfare, and seemingly this 
book deflected the antivivisectionist critique by claiming scientific rationality, 
humanitarianism and care towards animals. It was through these tactics that the UFAW 
reshaped laboratory relations between the human and animal in this period, and 
challenged the current legislation on animal experiments.607  
 
The 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act (see next chapter), defined pain in purely physiological 
terms. The Handbook instead provided scope for a redefinition of pain and acknowledged 
the psychological dimensions of the laboratory animal. Yet it did admit that a great deal 
of work in this area had to be done: 
 
There appears to be room for a good deal of research into the psychological 
conditions that make a happy and contented stock. Captive animals may suffer 
acutely from boredom, and the certainly need exercise, companionship and 
opportunity to play. Most rodents appear to be agoraphobic and appreciate a 
nestbox or hut into which they can retreat, and they like to store food. How far 
such wishes be gratified depends, no doubt, on experimental requirements… but 
there is room for ingenuity and research in the matter.608  
 
The use of subjective words such as ‘boredom’ and ‘companionship’ demonstrate an 
underlying paradox of this science of animal welfare. Firstly, animals were imbued with 
subjectivity, yet at the same time still perceived as objects of study – or ‘stock’. The 
nonhuman had been re-constructed as an active agent in the world, yet one which was 
still objectified. How can one have ‘happy and contended stock’? Surely this is a 
misnomer? The etymology of the word ‘stock’ denotes the ‘total amount of goods 
available’609 ; it refers to material objects rather than sentient beings. In spite of this 
contradiction, the UFAW still challenged the legal definition of pain in the nonhuman 
and afforded them a degree of subjectivity that was far removed from the Cartesian 
principle of the nonhuman being a machine. This individualising of laboratory animals 																																																								
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was also a form of power over the nonhuman body that combined with the spatial layout 
of the laboratory, and rendered nonhuman animals, through the male gaze, even more 
subjugated in the relations of power-knowledge. This individualisation via the male gaze 
created subject-object binaries that were masculinist and had implications for both 
animals and women: 
All the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double 
mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; 
normal/abnormal); and that of coercive assignment, of differential distribution 
(who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterised; how he is to be 
recognised; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an 
individual way, etc).610 
 
Yet, despite this almost unconsciously expressed Cartesianism, Descartes’ influence on 
science is both acknowledged in the introduction of the Handbook and at the same time 
challenged its author, Professor T. Dalling, Director of the Veterinary Laboratory for the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. It was here that Dalling claimed that the Cartesian 
view of animal-as-machine was obsolete ‘in view of what is now known of the biological 
relation between man and the lower animals’.611 And yet, according to Dalling, ‘this queer 
heirloom bequeathed by the great-grandfather of modern science is still lying about in 
intellectual lumber-rooms’. 612  In other words, Dalling was sure that the advocacy of 
Cartesian ideas was becoming rare and was increasingly being dismissed by scientists as 
erroneous. Yet, it still persisted in some areas of scientific research. Was this true? Or 
were laboratory science and its methodologies still Cartesian in their material practice but 
disguising their assumptions through a changed performance of semiotics? Dalling 
elaborated on this point by offering a statement on the need for an acceptance of 
subjectivity in laboratory human-animal relations. He philosophised on how his: 
 
[O]wn subjective consciousness is the sole source of any conception I can form 
of any mental state, painful or otherwise. I cannot inspect another man’s mind, 
and when I picture it or converse with him I have to use my own thoughts and 
feelings as symbols of his, interpreting his observable reactions in terms of my 
own. It is impossible to prove that his mind exists outside my imagination, for 
every attempt to refute metaphysical solipsism will be found to beg the question; 
the justification for a transcendent interpretation of my experience is the 
pragmatic one, that it enables me to control the latter. The same interpretation is 
applied to the behaviour of animals, with the same justification, by trainers, 																																																								
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trappers and others who have to deal with them. Finally, while human beings can 
escape from the severer levels of pain by swooning, it seems doubtful whether 
most animals, if any, can do so.613 
  
To advance such a bold statement about the ontological nature of existence shows how 
the epistemological foundations of science were being shaken by the notion of animal 
stress and the ability for the nonhuman to feel pain. In an era dominated by ‘experts’ 
who advised government on contemporary policy-making decisions that would affect all 
aspects of British life - from welfare, healthcare, and the family, to war and the need for 
weapons of mass destruction – scientists needed animals. But, they did not want to face 
the challenges to vivisection to such a degree as the nineteenth century scientists did in 
response to those antivivisectionists who, they claimed, sought to stifle human 
‘progress’.614 Medical scientists needed a get-out clause, and Selye could help with this. 
Hence, this ‘turn to subjectivity’ would have its economic, social and political advantages 
for some scientists in the post-war era. The UFAW Handbook was just sowing the seeds 
for the development of a different kind of power over living beings – a power over life, 
which involved an anthropocentric and androcentric understanding of subjectivity. 
 
 
‘Stress Without Distress’: The Scientific Basis of Kindness to Animals 
 
In stressful investigations, there seems at first sight an irreconcilable conflict 
between the claims of humanity and efficiency. For how can we eliminate, or 
even reduce, the distress imposed [on animals] without prejudicing the end [of 
the experiment] in view?… There is grounds for hope that, perhaps when a little 
more is known, the responses themselves may be evoked, as required, by 
intervention at a more peripheral or co-ordinative level than that of the sites of 
integration of distress itself. In other words, we may soon be able to get stress 
without distress.615 
 
After the success of the Handbook, the UFAW continued to publish work about 
laboratory animal welfare. It was after its publication that scientists began to accept the 
legitimacy of the psychological dimensions of pain and suffering an animal could 
withstand when in laboratory environments. What the UFAW did was to rationalise and 
objectify animal emotions in the laboratory.  They moved away from philosophical and 
																																																								
613 Ibid. p. 18. 
614 French, Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society. 
615 Burch, The Principles of Humane Experimental Techinque. p. 135. 
	 153	
emotive descriptions of pain, fear and distress in the animal, as favoured by the 
antivivisectionists, and developed a new discourse of animal morality. This discourse was 
deployed to legitimate the continued use of even more animals in medical experimental 
procedures. 
 
This section unpacks this discursive strategy by focussing on the UFAW publications 
about animal laboratory welfare in the 1950s and early 1960s. As has been mentioned, it 
was this organisation that led the way in fashioning a language of animal-use as 
‘humane’ 616 , which legitimated animal experimentation. Further, the idea of animal 
psychological-stress prompted the consideration of a change in scientific methodologies 
and practices associated with medical experiments on animals.  
 
Alongside the Handbook, it was the publication of John Baker’s The Scientific Basis of 
Kindness to Animals in 1948 (subsequently re-issued in 1951 and 1955) which set the tone 
for the animal welfare movement in the early post-war period. It was Baker himself who 
positioned the emergent discourse of animal welfare as a ‘movement’ and defined it as 
being ‘concerned primarily with the consciousness of suffering’. 617  However, this 
consciousness of suffering was hierarchical and subject to an age-old scientific episteme 
that ordered nonhumans according to their closeness (physiologically) to humans: 
  
it is chiefly animals that live in groups and have special habits in relation to social 
life and young animals tended by parents, that call attention to their sensation of 
pain in a way that is obvious to us… a non-social animal gains nothing by calling 
attention to pain or fear.’618  
 
These ‘social animals’ described by Baker are mammals and vertebrates and the ‘lower 
animals’ were deemed as those who were invertebrates. To acknowledge the subjective 
was suitable only when considering those animals that were considered to be closer to 
humans. Baker asserted that there was a ‘good reason to suppose that some of the higher 
animals may suffer as a result of purely psychological causes; from fear, for instance’.619 
But for amphibious nonhumans their forms of consciousness were questionable (it 
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should be noted, amphibians must have been a ‘lower’ kind of vertebrate for Baker, 
compared to the mammal): 
 
When we drop some acid onto the skin of the hind leg of a frog, the animal will 
kick out and hop away. One may perhaps regard this reaction as a deliberate 
attempt to escape a source of injury. The frog will also kick out with its back legs, 
however, in response to the same stimulus, if the brain has previously been 
removed. Now in the absence of the brain no physiologist would consider that 
the animal could be conscious, and the apparent attempt to escape the source of 
injury by extension of the back legs cannot therefore be regarded in itself as a 
proof of the existence of pain.620 
 
Consciousness and the ability for the nonhuman to feel pain which had its origins in the 
physiological was only attributed to the group of animals known as mammals. For Baker, 
it was the mammalian vertebrates who were endowed with the gift of awareness and 
sentience, but for those in the lower echelons of the scientific animal order of things, it 
was ‘much harder to obtain evidence as to whether [they] are conscious’.621 Furthermore, 
what Baker bestows upon the nonhuman is an a priori assumption about animal 
responses to pain, largely borrowed from pre-existing frameworks that reflect his 
experiences of human society. In other words, Baker and the UFAW were guilty of 
anthropomorphism via his interpretation of their behavioural responses, in categories 
already presupposed – especially in relation to those mammalian species that were most 
similar to humans.622 
 
Read alongside the UFAW Handbook on animal husbandry, Baker’s treatise on animal 
consciousness provides us with the starting point from which we can discuss the new 
science of animal welfare in mid-twentieth century Britain. Furthermore, it shows us how 
mid-twentieth century British medical science was beginning to problematize the idea of 
animal suffering in the laboratory, and to act as a crucial point within which the care of 
laboratory animals interrelated with the power scientists had over laboratory animals. 
There was no neat dividing line between care and power. Fundamentally, this 
acknowledgment of animal subjectivity was produced by a change in the way laboratory 
based scientists observed and were told to observe, the nonhuman. 
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The recognition that (some) animals in the laboratory could suffer psychologically 
opened up a new area of scientific expertise,623 and thus enabled the scientist to enter 
into a new form of observation over the animal body. No more were animals to be used 
and treated as mere objects of research; instead, they had to be cared for in the name of 
scientific efficiency, cost and time management.624  This practice of observation was 
produced through the recognition of consciousness and subjectivity in the animal and by 
the concept of Selye’s concept of stress.  
 
In 1954, the UFAW funded another research project that intended to outline a welfarist 
approach towards laboratory animal science.625 Buoyed by the success of the Handbook, 
the UFAW enlisted two scientists to continue its work into laboratory animal welfare: 
W.M.S. Russell, UFAW research fellow, Department of Zoology and Comparative 
Anatomy, University College London, and, R.L. Burch UFAW research assistant. This 
time the focus was not going to be on animal husbandry and laboratory spaces, but 
rather, the very methodologies employed by scientists to conduct their experiments.  
 
With contributions from several distinguished scientists in the fields of ethology, 
physiology and zoology, including Professor P.B. Medawar, as chair of the Consultative 
Committee for the book, 626  and Dr Lane-Petter head of the Laboratory Animals 
Bureau,627 the book was intended to be a contribution towards the celebrations of the 
centenary of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species. 628  With Russell taking the main 
editorial lead,629 the book became known as The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. 
The book recognised that: 
It has sometimes seemed that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 
claims of science and medicine and those of humanity in our treatment of lower 
animals… The conflict disappears altogether on closer inspection, and by now it 
is widely recognised that the humanest possible treatment of experimental 
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animals, far from being an obstacle, is actually a prerequisite for successful animal 
experimentation.630  
 
The aim of the book was to demonstrate the links between ‘humanity and efficiency’, in 
the treatment of animals during the course of experiment – the very methodologies of 
experimental science were being questioned. 631  The book’s authors suggested that it 
represented the starting point of a ‘new science’ of humane experimentation because of 
its interdisciplinary approach, and its establishment of a set of ‘general principles’ for this 
‘new subject’.632 However, the humane principles were only applied to a certain kind of 
nonhuman, the vertebrates, for reasons of ‘simplicity and clarity’.633 It was against this 
background that the book proposed differing ways of assessing pain, measuring 
subjectivity and imparting guidance for a more humane approach towards those 
nonhumans with a backbone.  
 
Stress, Distress and Fear: Selye’s Influence on the UFAW’s Humane Experimental Technique 
 
Russell and Burch proposed a ‘psychosomatic’ approach to this new construction of the 
lab animal.634 This was a branch of medicine which stipulated the link between the mind 
and the body and rejected the historical propositions of the Cartesian idea of the mind-
body binary. The authors claimed that ‘the mind-body dichotomy is an entirely 
pathological fantasy… first thrust upon science by Descartes’.635 As will be recalled, the 
disavowal of Cartesian principles was first suggested in the Handbook and echoed by 
Hume in the Humane Experimental Technique. This time the idea was conceptualised 
through the ideas of Hans Selye and his General Adaptation Syndrome. The book was 
replete with Selyian ideas and language associated with stress and the nervous system, 
and the hormonal and endocrine changes the body underwent during periods of ill 
health. But, as the authors suggested, ‘it is regrettable on humane and scientific grounds 
that so large a proportion of the study of psychosomatics in animals has so far been 
carried out with the bludgeon of ‘stress’ of the more severe kinds’.636 It was at this point 																																																								
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that the authors emphasised the importance of assessing more ‘subtle interactions’ 
between behavioural and physiological states in lab animals.637 
 
Interestingly, the studies mentioned regarding the more indirect stressful states in the 
nonhuman are directly related to experiments conducted on animals concerning 
reproductive physiology, as it was claimed that in this particular branch of medical 
research ‘we know most about the complex effects of the physical and social 
environment on endocrine control units’.638 Furthermore, the exploration of these subtle 
states was justified by Russell and Burch with reference to modes of synchronisation in 
reproductive states of mating and ovulation in a female nonhuman. The authors refer to 
the female oestrous cycle, claiming that ‘the female will only mate (or is only attractive) at 
a period suitably timed with her own spontaneous ovulation’ and this depends on their 
social environment. Hence, stress and lab animal distress was distinguished as being 
produced in seemingly termed ‘trivial’ or inconsequential circumstances.  
 
The idea of the social environment being a precursor to stress in the nonhuman was 
based on the Selyian ideas of hormones interacting with the social environment and 
hence used hormonal models of the animal body as an explanation for distress. Although 
semantically the book was asserting a viewpoint which eschewed the Cartesian principles 
of mind-body separation, in actual fact the binary was still very much in place. As Evelyn 
Fox-Keller asserts, in the mid-twentieth century, biology and its affiliated disciplines 
became accepted members of the scientific community through the idea of the body – 
both human and nonhuman – as a ‘chemical machine’.639 Reference is made in the book 
to the usefulness of cybernetics – a science that prioritised the idea of communications, 
feedback routes and automatic control systems in both machines and living beings – by 
claiming that ‘this new science has the virtue of being a synthetic one’ as ‘part at least of 
biology is by now an industry, and in the cybernetic age no industry can afford to 
dispense with corrective feed-back or with the systematic scanning of techniques’.640 
Hence, the nonhuman body in medicine, as well as the human body, was now a 
cybernetic machine, autonomous and ‘capable of constructing itself, maintaining itself, 
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and reproducing itself.641 To draw on Donna Haraway, the nonhuman body became a 
cyborg.642  A cyborg is a ‘cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a 
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction’.643  
 
However, where Haraway posits that cyborgs have disintegrated the traditional 
boundaries of mind/body, nature/culture, I want to argue that the work of the UFAW in 
this period actually reinforced these polarisations. The semantics of the science proposed 
by the UFAW formed a new kind of dominance over nature. The boundaries between 
what Michael Lynch calls the ‘naturalistic’ animal and the ‘analytic animal’ in the lab had 
become blurred.644 The UFAW were reshaping and re-constituting the nonhuman animal 
in the laboratory, and the book was contributing towards this definition. 
 
The Handbook seemed to provide a rigorous foundation for all of lab animal science and 
the general methodological assumption underlying this field of expertise was 
accompanied by social expectations about the maintenance of the ideal animal body for 
scientific experiment. This was of course resting on Selye’s ideas of hormonal 
contributions to ill health as well as cybernetic notions concerning the body as a 
machine. Selye himself, in his 1949 paper (mentioned above), constructed his theories 
around the mechanico-reductive model of the body. As Helen Longino asserts, these 
scientific models, which give priority to the role of hormones in addressing behaviour, 
are in fact linear and reductionist. She dubs this ‘The Linear-Hormonal Model’.645 Here, 
the model bases all behavioural and sex differences on the hormones, but we can also 
apply Longino’s model to the propositions espoused by Burch and Russell, with their 
emphasis on animal psychosomatics, hormonal and endocrine mechanisms in preserving 
wellbeing in the laboratory animal. With their idea of the behaviour of nonhumans as an 
outcome of a fixed and irreversible set of processes initiated by exposure to certain 
hormones at certain points in their lives: 
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The psychosomatics of experimental animals is perhaps the most important 
single subject for the development of humane and efficient technique in animal 
experiments. If we may by this time use the tag without fear of Cartesian 
implications, the motto of the experimenter in his dealings with his subjects must 
be mens sana in corpore sano, and he will not get the one without the other.646 
 
Mens sana in corpore sano meant having a ‘sound mind in a sound body’. Hence, the lip 
service paid to the rejection of Cartesian principles. In fact, the idea of having a sound 
mind in a sound body renders visible the discourse of the body as a machine with the 
mind, although part of the body, still dependent on physiological mechanisms for ‘its’ 
use, rather than the two being interdependent. This is most explicitly recognised when 
the authors discuss pain, fear and distress in the nonhuman and their capacity to 
experience certain dispositions or moods: ‘the sequence of moods in a lower animal… is 
rigidly controlled by internal and external changes according to a code of rules, largely 
pre-set for a given species’, and hence, of course ‘in this respect, animals are functionally 
similar to neurotic humans’. 647  Furthermore a measurement scale was proposed to 
measure wellbeing and distress in the nonhuman.648 
 
By moving from a notion of pain to one of distress, the idea was for medical science to 
emphasise wellbeing of the animal and thus would allow for the embedding of 
quantifiable techniques both prior to the use of the animal for experiment and during 
experiment.649 With the authors defining stress ‘as a central nervous state of a certain 
rank on a scale, in a direction of the mass autonomic response which, if protracted, would lead 
to the physiological stress syndrome’ 650 Distress and consciousness became a variable for 
measurement and accountable to the experimenter. What Burch and Russell did was 
recommend ways of reducing distress and enhancing wellbeing through a discussion on 
ways to reduce, replace and refine animal experiments:651 
 
Replacement means the substitution for conscious living higher animals of 
insentient material, Reduction means reduction in the numbers of animals used 
to obtain information of a given amount and precision. Refinement means any 																																																								
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decrease in the incidence or severity of inhumane procedures applied to those 
animals.652 
 
These 3 R’s acted as a foundation from which medical science could reshape laboratory 
relations and re-construe the nonhuman. But, what actually occurred was a change in the 
semantics, or ways of speaking about laboratory animals, and not necessarily the material 
practice of medical laboratory animal science. For Replacement the authors continued to 
justify the use of nonhuman animals through the concepts of absolute and relative 
replacement. 653  The stated aim was to completely replace vertebrate animals under 
experiments with either invertebrates or plants. Instead the focus remained on relative 
replacement where animals were still required but ‘in actual experiment they are exposed, 
probably or certainly, to no distress at all’.654 Moreover, the concept of Replacement was 
defended through: 
 
[T]he case of non-recovery experiments on living and intact but completely 
anaesthetized animals. Provided the anaesthesia is general and sufficiently deep, 
and its time-course properly synchronised with the treatment itself, such 
experiments are totally free from inhumanity.655 
 
Coupled with this was the emphasis on Replacement in which experiments using animals 
would fit the criteria of Replacement if they were painlessly killed afterwards as ‘this 
already constitutes a further advance’ in humane experiments ‘provided the euthanasia is 
satisfactory and provided there is substantial reduction in numbers, such experiments are 
beyond reproach’.656 Reduction and refinement of the use of animals were consequently 
justified on the nature of the experimental technique used and the ability to quantify 
results of experiments.  
 
Ironically, in the 3 R’s, what the authors were proposing was a way to perceive the 
nonhuman differently, not just as passive objects but active agents in the world. 
However, the nonhuman was re-shaped into an active object, a new form of tool, for a 
new version of science, one that had to be made more efficient in a post-war world of 
medical research. Thus, this new biological science was achieved through still seeing the 
nonhuman body as a machine-like-object. Reducible to their component parts and 																																																								
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psychological factors controlled via these biomechanical constituents through a series of 
feedback loops. 657  This is most evident in the discussion concerning direct and 
contingent inhumanity. Direct inhumanity was seen as the infliction of ‘distress’ as an 
‘unavoidable consequence’ of the experiment, whereas contingent inhumanity was the 
‘infliction of distress as an incidental and inadvertent by-product’ of the experiment.658  
 
It is here that we can perceive the historical continuity of the influence of the Cartesian 
method, as argued elsewhere in the chapter. Despite the UFAW’s and authors’ rebuke of 
Descartes, the mechanistic nature of the conceptions of the nonhuman extended into the 
new epistemologies of scientific welfarism. This post-Cartesian epistemology 659 
established a claim to the authority of medical science in a post-war world. It became a 
way of disciplining bodies, most notably nonhuman bodies, but also, as we shall see 
gendered human ones, through the power of the gaze and through the manipulation of 
the physical spaces laboratory animals were residing in. This form of social control was 
product of the broader social and cultural milieu of the time, one which embedded and 
embraced a notion of modernity which was drawing on historical paternalistic modes of 
thought and practice.660 These paternalistic impulses were at once entrenched in wider 
society and the laboratory, through the persistence of the scientific discourses of 
hierarchy, both within the animal kingdom, and in human society in the form of 
hierarchies of stratification according to social class, gender and race.  
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When the Distressed Animal Became the Neurotic Woman 
 
As will be recalled, within the writings of the Principles of Humane Experimental Technique 
reference was made likening the distressed laboratory animal to the neurotic human.661 It 
was in 1950s and early 1960s Britain that Selye’s ideas of stress were synthesised with 
psychological markers of distress in the human. These ideas of stress overlapped with 
notions of women’s health and mental health, sex-appropriate behaviour, sexual 
intercourse and the role of hormones in the development of sex differences. From the 
interwar years to the early 1960s, the idea of hormones, and more specifically sex 
hormones, became the new paradigm for medical science to operate from.662 With the 
introduction of the contraceptive pill to British women in 1961,663 it would seem that 
medicine and science revolutionised cultural life by giving women more control over 
their bodies. However, that in itself did not transform the power relationships between 
men, women and scientific constructions of sex, gender and incidentally, animality. 
 
This section explores Selye’s ideas of stress and how it links to the intersection between 
animals and the construction of women, specifically in relation to discourses on pre-
menstrual stress. For instance, it should come as no surprise to know that prior to the 
first wide-scale human trials of the contraceptive pill, nonhuman animals were used, 
mostly rabbits and mice, because of their varied but equally similar oestrous cycles to 
female humans. Experiments were conducted throughout the 1950s in order to find out 
the levels of toxicity of the different substances and their propensity to inhibit 
ovulation.664 Furthermore, some of the initial human trials of the contraceptive pill in the 
United States used psychotic women who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
depression, and who were confined to asylums.665 It is here, then, that we can begin to 
explore the dependency that medical research had on women and animals for both the 
testing of new drugs, and the contribution it made to the construction of broader cultural 
ideas about sex, gender and animality.  
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Rivers of Blood: Science, Pre-Menstrual Stress and Controlling the Animal Within 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a series of philosophical dichotomies that separated 
nature from culture, man from woman, animal from human and reason from irrationality 
underpinned mid-twentieth century British science.666 In turn, these binary opposites, 
although not consciously presented in medical research, were still imposed upon it, as 
evidenced by the role post-Cartesian philosophy played in the construction of a science 
of animal welfare. This post-Cartesianism, as mentioned, retained the old dualisms 
through the acceptance in biology (medical science) of mechanistic accounts and models 
of bodies, as well as in the ‘hyperseparated’667 accounts of the human subject from the 
animal ‘active’ object in the laboratory. In other words, there was a heightened separation 
still between the mind and body, and therefore, a persistence of Cartesian philosophy in 
the material and methodological practices of medical science through its appropriation of 
mechanism and materialist reductionism, despite its disavowal by certain scientists of the 
UFAW. 
 
The UFAW presented discourses of animal welfare that hoped to resolve the 
human/nature dualism by constructing nature, animals and the human within a 
mechanistic framework and in reductionist and essentialised terms.668  But the nonhuman 
within the medical research laboratory still encapsulated these binaries through their use 
as active objects. The interplay of scientific discourses introduced by the UFAW saw the 
nonhuman as being the ‘Same and Different’ from humans – with a tendency to oscillate 
between the two poles.669 This treatment and implicit construction of the natural as 
separate from the cultural also had implications for women of the time. The discourses 
surrounding a science of animal welfare overlapped with discourses of sex and gender. 
Women were seen by biological and psychological (psychiatric) science to be more 
susceptible to neurosis as a result of their gender and their biological disposition to 
certain illnesses. Most notably, neurosis and stress was thought to be brought on through 
the monthly occurence of menstruation. 
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In mid-twentieth century Britain, menstruation became scientifically conceptualised and 
various psychological and physiological changes in the body associated with it were 
labelled as ‘pre-menstrual syndrome’ (PMS). Not only did this occur within the medical 
field but also the notion of PMS permeated into the cultural milieu and had a huge 
impact on how people perceived the female body. In particular, PMS and menstruation 
were tied to notions of the psychological and hence contributed to a form of regulation 
and control over the female body through the practice of medicine.670 This regulation 
over the body helped shaped popular discourses of womanhood and manhood, with 
various rites of passage associated with each.  
 
It was during the 1950s that research on hormones and the role they play in 
menstruation became fashionable, especially in relation to the psychological. After the 
publication of Hans Selye’s 1946 paper, scientific theories surrounding the responses of 
the body during times of trauma directly related to the concept of stress. It was in Selye’s 
1956 book The Stress of Life that he fully articulated the link between stress, women and 
animals: 
Clinical studies have confirmed the fact that people exposed to stress react very 
much like experimental animals in all these respects. In women menstruation 
becomes irregular or stops altogether, and during lactation milk secretion may 
become insufficient for the baby.671  
 
Despite also noting how men’s ‘sexual urge and sperm count diminished’ during times of 
stress, the emphasis was very much placed on the woman being abnormal. For the rest 
of the chapter Selye discusses PMS and characterises it as being ‘among other things, 
nervous tension and the desire to find relief in uncustomary, compulsive actions which 
are difficult to restrain’.672 He went on to assert that:  
[T]he derangement deserves serious attention because it is frequently 
accompanied by a number of disturbing mental changes such as: periods of 
abnormal hunger, general emotional instability, and occasionally, a morbid 
increase in the sexual drive. It is particularly noteworthy that, according to 
extensive statistical studies, 79 per cent to 84 per cent of all crimes of violence 
committed by women occur during, or in the week, before their period.673 
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So, for Selye men could have a sex drive and there was danger of it diminishing during 
times of stress, but women who showed signs of wanting to have sex were seen as 
abnormal. It was within the framework of Selye’s theory of stress and the body that PMS 
could be articulated as a mental disorder. Other scientists sought too to investigate the 
disorder in the 1950s using the language of stress as a theoretical backdrop to their 
research. For instance, in 1951 a psychiatrist named Joseph Henry Rey made an 
application for a licence to use animals in an experiment that would assess the role of 
hormones for the ‘treatment of patients suffering from disorders of the menstrual cycle, 
together with mental illnesses, and to investigate the psycho-physiological mechanisms in 
such states’.674 The certificate to perform such experiments was granted on 12 February 
1952 by the Under Secretary of State for the Home Office.  
 
The Selyian psychosomatic approach was becoming increasingly popular and used in 
aspects of psychiatry, particularly in relation to women and mental health. This was 
where the discourses of women, madness and animality overlapped via the post-
Cartesian philosophy of science, which permeated every aspect of medical discourse in 
mid-twentieth century Britain. After successfully applying for licence, Rey went on to 
produce several papers about the role of hormones in PMS. This included studies of 
‘menstrual disorders in psychiatric illness’ through experimentation on female psychiatric 
patients. 675  Here, a clear distinction between normal and abnormal was made. Rey 
claimed that ‘there are certain abnormalities of behaviour and changes in mental state 
coinciding with certain phases of the [menstrual] cycle’,676 listing depression, a higher 
incidence of suicides and ‘delinquency’ during the premenstrual phase.677 The patients 
involved in the study were assessed through the taking of daily vaginal smears and urine 
samples. This was so Rey could analyse the effect of certain hormonal mechanisms on 
menstrual function and emotional disturbance.678 The study concluded by claiming that 
there was a positive relationship between the severity of psychiatric illness and ovarian 
function.  
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Not only were female psychiatric patients implicated in the discourse of hormones and 
PMS, but so too were nonhumans. Following Rey’s report, Dr. B. T. Donovan discussed 
the relationship between ‘psychogenic amenorrhoea’, 679  a psychologically induced 
absence of menstruation. Here Donovan drew on animal studies to highlight the 
mechanisms underlying ‘the condition’: 
Destruction of a large area of the hypothalamus [part of the brain] immediately 
posterior to the optic chiasma sometimes produced a state of constant oestrus in 
guinea-pigs. Ovulation did not occur and the ovaries contained only large 
follicles. This result was subsequently confirmed in the rat… Greer (1953) made 
the observation that progesterone given daily was able to produce ovulation in 
rats displaying constant oestrus and permit the resumption of oestrous cycles.680 
 
The ideas of the psychiatrists who studied menstruation contributed to definitions of 
femininity and female sexuality in the 1950s. With menstruation’s vast and unstable 
repertoire of physical and emotional symptoms, women had to be controlled, and it was 
the male doctors and biological scientists who implemented this control over female (and 
animal) bodies. 681  Women were seen by biological science as natural objects of 
knowledge, similar to the nonhuman in the lab. As Elizabeth Grosz asserts, ‘the female 
body has been constructed not only as a lack or absence but with more complexity, as a 
leaking, uncontrollable, seeping liquid; as formless flow…’ Women’s bodies became 
‘inscribed [with] a mode of seepage’.682 Therefore these ideas of menstruation intersected 
with ideas of the nonhuman – both were seen as natural objects of knowledge to be 
controlled and regulated. Women, in terms of menstruation and mental health, were 
diagnosed as abnormal, prescribed treatments, and accordingly construed as ‘a 
conglomeration of attributes to be predicted and controlled along with other natural 
phenomena’.683  
 
The most prominent medical texts about menstruation and PMS came from a woman 
scientist at the time. It was the work of British psychologist and general practitioner 
Katharina Dalton which really set the tone for the links between PMS and madness in 
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mid-twentieth century Britain.684 What Dalton did was to construct an argument about 
the pre-menstrual woman as being centred entirely around the functions of their 
reproductive organs. She traced a dividing line between normality and abnormality at 
certain times of the month. Her research focused on the effects PMS had on women’s 
physiology, women’s tendency to commit violent crime, their productivity at work and 
school, and the propensity for more women to be admitted to psychiatric hospitals at the 
peak of their ovulatory period.685 In her 1960 British Medical Journal paper, she declared:  
 
The adverse effect of menstruation on the normal school work of 217 
menstruating girls, aged 11 to 17 years, is evidenced by the finding that one in 
every four girls had a fall in weekly mark during the premenstruum followed by a 
rise after menstruation. It is appreciated that in times of stress the premenstrual 
symptoms are increased (Dalton, 1955). It would appear, therefore, that on 
occasions of important examinations the handicap imposed by menstruation will 
be proportionately increased. About one girl in six in any examination entry will 
be in her premenstruum and thus at her lowest intellectual ebb. While zealots 
campaign assiduously for equality of the sexes, Nature refuses to grant equality even in one 
sex.686 
 
For Dalton, nature was indeed separate from culture, women and girls were part of 
nature and were adversely affected by their menstrual cycles, and they were  biologically a 
very different species to that of men. Dalton further explained the links between PMS 
and physical violence in her popular book of 1964 The Premenstrual Syndrome where she 
suggested that the monthly hormone imbalance and the ‘handicap’ of menstruation may 
make the woman deceitful: 
All too often the patient herself is not fully aware of the distress caused by her 
periodic tantrums and it is the husband or social worker who first stresses the 
need for treatment. When a women demonstrates bruises as signs of her 
husband’s cruelty it is well to remember the possibility that these may be 
spontaneous bruises of the premenstruum and it is wise to enquire about the date 
of her last menstruation.687 
 
Katharina Dalton contributed to the medical construction of women as ‘something’ that 																																																								
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is natural and abnormal, deceitful and dishonorable.688 By responding to women’s pain 
and distress in a manner that understood their causes in biologically and hormonally 
charged ways, this implied the cures of the condition as bringing the body back to a state 
of normality.689 And so this form of control over the female body did not necessarily 
contribute towards women’s emancipation but rather subjected it to a mechanistic 
physiology690 which related to broader social and cultural understandings of women at 
the time.  
 
This mechanistic physiology and the conjoined ideas of Selye’s stress syndrome were 
analogous to the British state technocracy, which operated from a notion of functional 
fit. Mid-twentieth British society was governed through the use of a functionalist model, 
which emphasized technological imperatives, controlled and directed by scientific 
experts.691 Hence human and nonhuman behaviour were explained through the discipline 
of ethology, and consequently were to be explained in mechanistic terms.692 As Haraway 
asserts: 
Human engineering sought to construct a control hierarchy, modeled on the 
individual organism with the nervous system on top. This organismic model 
facilitated the conception of society as a harmonious, balanced whole with proper 
distribution of function. The interrelations of nervous and reproductive systems, 
the two main integrative mechanisms of the organism, provided a microcosm of 
life, including social life (superorganism). The principle scientific goal was a 
biological theory of co-operation based on management hierarchies. What has to 
be managed were organic life, instinct, sex. At the top of the organism-pyramid 
was mind, permitting altruism to mitigate the excesses of competition. 
Psychobiology… was faced with rationalizing altruism in a competitive world – 
without threatening the basic structure of domination.693 
 
What British medical science did was emphasise this functional fit by using nonhumans 
in medical experiments and by rendering menstruation abnormal and in need of a form 
of control. Animals and women were natural objects of knowledge that needed to be 
controlled and managed, even standardized. The sexism and speciesism implicit in mid-
twentieth century British science is less in the ideology of sex roles as one based on the 
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technocratic logic of human domination over nature. 694  To change the semiotics of 
animal experimentation into one of scientific welfarism, contributed to the creation of a 
discourse of care towards the nonhuman which had notions of domination hidden 
within it. The very representation and language of science was changed to enable more 
subtle modes of control to be had over ‘natural’ bodies. 
 
Returning to Carol J. Adam’s notion of the ‘arrogant eye’ of animal experimentation we 
can see the overlapping representations of the nonhuman and the woman taking shape in 
mid-twentieth century British medical research and practice.695 The idea of a subject-
object binary is reproduced in the laboratory as well as in defining women from the 
standpoint of the human male gaze. As Susanne Kappeler points out, ‘what distinguishes 
man from woman is his access to representation, to cultural symbolisation, the power of 
naming, in which he uses women, along with all the other silent animals, as symbols, as 
objects for representation’.696 This symbolisation is most evident in a science that was 
marked by patriarchal naming devices. One does not have to be a man to participate in 
the semiotics of medical research, as Katharina Dalton proved. However, the discourses 
of medicine in the guise of stress and distress were replete with naming devices that 
created and shaped subject-object statuses for both the animal and the woman.  
 
These naming devices were disciplinary techniques which manifested as power-
knowledge relations. Power over both animals and women was regulated through 
different yet comparable techniques. Both forms of power encapsulated scientific 
knowledge about the bodies of animals and women. The history of the female body is 
just as much caught up with the history of the animal body and of course, the male body. 
This ties to power-knowledge relations which discursively construct bodies through 
disciplinary techniques pervasive in modern society, in this case, mid-twentieth century 
Britain. Moreover, the power-knowledge of the discourses of laboratory animal science 
shows that gendered disciplinary power can be articulated through the very performance 
of science and its persentation of an objective reality through the paradigm of positivism, 
wrought by the disciplinary male gaze.  
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The disciplinary mechanisms applied on living beings were normalised through the 
creation of regimes of truth and operationalized within institutions such as the state, and 
science working together in a power-knowledge nexus.697 This power-knowledge nexus 
was ultimately a way to create an understanding of nonhumans as objects but also, as has 
been stated, these disciplinary mechanisms also objectified women and discursively 
produced the ‘feminine body’.698 Further this can be considered alongside broader cultural 
constructs of women as also being passive and docile, as evidenced above, as Foucauldian 
feminist Susan Bartky writes: 
The disciplinary techniques through which the “docile bodies” of women are 
constructed aim at a regulation that is perpetual and exhaustive – a regulation of 
the body’s size and contours, its appetite, posture, gestures and general 
comportment in space, and the appearance of each of its visible parts.699 
 
Indeed, one only has to compare the disciplinary techniques practiced upon laboratory 
animals as recommended by the UFAW in their work to recognise how similar these 
techniques of power were over both the laboratory and animal and the woman. A 1956 
family medical compendium entitled Healthy Minds and Bodies, by Dr T. Traherne and 
Frank Preston, further demonstrates the regulation of femininity (microphysics of power) 
in 1950s Britain with some advice for wives: 
A wife should always be careful to be “sweet” to her husband. She should look, 
feel and smell as nice as she possibly can. Her hair, her hands and her skin should 
be kept clean. Most women perspire under their aims and breasts and between 
their legs. Before going to bed a wife should wash and powder the parts that tend 
to get hot and sticky during a busy day. 700  
 
The gaze then, became gendered in mid-twentieth century Britain by becoming 
embedded within the domain of the masculine. Disciplinary techniques over animals and 
women ensured that their bodies became standardized and regulated. Although women 
and animals are clearly distinct beings, their histories are entangled and reinforce each 
other. 
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Conclusion 
 
What the UFAW did for nonhuman laboratory animals, Dalton and her colleagues did 
for women. Overall this was tied to Selyian notions of stress and distress. No longer 
were animals and women to be seen as inert objects, but rather, through the language of 
stress, they became individual cyborgian “things” of the world, that could display 
recalcitrance if not subjected to some measure of control. It was here that the subject-
object statuses changed and the nonhuman, alongside the woman, became an active 
object in the world. The nonhuman was not wholly located in culture, and still a part of 
nature, but was rendered visible through a scientific gaze that created stress as much as it 
tried to alleviate it. They were, therefore, still objects, but disobedient ones.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Animals, Law and Gender: Vivisection Debates and the Review of the 1876 
Cruelty to Animals Act, 1947-1965 
 
In July 1963, Sir Sydney Littlewood published a letter in the British Medical Journal entitled 
“Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876”. He asked scientific researchers in the British medical 
profession to provide evidence pertaining to experiments on live animals in light of a 
forthcoming review of an Act passed by Parliament in 1876.  This Act regulated the 
practice of vivisection and introduced a compulsory licensing system for scientists who 
wanted to conduct experiments on living animals.701  He stated that, ‘The committee’s 
terms of reference are: to consider the present control over experiments on living 
animals and to consider whether, and if so what, changes are desirable in the law or its 
administration’. ‘[I]f any person has information or comment that will help’, he went on 
to state, ‘send it in writing to the …Home Office’. 702  The letter suggested the 
establishment of an inquiry into the Act’s relevance and application to scientific research 
and development of the time. This request acted as catalyst for a series of debates 
involving a variety of organisations, such as the Medical Research Council (MRC), The 
Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW), The Research Defence Society 
(RDS), the RSPCA, the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV) and the 
National Antivivisection Society (NAVS), amongst others. 
 
This final chapter explores the key debates surrounding animal experimentation from 
1947 to 1965 when the first post-war review of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 took 
place. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, animals were used in both military 
and medical experiments, much to the vexation of the anti-vivisection movement. 
Military experimenters used nonhuman animals for biological and chemical weapons 
testing, and medical researchers for experiments in relation to investigating psychiatric 
‘disorders’ such as pre-menstrual syndrome. Further to this, we have seen that discourses 
of animal welfare permeated the medical milieu in the 1950s, utilised by scientists to 
justify the continued use of animals in their research. It is at this point one can argue that 
within scientific circles at the time there was a bifurcated construction of the nonhuman. 																																																								
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On the one hand, the nonhuman was seen as an inert object to be used to test dangerous 
pathogens on; on the other, animals were granted the status of living beings but ones 
who were still endowed with object status.They became active objects, via emergent 
discourses of animal welfarism. 
 
This chapter analyses the contradictory discourses of the pro-and anti-vivisection 
movements of the time in order to understand constructions of nonhuman laboratory 
animals in mid-twentieth century Britain. In assessing the knowledge created by these 
movements in relation to attendant power apparatuses, this chapter will show how 
relations of power-knowledge were embedded in intricate socio-political networks, and 
had consequences for the law relating to vivisection and its practices.  
 
The first section discusses the post-war vivisection debate and addresses the possible 
precursors of the review of the 1876 Act. The second section discusses the main 
protagonists of the review of the Littlewood Enquiry’s review of the Act, including 
contributions from Porton Down Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, the 
Research Defence Society (RDS), the BUAV and NAVS. Because of the scope of the 
Inquiry, I am focussing on the debates about animal pain and the Pain Condition 
enshrined in the Act. Finally, the conclusion brings together the debates on animal pain, 
the 1876 Act and the Littlewood Inquiry to discuss the discursive practices of law in 
relation to gender. Drawing on feminist legal theory,703 I shall argue that the law relating 
to experimental animals paralleled that of legal discourses about women at the time.  
 
Through the review of the 1876 Act I shall be investigating the epistemological status of 
the animal body, questioning the origins of knowledge relating to animals and directing 
attention to the social practices that define the animal body in experimental research.704 
This chapter uses a narrative approach that questions the assumptions of law, its 
construction of what it sees as ‘natural’ and instead analyses the discourse of law as an 
effect of power relations.705 This means examining whether or not the ‘naturalness’ of 
constructing animals as objects is a product of viewing the law as a natural and inevitable 																																																								
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part of contemporary western society, therefore locating the law on experimental animals 
to be within the confines of legal discourses that are construed as universal masculine 
traits and of which run parallel to the philosophical assumptions mentioned in the 
previous chapters about the methodologies of science.706 
 
Previous Literature 
 
There is a substantial amount of scholarly literature devoted to nineteenth century 
vivisection debates and the creation and rise of the anti-vivisection movement in this 
period.707  Richard French, Harriet Ritvo, Nicolaas Rupke and Hilda Kean are the most 
prominent historians to cover the development of the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act. It is 
French’s book Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society that was the first 
contribution made towards the understanding of the development of animal 
experimentation and its opponents in nineteenth century Britain. French details the 
debates surrounding the formation of the 1876 Act alongside the prominent state and 
social actors at the time and explores the Act, its consequences and true beneficiaries.708  
Rupke’s book Vivisection in Historical Perspective follows on from French’s work and is a 
series of collected essays by various authors about the nineteenth century development 
of vivisection and the social movements that formed to counter it. The book explores 
the vivisection controversy in Victorian Britain in more detail, and subsequent chapters 
demonstrate the continuities of such debates to the present day. However, the most 
prominent chapter in the book is Mary Ann Elston’s ‘Women and Anti-Vivisection in 
Victorian England, 1870-1900’. 709  Here, Elston is concerned with exploring the 
connections between the emergence of the women’s movement and antivivisection 
movement in Victorian Britain. She highlights elements of intersectionality between the 
movements, for instance, discussing the historical constructions and associations made 
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between women and animals and the conflation of women and the nature.710 However, I 
seek to go further than this, and to elucidate the intricate power-knowledge networks 
that framed the mid-twentieth century vivisection debates and how these ran parallel to the 
broader socio-cultural milieu in relation to gender and women. 
 
A surge of scholarly interest followed these ground-breaking books, led by Kean, Ritvo 
and Bourke. They, however, were concerned with such issues as the animal rights 
debates, such as in Kean’s book Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain Since 
1800. Kean analyses animal rights from a historical perspective in relation to 
contemporary debates about the cultural and social role of the nonhuman.711 In her 
article ‘The ‘Smooth Cool Men of Science’: The Feminist and Socialist Response to 
Vivisection’, Kean addresses the broader social and historical context of the time by 
drawing on the work of Marshall Berman and his concept of modernity. 712  Whilst 
acknowledging the contradictory nature of Britain’s nineteenth century modern period, 
Kean articulates the very political contradictions that the 1876 Act contained, at once 
embracing science as an emblem of progress while at the same time the middle classes 
(particular the incipient feminist and socialist movements) were renouncing its 
practices.713  
 
Another key text, by Ritvo followed on from the work of French and Rupke, and fell in 
the same vein as Kean. In her book The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the 
Victorian Age she asks how and why Britain influenced global laws about animal rights 
and legislation.714 Ritvo undertakes a broader examination of vivisection debates in the 
nineteenth century in order to address Britain’s influence on a global scale when it comes 
to animal legislation and law. A more recent study that addresses the vivisection debates 
of the Victorian age is Joanna Bourke’s book What it Means to Be Human: Reflections from 
1791 to Present. This tackles the nineteenth century vivisection debates and their 
intersection with debates about slavery and women,715 and interrogates the assumptions 
that have saturated scientific discourse throughout the centuries about the links between 																																																								
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women and animal ‘others’.716 However, whilst Bourke claims that her focus is upon the 
period running from the eighteenth century to present, when addressing vivisection, its 
debates, and the laws surrounding it, she does not address mid-twentieth century British 
science or its precedents.  
 
Following this body of work, I will be drawing on the studies of Ritvo, Kean and Bourke 
to analyse the narratives of mid-twentieth century vivisection controversies, and to 
highlight the entanglements of the oppression of nonhumans with that of women. My 
work in this chapter offers an account of a historical subject that has been neglected: that 
of the review of the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, published in 1965 and entitled the 
‘Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on Animals’ (the Littlewood 
Report).717 Most histories of vivisection in Britain focuses upon the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, with the mid-twentieth century being neglected. It is only the work 
of Dan Lyons that pays any attention to this neglected aspect of the politics of animal 
experimentation. In his book The Politics of Animal Experimentation 718  he devotes a 
substantial part of one chapter to the Littlewood Enquiry but barely uses any primary 
sources except the Littlewood Report itself, and hence his work lacks much needed 
depth and historical context.719 Nor does he address these debates intersectionally, but 
rather they form part of his broader linear narrative about the development of animal 
experimentation law in relation policy networks.720 His work is heavily theoretical and 
pursues a deductive research strategy, which is dependent upon the antiquated and 
masculinist ontological standpoint of critical realism.721 On the other hand, I have been 
very much guided by the archival sources used in this chapter. I draw on archives of the 
BUAV and the RDS, alongside Governmental sources such as the departmental files of 
the War Office, Cabinet Office and the Home Office.  
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The Emergence of Vivisection and Antivivisection in Nineteenth Century Britain 
 
In the Victorian period, vivisection on nonhuman animals became a widespread and 
popular practice as a result of the newly emerging discipline of physiology.722 This was 
coupled with changing beliefs concerning health, illness and the body, and the shifting 
practices of British medical scientists and doctors.723 Influenced by the works of the 
French physiologists Magendie (1783-1855) and Claude Bernard (1813-1878), British 
scientists began to emphasise experimentation rather than clinical observation as a way to 
advance scientific knowledge about the body.724 Animal experiments soon became the sin 
qua non of experimental medicine and helped to facilitate the institutionalisation and 
professionalisation of the discipline, which in turn legitimated the role of the scientist, 
accelerating their professional and social status.725  
 
As a response to growing practice of vivisection amongst the medical community, and 
amid raising concerns for the treatment of animals (particularly amongst the middle and 
upper classes), in 1824 the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was 
formed.726 The Society established links with the aristocracy, and in 1840 was granted 
Royal status by Queen Victoria, becoming the RSPCA of the present day.727 It is here 
that we can argue that the birth of the anti-vivisection movement occurred and the 
RSPCA provided the impetus for its growing politicisation. The majority of its members 
were women, rising from 50 per cent of the membership in 1850 to 60 per cent in 
1900.728  Indeed, women made up the majority of memberships of the anti-vivisection 
movements in this period. After the formation of the RSPCA a variety of other 
movements more specific to the antivivisection cause appeared, most notably in 1875 the 
Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection (VSS) co-
founded by Frances Power Cobbe.729 Cobbe, a feminist, later left the VSS due to its 
changing emphasis from the complete abolition of vivisection to the restriction of the 
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practice. In 1898 she founded the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection as a 
response to the more conservative views of the VSS.730 
 
In nineteenth century Britain, the first-wave feminist and antivivisection movements 
coalesced and shared similar concerns. The emergence of the discipline of physiology 
provided a powerful counter-ideology of the body (both in terms of the animal and the 
female) to quell the demand for both the rights of animals and women.731 Sex roles and 
the social organisation of society were focuses of medical research in this period, with 
physiologists tying appropriate gender roles to their descriptions of physiological 
difference. 732  Hence, women were described and depicted as ‘natural’ objects of 
knowledge and linked overtly to animals.733 Women and animals were intimately linked 
through the discursive strategies promulgated by physiology. Women (who were 
incidentally becoming more visible in social life) and the concerns raised about 
vivisection, threatened to disrupt the social order and the growing status of science.734 
What was needed was a form of legislation to counter the accusations of the anti-
vivisectionists and help establish science and its practices as the enlightened and rational 
paternal carer of the social order. 
 
The 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act 
 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act regulated the 
practice of vivisection on nonhuman animals. In order to formulate and enact this piece 
of legislation, a Royal Commission on vivisection was set up in 1875.735 The Home 
Secretary Richard Cross appointed a variety of people from different political, scientific 
and lay backgrounds to help contribute to the writing of the Act.736 However, with the 
growing power of the medical profession and the elevation of the status of science in 
British society, the Bill was eventually amended to appease medical scientists and 
doctors.737 In the end, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 was substantially watered 
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down in order to ensure that animal experimentation could continue. 738  Yet at this 
particular time, the medical profession had distant ties with the Home Secretary who 
approved the granting of licences under the Act, and in the period of time between 1876-
1881, only 15% of licence applications were rejected.739 In 1881-2, the Association for 
the Advancement of Medical Research (AAMR) - a pro-animal research lobby group - 
was established, dedicated to pressurising the Government about the Act during which it 
emphasised its expertise whilst at the same time claiming that they and not the Home 
Secretary should be responsible for the issuance of licences.740  The AAMR thus became 
an advisory body to the Government and formed close ties with the Home Office, 
meaning that experiments on animals increased from 277 in 1876 following the passage 
of the Act, to 800 in 1885.741  
 
The early part of the twentieth century saw a second Royal Commission and review of 
the Act, during the period 1906-12. The rise in the status of the medical profession had 
significantly increased by this point and in 1908 the AAMR formed a public relations 
body called the Research Defence Society (RDS). The aims of the RDS were to advise 
the public, scientists and Home Office on the granting of licences and to protect the 
interests of the licensees, liaise with Parliament, and publishing pro-vivisection literature 
on the importance of animal experimentation to both medical personnel and the 
public.742 Consequently, during the second Royal Commission, the AAMR and its sub-
society the RDS overcame any objections to the contemporary usage of the Act. This, 
coupled with their claims of expertise and knowledge, conferred upon them scientific 
hegemony over the inquiry and no changes were made to the Act. Only 
recommendations regarding the ‘pain condition’ and the establishment of a Home Office 
advisory committee on the administration of the Act were suggested as a way to improve 
the Act.743  
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In the end, the 1876 Act can be summarised as a way to regulate the practice of 
vivisection. It required that ‘no experiment calculated to give pain shall be performed on 
a vertebrate animal’. Only experiments that were thought to be for ‘the advancement by 
new discovery of physiological knowledge or of knowledge which will be useful for 
saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering’ could be conducted.744 As we shall see, 
the concept and definition of pain and advancement of knowledge was a highly 
contested terrain in mid-twentieth century Britain. The stipulations of the Act and its 
idea of painless experimentation meant that premises had to be registered with the 
Office, and were liable to inspection by appointed Home Office inspectors. The 
experimenters themselves had to be licensed and had to apply for a certain certificate 
when conducting a particular experiment. The licence was granted by the Secretary of 
State, had to be signed by a sponsor, usually a President of a Society such as the Royal 
College of Surgeons, and lasted for a fixed period of time, which then had to be held by 
the researchers prior to applying for a specific certificate. Certificates were divided into 
‘codes’ and experimenters applied for the appropriate certificate depending on the 
severity of the experiment.745 
 
The Act had a huge impact on scientific research using animals but it was not until after 
the First World War that vivisection in Britain increased significantly. The antivivisection 
movements’ supporters became silent observers to the practice of animal 
experimentation, as public support seemed to grow in favour of it.746 Between 1920 and 
1940 licensed animal experiments increased from seventy-thousand to approximately one 
million. During these years, the antivivisection societies turning to more visible concerns 
of animal welfare such as the welfare of cats and dogs in the home, to the detriment of 
their campaigns against institutions.747 Some authors argue that the immediate post-war 
years were a period of invisibility for the antivivisection movement in Britain, and no 
serious challenge was made towards the abolition of animal experimentation.748 Richard 
Ryder, an eminent animal rights scholar and originator of the concept “speciesism”, 
claims that due to the mental distress of the First World War, the antivivisection 
movement stagnated. Ryder claims this is because survivors of the war ‘turned their 
attention to the welfare of their own species’, with the animal welfare movements, 																																																								
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‘dominated by middle class women’, failing to achieve as much public support as they 
used to. Incidentally, he claims, because of the tragedies of the War, the movement 
appeared ‘faintly ridiculous… and it seemed that the period from the mid-1920s until the 
1960s represents a gap in the progress of the movement’.749 
 
According to Ryder, nothing of particular note happened in the 1950s and 1960s 
concerning the animal welfare movements, apart from the efforts of a few ‘middle class 
women’. However, as we shall see, calls for a third Royal Commission on Vivisection and 
a review of the 1876 Act provided the impetus for the revival of the antivivisection and 
animal rights movements. Articles and letters critical of vivisection appeared in the 
columns of the daily newspapers between the period 1947-1965, and scientific societies 
began to convene public lecture specifically focussed on animal experimentation. 
Scientists came under increasing public scrutiny regarding their experiments (nuclear 
warfare experiments, biological and chemical weapons experiments were reported in the 
press – see chapter one). In response, the UFAW promulgated a welfare perspective 
towards the treatment of nonhuman animals under experiment and published a wide 
array of documents to substantiate this approach (see chapter five). It could be argued 
that science’s hegemony was under threat in a post-war period and hence, the battle 
regarding animal experimentation was far from ‘stagnant’ in this period.  
 
This ‘Monstrous Pretence’: Vivisection and the Call for A Third Royal 
Commission 
 
Funding for scientific research in the military and medical spheres grew exponentially in 
the post-war years. With that in mind, as we saw in the previous chapters the nonhuman 
body was seen as a parsable object through the creation of a discourse of lines. 750 
Further, the nonhuman body became a body that could suffer from physiological 
responses to stress and hence, they became acknowledged as being recalcitrant beings, 
yet still objects of manipulation. Thanks to Hans Selye and the appropriation of his 
theories by the UFAW, this endowed nonhuman experimental animals with active object 
status: docile bodied, but living beings. Science in post-war Britain was a contradictory 
maelstrom of ideas that construed the nonhuman in many varied and opposing ways. It 																																																								
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was here, then, that it was pertinent to discuss animal experimentation law. The law gave 
scientists permission to use animals in their experiments and deflect any unwanted 
attention away from them by having recourse to seek its protection. And so, within the 
discourse of law, the term animal is given both property and welfare status; they thus 
became objects of knowledge that needed to be cared for appropriately.751 Any counter-
discourse offered in response to lawful language is often deemed unsuitable. It is here 
that this section discusses the subjugated discourses of the anti-vivisection and animal 
welfare societies in the immediate post-war period and their renewed interest in 
pressurising contemporary governments to review the Act of 1876. As we shall see, not 
all of the societies representing the interests of anti-vivisectionists were successful.  
 
We begin our story on 23 February 1948 in the office of the Home Secretary, James 
Chuter Ede, where a Deputation of anti-vivisection societies has cooperated to argue for 
a review of the 1876 Act.752Those present included; The Dowager Duchess of Hamilton, 
chairman (sic) of the Animal Defence and Anti-vivisection Society, Miss Lind-af-Hageby, 
president of the Society, Dr Fielding-Ould, Director of the National Antivivisection 
Society, and Mr Wilfred Tyldesley, Secretary of the British Union for the Abolition of 
Vivisection, Dr Fergie-Woods President of the London and Provincial Anti-vivisection 
Society, Dr Bertrand Allison Honorary Treasurer London and Provincial Anti-
Vivisection Society, The Reverend Richard Lee, Chairman of the BUAV, and Mr 
Rodenhurst, Secretary of the Conference of Anti-Vivisection Societies.753  
 
The main argument advanced by the Deputation was that the Act had failed to protect 
animals from pain and suffering and that, in light of contemporary advances in human 
health and medicine, vivisection had ‘become obsolete’.754 Each representative of the 
Deputation read a statement to the Home Secretary indicating why this was so. Generally 
speaking, the primary theme of this meeting was that there had been vast improvements 
in public health due to the provision of better housing, sanitation and food, and 
therefore animal experiments were unnecessary. Furthermore, the Deputation claimed 
that the Act failed to safeguard animals given the immense increase in the number of 																																																								
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experiments and thus, the Home Secretary had failed to prevent the infliction of 
unnecessary pain and suffering in animals. It was felt that ‘the time was therefore, ripe, 
for a full investigation’.755  
 
This Deputation made comparisons between vivisection and the tortures people suffered 
during the Second World War at the hands of the Nazis. It was the Duchess of Hamilton 
who was the first to make such a statement, and claimed: 
It is notorious that experiments on animals lead to experiments on human 
beings, of which the horrible experiments carried out by German Doctors on 
helpless victims in the concentration camps are the worst examples. Moral 
sensibilities are easily blunted by cruel practices. Antivivisection seeks to save 
humanity from moral contamination and physical degeneration. It is a movement 
for the protection of humanity as well as one for the liberation of animals from 
the infliction of unjustifiable pain and suffering.756 
 
This emotive speech by the Duchess, made reference to recent atrocities in Germany and 
consequently hoped convey to the Home Secretary that vivisection was a question of 
moral responsibility, for the good of humanity and for the good of the nation. The 
Duchess also protested on behalf of the ‘taxpayers of this country’ who were ‘forced to 
share in the continuation of cruel and unjustifiable experiments on living animals’757 She 
noted that in the past year there had been seven instances of breaches of the Act in 
relation to the pain condition.758 The Duchess ended her speech by calling for a third 
Royal Commission into the workings of the Act in the interests of the public.759 
  
Another member of the Deputation, Miss Louise Lind-af-Hageby (1878-1963), echoed 
this statement by the Duchess. Lind-af-Hageby was a prominent figure in the 
antivivisection movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and was an 
ally of Frances Power Cobbe. The granddaughter of the Chamberlain to the King of 
Sweden, she trained in France, and then studied again in England. She claimed to have 
borne witness to the practice of vivisection during her training and this immediately 
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politicised her.760 As a trained scientist she advocated the practice of social medicine and 
criticised the antivivisectionists’ tendencies to appeal to the emotions.761 In 1906 she 
formed the Anti-Vivisection and Animal Defence Society and she represented this group 
at the Deputation. Despite her misgivings about appealing to emotion in order to abolish 
animal experimentation, her speech to the Home Secretary was laden with emotive 
rhetoric, and echoed the Duchess’ call for morality: 
[T]he cause of humanity to animals is a vital part of civilisation and social 
development. The Society [Antivivisection and Animal Defence Society] regards 
all cruelty as an evil which is socially disruptive and degrading to the perpetrators 
and it cannot accept the plea of “utility” as an excuse. The plea of utility or 
necessity was raised in defence of slavery and many systematised forms of 
exploitation of the weak and helpless. Social evolution, the development of 
sympathy has created a sense of responsibility extending to animal creation of 
which laws for their protection from cruelty are the outer expression… The laws 
for the protection of animals are as yet incomplete: they are nevertheless 
testimony to moral principles fairly generally accepted.762  
 
Hageby objected to the ‘hideous cruelty inflicted’ by the ‘vast and ingenious system of 
modern experimentation on animals’ 763 , which made ‘a mockery of laws for the 
protection of animals’.764 Dr Field-Ould and Dr Beddow-Bayly further elaborated upon 
the social determinants of health. Wilfred Tyldesly additionally noted how: ‘this nation 
will never be healthy while vivisection is permitted to uphold the monstrous pretence’.765 
Yet, despite the abolitionists seeking understanding from the Home Secretary, they were 
ultimately denied a review of the Act. Chuter Ede, in a letter to Ronald Chamberlain Esq, 
M.P. on 9 June 1948, stated that there was ‘no sufficient case’ with respect to the law or 
its administration to ‘justify [him] in recommending the appointment of a fresh Royal 
Commission’.766 
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‘But There Dubiety Begins to Obtrude’: The UFAW and Vivisection 
 
 The question arises as to why Chuter Ede refused another inquiry into the Act. As well as 
the obvious reasons related to the broader social, political and economic climate at the 
time, another possibility relates directly to the funding of civil science, animal 
experiments and the increasing presence of the UFAW in elite circles. Chapter four 
outlined the research conducted by the UFAW in relation to animal stress. However, 
could one tentatively suggest a connection between Ede’s repudiation of the 
antivivisectionists’ request for an inquiry into the workings of animal experimentation 
legislation and the UFAW? 
 
On the evening of Sunday 22 February 1948, a mere few hours before the antivivisection 
delegation met with the Home Secretary, BBC radio’s Home Service broadcast their 
‘Week’s Good Cause’. The ‘good cause’ of the week was the UFAW, and its appeal was 
read by its Chairman, Major C. W. Hume.767  The National Antivivisection Society’s 
(NAVS) magazine, The Animals Defender, did not discuss this public intervention of an 
organisation seemingly more favoured by the establishment than theirs until April of that 
year.768  The Society claimed to have been inundated with enquires ‘almost immediately 
[after the broadcast]…from our members as to whether this was a cause sufficiently 
good to merit financial support’.769 The article initially seemed to praise the UFAW, 
encouraging its members to wholeheartedly support the organisation as it ‘does a 
considerable amount of invaluable work – notably in connection with rabbit catching 
and humane killing etc.’.770  
 
But what about the NAV’s cause célèbre, animal experimentation?  Where did it stand in 
relation to the views advanced by the UFAW? Despite the Society’s positive views 
towards the UFAW’s ‘university connections with scientists of various types, and with 
physiological investigators’, which consequently gave them the ability to ‘exert on the 
vivisectors some degree of moral suasion’,771 it was here that ‘dubiety [began] to obtrude’ 																																																								
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and the NAVS and UFAW were clearly not complementary organisations. As we saw in 
chapter four, the UFAW took a welfarist approach to the care and treatment of 
laboratory animals, and were not opposed to animal experiments. Rather, the UFAW 
sought to make sure that ‘everything possible should be done… to ensure the maximum 
comfort and consideration, inside the laboratory, for the animals concerned’.  Thus, the 
NAVs were not particularly pleased to have the UFAW receive such a public airing of its 
views, and the article sought to dissuade their supporters from being misled by the 
organization, and to reiterate their abolitionist approach to the practice of vivisection by 
claiming that the Act was ‘delusive’ and that ‘the majority of vivisectors will consider 
themselves entitled to go to the limits of what the Act sanctions’. Hence, the UFAW 
used methods of ‘peaceful persuasion’ that ultimately ‘achieve[d] little in a few cases’.772 
 
As mentioned above, requests for an enquiry into the workings of the 1876 Act were 
denied in June and August of that year. The UFAW made their broadcast debut the night 
before the Deputation to the Home Secretary. Would it be reasonable to assume that this 
was a tactical move by the organisation, one that was ultimately successful, in dissuading 
the Home Secretary to accept the arguments put forth by the Antivivisectionists? 
Conjecture aside, who knows? But one thing is certain: that the rise, and rise of the 
UFAW in the 1950s served to suppress the protests of abolitionists in this period. 
 
The Vivisectors Call for a Review 
 
The BBC’s endorsement of the UFAW occurred just in time to deflect any attention 
away from the rhetoric of the antivivisectionists. It was not long before the world-
renowned medical periodical, the British Medical Journal, was publishing letters and articles 
also calling for a review of the 1876 Act. However, this time, these came from the 
medical profession, and featured a special added extra – animal welfare. On 2 July 1949, 
an article entitled ‘Laboratory Animals’ appeared in the journal, almost a year after the 
antivivisection delegation were refused an enquiry by the Home Secretary. The article 
discussed the publication of the UFAW Handbook (see chapter four) and establishment 
of the Laboratory Animals Bureau by the Medical Research Council.773 More importantly, 
the article talked about the necessity of law when it came to vivisection, arguing that  
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The vast majority of laboratory workers using living animals under licence and 
appropriate certificates regard the Act as an invaluable protection… They would 
no more support the complete absence of Government control in these matters, 
which would leave their flanks completely exposed to the not always too 
scrupulous attacks of antivivisectionists… In this matter it would seem that our 
own law also might benefit from scrutiny and possible amendment.774  
 
The article proceeded to consider the ‘pain condition’ enshrined in the Act, remarking 
that ‘surely it would not defy the wit of parliamentary draughtsmen so to reword the Act’ 
so as to spare the Home Secretary ‘possible embarrassment in this matter’.775 Under the 
current law, it continued, thousands of ‘painless injections and feeding experiments’ were 
deemed inappropriate according to law. The article concluded with a call for solidarity 
between the UFAW and the Research Defence Society (RDS): 
We believe that most members of the UFAW and all members of the Research 
Defence Society would find common ground for constructive improvement at 
almost every point where the present law is a survival of vestigial precautions 
rather than true and “humane” expression of modern requirements.776 
 
The UFAW were becoming ensconced and validated by those scientists in the medical 
arena who had status, power and political positioning.  Another article appeared a week 
later, on 9 July 1949, entitled ‘Care and Treatment of Laboratory Animals’. This article 
made reference to the UFAW’s technical secretary Dr Jean Vinter, who advocated a form 
of animal welfare in the laboratory which took shape through the ‘good will of the 
experimenter and his technical assistants’, a ‘sound knowledge’ of animal care, and 
finally, the ‘control imposed by law’.777 It was this final element that the article focused 
on primarily, calling for a ‘new model law’ that would be based on a ‘schedule of degrees 
of suffering, rather than on favoured animals, since there was no evidence that rats or 
mice suffered pain any less than cats or dogs’.778 The article also suggested that: 
There should also be a qualified veterinary adviser attached to the Home Office 
Inspectorate, who could be consulted about the breeding and supply of 
laboratory animals, their care and maintenance, the choice of anaesthesia etc. It 
was worth studying the UFAW handbook and keeping in mind such points as 
these: needles should be really sharp; animals should have adequate space for 
exercise; most animals in captivity required water to drink; the best methods of 
anaesthesia should be known and practiced; and there should be some care and 
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forethought given to the planning of animal as to the planning of test tube 
experiments.779 
 
Science and sentiment were calling for a review of the 1876 Act, except this time both 
sides had morality on their side. One issued a moral call for the inalienable rights of all 
sentient beings; the other emphasised welfare, but more importantly, power.  
 
‘These Perverse Zoophilists’: The Research Defence Society’s Public Lectures 
 
Following the dramatic Labour Party victory in 1945, a ‘welfare state’ was established, 
with access to free healthcare, education and housing for all regardless of social class and 
income. Despite the 1950s witnessing a change in government, from Labour to 
Conservative, the welfare state survived intact, but, was accorded a lower priority 
compared to defence. 780 The Conservative government, despite the post-war consensus, 
saw the welfare state as an impediment to economic growth.781  As will be recalled, 
defence expenditure had significantly increased in 1950-1951 because of the outbreak of 
the Korean War, the threat of the Cold War and Britain’s investment into weapons of 
mass destruction. In spite of this, the notion of the state as being a paternal carer was 
emblematic of the era, which was marked by a ‘conservative modernity’.782 This form of 
governance, although meeting the welfare needs of its population, still embraced a 
paternalistic system of modernisation, by still viewing society as having a natural and 
inevitable hierarchal social structure. 783  One could argue that this patrician style of 
government filtered into the methodologies of science, most notably the idea of animal 
welfare postulated by the UFAW in relation to experimental science.  
 
During this time, the UFAW made many significant alliances with the medical 
authorities, most notably forming links with the MRC and RDS. It was these 
organisations whose members were bestowed with Knighthoods and Lordships. More 
significant members of the RDS in this period included Sir Henry Dale, 1936 Noble 
Prize Winner, physiologist and pharmacologist, and The Rt. Hon. Lord Cohen of 
Birkenhead, physician and President of the British Medical Association, General Medical 																																																								
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Council and the Royal Society of Medicine. These two highly influential men were often 
mentioned in speeches in the House of Lords, whether it was to substantiate a point 
made about animal slaughter, or on debates about science and society.784 
 
Access to powerful networks within government was essential for both the UFAW and 
the RDS. It was not long before the RDS, in public speeches, co-opted the rhetoric of 
the UFAW to convince the general public of the benefit of animal experimentation for 
medicine, and the safety, welfare and health of the animals used in experiments. This 
promulgation of pro-animal experimentation ideology was particularly evident in the 
1950s, emanating from Sir Henry Dale and Lord Cohen of Birkenhead in their public 
speeches for the RDS. In the 1955 Paget Memorial Lecture entitled ‘Humanity’s Rising 
Debt to Medical Research’, Sir Henry Dale gave an impassioned speech about the 
benefits of animal experimentation for the development and progression of medical 
science. 785  Dale claimed that the antivivisectionist approach to the idea of animal 
experimentation was without any ‘logical consistency’ despite their ‘sincere effort’ to be 
rational in their arguments. This was coupled with their:  
‘Imaginative sympathies [which] lead them to reject medical science altogether, 
and to exclude all animal products from their food or clothing; though even such 
peculiar people as these must be prepared I think, to answer the charge of cruelty 
by omission, when they refuse the chance survival, or of the relief of pain, which 
medical aid could offer to children and others for whose care they are 
responsible’786 
 
The speech therefore reversed the charge of cruelty usually directed towards scientists 
onto the antivivisectionists. Dale’s speech appropriated the rhetoric of the 
antivivisectionists in order to accuse those animal defenders as having ‘so completely lost 
all sense of balance in their imaginative sympathies, that their concern for the assumed 
possibility of pain in a few guinea-pigs and mice has involved them in actions which have 
had, as a direct result, real and hideous suffering and death to members of their own 
species’.787 Dale labelled antivivisectionists ‘perverse zoophilists’788 due to their readiness 
to sympathise more with ‘the assumed sufferings of the lower animals’ than the 																																																								
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‘unquestionable sufferings of their fellow human beings’. 789  Dale thus accused the 
antivivisectionists of a ‘cruelty which is none the less detestable because it originates in 
blind and self-indulgent emotion’.790  
 
Dale went on to consider Dr Lane-Petter of the Laboratory Animals Bureau (L.A.B.).791  
This organisation sought to standardise animals used for experimentation through strictly 
controlled breeding programmes that resulted in genetically similar strains of animals to 
be used by scientists.792 Lane-Petter, in the publications of the L.A.B., emphasised the 
welfarist approach to the keeping and breeding of laboratory animals, in a manner not 
dissimilar to the UFAW Handbook on the Care and Management of Laboratory Animals.793 In 
order for prospective breeders of laboratory animals to be accredited by a Government 
regulatory authority, they had to ensure that the housing, feeding and health of the 
animals were all of a “high” standard.794 All of these considerations were linked to the 
recommendations given by the UFAW. Lane-Petter was emphasising the welfare of the 
animals, and also linked this to the welfare of the human population: human wellbeing 
was connected to nonhuman wellbeing in the laboratory.795  
 
Lane-Petter was recruited by the UFAW to collaborate on the second edition of the 
Handbook, and was not only the Director of the L.A.B., but also Honorary Secretary of 
the RDS.796 Dale’s praise of Dr Lane-Petter and the L.A.B in his speech emphasised the 
growing influence of the scientific welfarist approach to the nonhuman under 
experiment:  
[T]he Bureau has the general object of making information available about 
accredited sources of healthy animals, suitable for the various purposes of 
research, and also about the kinds of accommodation and treatment that have 																																																								
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been necessary by experience to keep them healthy under laboratory conditions. 
The objects of the Bureau are entirely congenial to, and to some extent indeed 
overlap, with those of this Society’.797 
 
Sir Henry Dale and the RDS were adopting the rhetoric of the UFAW in the hope of 
countering the ‘ignorance and muddleheadedness’ of the antivivisectionists. 798   Also 
proving that the two organisations were in ideological alignment and collaboration. 
 
More Pressure to Review the Act 
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was renewed effort from the abolitionist and 
welfare camps to put pressure on the government to address the legislation. This 
emanated from a newly formed organisation, the Lawson Tait Memorial Trust and the 
RSPCA’s Deputation. Created by an amalgamation of organisations including the NAVS 
and BUAV, the Lawson Tait Trust aimed to fund alternatives in research to experiments 
on animals.799  Founded in 1961 as the Humane Research Trust, it was re-named in 
1962.800 Lady Muriel Dowding, wife of Air Chief Marshall of Battle of Britain fame, Lord 
Dowding, led the Trust. The Dowdings were staunch antivivisectionists, vegetarians and 
spiritualists. Lord Dowding often spoke in the House of Lords regarding ending 
vivisection, most notably in 1957. The Government had previously rejected anti-
vivisection requests from organisations such as the BUAV and NAVs, but in 1957 the 
government promised to keep the matter under review. This may have been because of 
Lord Dowding speech, but also, the growing influence of the UFAW’s discourses of 
welfare within the scientific milieu, and scientists’ public call for an assessment of the 
workings of the Act. Moreover, the changing political context towards the end of the 
1950s, with a general election looming, government might have wanted to appeal to the 
electorate by displaying some degree of interest in the Act. 
 
In 1961, it was reported that 3.7 million experiments were conducted on animals in 
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Britain, with 3.45 million permitted without anaesthetic. 801  The establishment of the 
Lawson Tail Memorial Trust might have been a response to these figures. MP Elizabeth 
Braddock, during a meeting in the Commons asked the Parliamentary Secretary for 
Science MR Denzil Freeth if he was aware of the Trust802 and after an affirmative answer, 
stated:  
 
Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that there is so much resentment about the 
rise to 3,750,000 in experiments on living animals that any opportunity or 
attempt to find alternatives ought to have the fullest financial support of the 
Government? Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to meet a deputation in 
order to discuss ways and means to deal with this situation from a financial point 
of view?803  
 
And so the Secretary did meet with the Trust. On 25 January 1962 at Richmond Terrace 
in London, the Mr Freeth, Dr Joan Faulkner for the MRC and the Trust’s deputation 
including Lady Muriel Dowding, Mr Harvey Metcalfe and Mr Wilfred Risdon convened a 
meeting about the Act.804 However, Mr Freeth did not meet the deputation without first 
having a briefing meeting with Dr Lane Petter, head of the aforementioned L.A.C.,805 Mr 
Burley, assistant secretary to the Home Office and Mr Hallett, Office of the Minster for 
Science.806 During the briefing meeting, the MRC stressed to Mr Freeth the necessity of 
animal experiments, and asserted that the 1876 Act ensured that ‘no experiment 
calculated to cause pain may be performed on a living animal, unless the person 
performing it has obtained a licence from the Home Secretary.’807 With this, the MRC 
had already shaped Mr Freeth’s opinions prior to his meeting with the Deputation. So 
much so, in fact, that during the meeting, he claimed that the licencing of animal 
experiments was a matter for the Home Office, and so was not able to comment on it 
when asked by the Deputation.808 The meeting concluded with little progress for the 
antivivisectionists: all the Parliamentary Secretary had offered was an assurance that ‘no 
unnecessary use was made of animals for experiments and that steps were always taken 
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to minimise any animal suffering’.809 The scientists were still winning, but what would 
follow would eventually prompt a review of the Act. 
 
 
 The RSPCA Deputation and the Beginnings of a Review   
 
‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ 810  asked R.F. Rattray, the Vice-Chairman of the 
R.S.P.C.A. in a letter to the British Medical Journal in 1962 about the failings of the 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1876. In his letter, Rattray claimed that the inspectors under the 
Act, despite an increase in their number from ‘two to now six’, still allowed scientists to 
conduct painful experiments on animals because the inspectors, all ‘medical men without 
any veterinary qualification’, were weighed down by bureaucracy and frequently painful 
experiments, contra the pain condition, were mistaken for ones that abided by the law.811 
Rattray also drew on the welfarist rhetoric of the UFAW and quoted a series of passages 
from The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, in relation to the humanity of current 
experimental methods on animals. Rattray’s letter was indicative of the growing prowess 
of the UFAW in many different circles. Not only that, the RSPCA, a more conservative 
organisation not opposed to vivisection, had in 1962 requested a deputation with the 
Home Secretary about the 1876 Act. This deputation from the RSPCA was separate 
from and initially unknown to the abolitionist anti-vivisection organisations such as the 
BUAV. In their Branches Newsletter in 1962, the BUAV claimed they had ‘discovered, quite 
by accident’ that the RSPCA ‘had written to the Home Secretary on the matter’ of the 
law in relation to experiments on animals.812 The BUAV declared that despite offering 
solidarity the RSPCA nevertheless ‘stuck to their decision not to cooperate’ with them.  
 
This decision of the RSPCA not to cooperate nor align themselves with the abolitionist 
antivivisection societies was clearly indicated in a letter sent by the organisation to the Rt 
Hon Viscount Halisham, Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science. When 
requesting a meeting with the MRC to discuss the administration of the 1876 Act, John 
Hall, Chief Secretary of the RSPCA declared: 
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As you are no doubt aware the RSPCA is at present conducting a campaign on 
the subject of animal experimentation. We are not an anti-vivisection 
organisation and we are concerned only to strengthen the administration of the 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and in particular, to bring a about a more adequate 
supervision of experiments.813  
 
The RSPCA made it clear that they were not after the complete abolition of vivisection, 
but rather asked for a renewed investigation into the workings of the Act, most notably 
the number of inspectors and the methods of experiment, ‘to ensure that every safeguard 
is imposed against suffering and needless repetition’.814 The organisation had previously 
corresponded with the Home Secretary, Rab Butler, but had been refused a meeting on 
several occasions by him.815 The RSPCA in a final letter addressed to Butler warned that 
‘the RSPCA has now no alternative but to make these matters a public issue’,816 and so 
they did, in addition to writing to the Minister for Science.  
 
In spite of the RSPCA’s acquisition of Royal Approval, they were still refused a meeting 
with the MRC. Halisham, in private correspondence with Harold Himsworth, Secretary 
of the Medical Research Council, deplored the RSPCA, writing that ‘this is a body for 
which I have no great respect, but there are obvious political implications in refusing 
what on the face of it appears to be a reasonable proposal for discussion’.817 A note at the 
bottom of the page written by Hailsham reveals further his disdain for the organisation, 
declaring that ‘I have no respect for the integrity of the RSPCA, but we must tread 
warily’.818 Hailsham eventually replied to the RSPCA, giving a detailed answer to their 
request into a review of the administration of the Act. The letter was dated June 1962, 
emphasising the ethical obligations of the MRC, making reference to the UFAW, and 
referring them back to the Home Secretary.819 This worked, and the RSPCA responded, 
via John Hall, its secretary, saying ‘it has been decided, that for the present, no approach 
shall be made to the Medical Research Council’.820  Despite this rebuttal from the MRC, 
the RSPCA stepped up their public campaign against the Act. The pressure exerted over 																																																								
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the past decade by a variety of organisations, including the influential work of the UFAW 
and public letters written by scientists calling for a review, meant that the Home 
Secretary felt compelled to establish inquiry into the workings of the Act, and did so on 
30 November 1962.821 
 
The Littlewood Inquiry 
 
It wasn’t until 25 June 1963 that Sir Sydney Littlewood, Chairman of the inquiry into the 
workings of the Cruelty to Animals Act, wrote to public bodies and newspapers to 
announce the review and to ask for evidence relating to experiments on animals.822 At the 
same time, a committee was appointed to consider the administration of the Act. It 
included Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, Mr T.C. Green, Sir Charles Robert Harington, Sir 
Hugh Linstead MP, Mr Lionel McColvin, Colonel Sir James Millar, The Reverend 
Edward Rogers, Professor Francis Stammers, Mr Alasdair Steele-Bodger, Lord Walston, 
and Mr P. Beedle of the Home Office as Secretary to the Committee.823 This was an 
group of doctors, scientists, religious leaders and Members of Parliament. During a 
debate in the House of Lords, Baroness Evelyn Emmet recommended to the Chairman 
that a woman should be present during the inquiry as  ‘women are not supposed to be 
quite so hardened or callous about these things as the male sex. One might have a 
woman doctor or nursing expert or zoologist on the Board. Certainly, I should like to see 
a woman on the Board’.824 Subsequently three women were appointed to the Committee: 
Mrs Joyce Butler MP a Labour MP, Lady Barbara Dyer, aristocrat, who was Deputy 
Chairman (sic) of the juvenile court panel and former chairman of the National 
Federation of the Women’s Institute, and Mrs Katherine Horsfall, a representative of the 
Liverpool Regional Hospital Board.825 
 
With the Committee appointed, during the course of their inquiries they visited twenty-
nine establishments, including the very secretive Porton Down Chemical and Biological 
Defence Establishment, in order to view animals before, during and after experiments, 																																																								
821 "Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on Animals."p.14. And see: Lyons, 
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and to talk to employees. Visiting these establishments involved some twenty-seven 
private meetings, taking eighty-three accounts from witnesses representing twenty-six 
organizations.826 The organizations were diverse, ranging from pro- to anti-vivisection 
groups including the Royal College of Surgeons, Home Office, Medical Research 
Council, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence and Army Department, BUAV, NAVS, 
RSPCA, and of course from the UFAW.827   
 
Because of the scope of this enquiry, in this section I will only be focussing on a few 
representatives notably Porton Down, the RDS and BUAV. Furthermore, I will be 
discussing only one of the main focuses of the inquiry: animal pain. The notion that an 
animal could feel pain and suffer psychological distress was something that scientists had 
begun to take seriously from the early twentieth century, most notably via the work of 
the UFAW (see chapter five). It was this inquiry, alongside the publiations of the UFAW, 
which contributed to a broader redefinition of animal pain and hence a change in the 
semantics of animal experimentation. It is here that we can observe how the description 
and purpose of animal experimentation was under contestation, a challenge which 
ultimately revolved around the idea of pain and suffering. Hence, I am arguing, alongside 
Lyons, that this analysis of the review of the Act in 1965 acted as a catalyst for the 
creation of animal experimentation legislation in Britain today,828 but I also argue that it 
was a defining moment for the emergence of the Animal Rights movement in the 1970s.  
 
Pain With A Purpose: Considering Stress, Distress and Psychological Pain of the 
Nonhuman 
  
As has been described, the Research Defence Society was an umbrella organisation that 
represented the interests of the medical establishment. In light of the review of the Act 
they gathered together a team of scientists in order to defend animal experimentation. 
The team, comprised of a committee of experts within the RDS, were in fact all men, 
professors of medicine, biochemistry and physiology. They included Professor George 
Brownlee (Biochemistry), Professor J. A. B Gray (Physiology), Professor A. V. Hill (The 
Royal Society of Medicine), Dr W. Lane-Petter (The Medical Research Council), Dr W. 
R.Woolridge (representing veterinary surgeons). This committee also included Sir George 																																																								
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Boyd (to represent Physicians, Pathologists and Microbiologists), Professor Macdonald 
(of the Pharmacological Society), Dr J. B. E. Baker (who became the secretary of the 
committee) and Sir Charles Lovatt-Evans and Sir Charles Harrington both eminent 
scientists.829 
 
It is interesting to note that there were two members of the RDS who had connections 
to the UFAW: Dr Baker, author of UFAW’s The Scientific Basis of Kindness to Animals at the 
time of its 3rd edition, and Dr Lane-Petter, who edited the second edition of the 
Handbook in 1957, and was director of the L.A.C.830 Elite networks of scientists were 
integral to the perpetuation of animal experimentation, and this was no more evident 
than during debates arising during the inquiry about the language of animal pain as 
defined in the Act. Embedded in the 1876 Act was a definition of animal pain called ‘The 
Pain Condition’ which required that any animal suffering pain which was likely to be 
severe and endure must be killed after the experiment. Moreover, if an Inspector was 
present and saw such suffering from an animal, they could direct the researcher to 
‘destroy’ them.831 This definition of pain, and its consequents, caused some consternation 
amongst the scientists and researchers within the pro-vivisection camp.  
 
This dismay was evident during a meeting held on 7 January 1963, where a new version 
of the Pain Condition was sketched out to submit to the committee of inquiry. Overall 
the meeting showed that the members of the RDS were satisfied with the powers of the 
Act, but they claimed that its wording was difficult to interpret. Their recommendations 
for change included changing the name of the Act, from the Cruelty to Animals Act to 
‘The Experiments on Animals Act’, a recommendation to remove the expression 
‘calculated to give pain’ throughout, when discussing experiments. Further the idea was 
to replace the sentence ‘with a view to advancing or imparting knowledge or knowledge 
which will be useful for saving or prolonging life and alleviating suffering’ to read ‘the 
experiment must be performed by a person holding such a licence from one of Her 
Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State’.  In order to establish this new discourse of 
vivisection, the RDS stipulated that a ‘new qualifying opening’ must be written and 																																																								
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changed from the current one to: ‘in any procedure likely to produce more than trivial 
discomfort the animal must during the whole of the experiment be under the influence 
of some anaesthetic of sufficient power to prevent the animal feeling pain.’832  This 
meeting of RDS members, also included Sir Charles Lovett-Evans, a prominent British 
scientist who had worked on the development of chemical and biological weapons at 
Porton Down during and after the First World War.833 In his written testimony to be sent 
to Littlewood he stated: 
Today, by far the greatest number of physiological experiments are carried out 
under full anaesthesia, so that standard experiments are quite painless… In the 
relatively few experiments in which recovery from anaesthesia is essential, the 
subsequent treatment is much the same as a human patient would have, and if 
there is any evidence of pain the animal is destroyed. The whole question of 
animal experimentation is one of priorities. If the lives of animals have priority 
over the needs and lives of mankind, there is nothing more to be said, and 
experiments on animals should all be prohibited.834 
 
According to Lovett-Evans, experiments on animals were essential and the animals were 
well anaesthetised so as not to feel any pain. Human life far outweighed the life of an 
animal. Whereas before, animals had been used by pro-vivisectionists as analogous to the 
human; now a prominent man of science was demarcating the human from the animal in 
a social hierarchy, in order to promote the necessity of animal experimentation.  
 
It was not only members of the RDS who raised the issue of the Pain Condition. When 
the Committee of Inquiry visited Porton Down Chemical and Biological Defence 
Establishment, they too highlighted the issue of animal pain. As will be recalled from 
Chapter three, the Crown did not bind any establishment run by the state in law. This 
meant research could be conducted without a government establishment being licensed. 
As we saw, there was a great deal of consternation and anxiety about this, as Porton 
Down were afraid the public might find out about the top-secret experiments and that 
they did not need to be licensed. In the end, government officials, scientists and solicitors 
decided that since research workers had to be licenced they were in effect legally 
protected by the Act, if rather vicariously. 
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Even so, Porton Down and its laboratory animals breeding farm, Allington Farm, 
contributed significantly to the inquiry.  With a hundred licence holders in the War 
Office, fifty-eight of whom were situated at Porton, the chemical and biological defence 
establishment played a prominent role in laboratory animal science.835 The top-secret 
organisation allowed the committee to visit its UK site in Salisbury, and on 24 June 1964 
in the conference room of the Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment, gave oral 
evidence as to the nature of the research carried out at Porton Down.836 All of the 
inquiry committee were present, and representatives from Porton Down included Dr 
Paterson (Superintendent of Allington Farm), Lt Col Wilkins (Assistant Director and 
Army Vet) and Mr James (Director of both Biological and Chemical Defence at Porton 
of the Ministry of Defence).837 
 
During the meeting, representatives of Porton Down answered a series of questions 
regarding research, compliance with the Act, licensing, certificates, animal husbandry and 
animal pain. Accordingly, the delegates characterised research at Porton Down as 
‘essential to the general welfare of the community and morally justified’. Warfare and 
welfare were not juxtaposed but rather coalesced to form a discourse of the animal in 
relation to the human, claiming that ‘it was necessary to use animals for study of 
biological effects where the closest analogues to men were required’. Animals were seen 
as comparable with the human body and thus, essential. 838 Likewise the Porton Down 
scientists asserted that ‘many discoveries obtained for research designed for defence 
purposes had been found to have civilian applications e.g. in the… development of 
immunology and the production of vaccines’, and, with a nod made to the L.A.C. and 
UFAW, that Porton Down was at the forefront of helping to develop the ‘emerging 
technology of animal laboratory science and animal production’.839 
 
As far as the notion of animal pain went, the witnesses claimed that it was very difficult 
to detect the presence of pain in the animal and that it was ‘not much easier to establish 
that it might be suffering discomfort or was ‘”out of sorts” unless the animals’ ordinary 																																																								
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behaviour was well known”.840  It was here that the hierarchal division of laboratory 
labour was demonstrated, with technicians being recruited ‘just after the war from among 
redundant farm works, who had neither the interest for study and examinations’ about 
the science of animal care and welfare, but were ‘excellent and reliable animal handlers 
and could be trusted to notify licensees if their animals began to show signs of 
discomfort…Or to kill an animal as soon as symptoms of suffering became evident’.841 
Divisions of social class entered the laboratory in subtle ways, especially when it came to 
ending an animal’s life. The Porton Down meeting concluded with the witnesses stating 
that the Act ‘had worked well and did not require major revision’ and that ‘procedures 
that were not strictly experimental, e.g. the use of animals for harvest of isolated organs 
or tissue or for the production of vaccines and sera, should not be made subject to the 
full force of the Act’.842 The committee heard about the total number of animals used 
annually by Porton, which included 100,000 mice, 300 cats, 30 dogs, 10,000 guinea pigs 
and 4,000 mice in total.843 The witnesses were keen to emphasise the economic benefits 
of their establishment, telling the committee that any ‘surplus animals… were sought 
after by many bona-fide research organisations and between 10-20% of production was 
sold to University Departments, pharmaceutical firms and other government 
departments’.844   
 
The written reports sent to the committee of inquiry also supported omitting 
anaesthetics for certain experiments and continued to deny pain in the animal. A letter to 
the Secretary of the Committee from the Director of Porton Down, D. E. Woods, gave 
reasons as to why anaesthesia was dispensed with during the course of a series of 
experiments on the study of blast effects: 
It is emphasised that animals are placed in the Armoured fighting vehicles in 
crew positions where it is feared that marginal blast effects might occur. Blast 
effects may be so slight that animals appear physically unaffected. 
Histopathological changes in the tissues of such animals may also be minimal 
and, it is for this reason that anaesthesia has been dispensed with since 
anaesthesia itself may produce minor degrees of change...The hatches are always 
open within a minute or two or firing. If then an animal was seen to have 
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suffered obvious injury by blast or fragment, the animal would be destroyed on 
the spot.845 
 
The idea of psychological distress was not emphasised by Woods.  In effect, Porton 
Down were denying the sentience of the nonhuman, and arguing that the determination 
of pain was subjective at best. The case for using animals to protect the nation was 
accentuated in the committee’s report about their visit to the establishment: ‘their 
[animals’] defensive value’, it noted, ‘may be a direct benefit in saving life and alleviating 
suffering’.846 However, the Committee did reflect on psychological suffering, reporting 
that ‘we paid special heed to the question of pain in defence experiments. We were given 
categoric assurance that no experiments had been, or were being, performed at Porton 
that cause pain or acute distress to an animal for an appreciable time’.847 Additionally, a 
War Office Memorandum for the Home Office Committee on Experiments on Animals, 
Porton Down and related military establishments called for a redefinition of pain: ‘pain 
should be specified more clearly and degrees of pain should be recognised with necessary 
statutory action laid down’. 848 Overall both the RDS, who represented the medical 
establishment, and Porton Down, were representing the military establishment, 
concurred that the present Act was acceptable, and that it worked to safeguards 
nonhuman animals from any form of pain. However, both sets of representatives were 
keen to challenge the contemporary definition of animal pain and that of which was 
enshrined in law, the Pain Condition. However, the BUAV were yet to present their oral 
and written testimony to the committee. 
 
Anti-Vivisection Response 
 
The Intention of the Act is quite obviously to keep animal suffering to an 
absolute minimum and that it could only be regarded as legitimate in as far as it is 
for the purpose of advancing medicine (in the very widest sense) or improving 
health. This intention, however, is not fulfilled in the working of the Act. Any 
experiment to confirm what is already known, performed in relation to 
something not absolutely vital as that could be done without the use of animals, 
is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Act. Yet a large proportion of the 
experiments carried out under the Act are obviously such a nature. For instance, 																																																								
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highly desirable shampoos and cosmetics maybe, it cannot be argued that they 
are matters of life and death; yet thousands of animals are used in the testing of 
these substances. Again, the keen competition of the rival drug companies, each 
with its own research and testing department, must inevitably mean that the same 
experiments are being duplicated and possible triplicated or even 
quadruplicated.849 
 
The BUAV, alongside its member organisations, such as the Friends Animal Welfare and 
Anti-Vivisection Society and the Scottish Anti-vivisection Society, collaborated in 
submitting evidence to the committee. Despite their abolitionist position, the BUAV 
tempered their beliefs in order to present evidence for evaluation. It is clear from the 
quote above that experiments on animals were abhorred. Whereas the pro-vivisection 
groups, such as the RDS sought to change the language of the law, from ‘vivisection’ to 
‘experiments on animals’, the abolitionist groups strived to keep this wording intact. 
Therefore, the intention of the BUAV was to indict science through its construction of 
nonhumans as helpless beings. The Scottish Anti-Vivisection Society claimed in its 
written evidence that ‘There are many paths to knowledge. To seek it through the 
infliction of suffering on weaker creatures is, in our view, morally indefensible. 
Experiments on animals have become mania”.850 A wealth of evidence was presented to 
the committee that outlined their perspective on the Pain Condition. Interestingly, both 
sides of the vivisection debate shared similar sentiments when it came to discussing pain. 
The BUAV, in their testimony to the committee, declared that ‘if pain was accepted as a 
critical matter for control, it should be interpreted in its widest sense to include distress, 
suffering and psychological stress’.851 
 
It is obvious that the influence of the UFAW on the definition of pain in the animal was 
broad and encompassed both the pro- and anti-vivisection groups. However, the NAVS, 
alongside the BUAV, contradicted the RDS in their analysis of the Pain Condition, 
declaring in their written testimony that ‘we would prefer to see the word “suffering” 
substituted for the word “pain”’ and that ‘the present form of provision is that an animal 
which is suffering pain which is likely to continue after the effect of the anaesthetic and 
that the same should apply if the animal has sustained any serious injury…these are 
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surely minimal requirements which should not be further watered down’.852  Further, 
their insistence on keeping the word ‘pain’ contradicted the RDS’s desire to alter the 
wording from ‘pain’ to ‘suffering’. The question remains, how did the inquiry respond to 
such suggestions, and what was the end result? 
 
Conclusions of the Littlewood Inquiry: The Growing Ubiquity of the UFAW and 
the Pain Condition 
 
We recommend, that the Act should be amended so as clearly to apply to an 
experimental procedure liable to cause pain, stress, or interference with, or 
departure from, an animal’s normal condition of well-being.853 
 
The Littlewood Report’s findings were published in April 1965, and the government’s 
response to was largely apathetic.854  With eighty-three recommendations and appeals for 
new legislation in light of some of the findings, the main emphasis concerned the reform 
of the administration of the Act due to the increase in animal experiments in the post-
war period. Recommendations included changes to the licencing system, methods of 
inspection and the number and quality of inspectors, greater public engagement with 
regards to experiments, and a more prominent role for the advisory committee.855.  
 
But where did the committee stand on pain? As the quote at the beginning of this section 
suggests, the inquiry recommended the definition of animal pain be changed to include 
the recognition of stress and distress in the animal. It was no coincidence that the UFAW 
were referenced throughout the published report, especially in the section related to ‘Pain 
in Animals’.856 As discussed in chapter four, the UFAW constructed the idea of the 
“stressed animal” and a whole discourse of welfare of the nonhuman in the laboratory 
developed as a result of this. It was claimed that animal welfare was integral to 
experimental science so that experiments would become more efficient, and 
methodological techniques would possess greater validity. The redefinition of pain was 
made in light of the writings of the UFAW, and the final publication of the Littlewood 
Report included substantial references to this particular organisation. This, it could be 																																																								
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argued, signalled both a change in scientific discourse in relation to the nonhuman but 
also a transformation of the discourse of law when it came to regulating animal 
experimentation. 
 
However, one wonders, as Elaine Scarry does in her book The Body in Pain: The Making 
and Unmaking of the World,857 how pain becomes defined and objectified. According to 
Scarry, pain is inexpressible. 858 Therefore, what mechanisms of power are at work in 
order to facilitate the expression of pain? Who does the expressing and on whose behalf? 
Despite Scarry’s focus on the human body, there are parallels that can be drawn in 
relation to the nonhuman body, pain and its objectification through structures of power. 
Her most notable contribution to this work would be in her definition of pain something 
which is completely ineffable, and consequently, pain ‘does not simply resist language but 
actively destroys it’.859 In other words the bodily experience of pain is one that cannot be 
described or voiced, even by the one experiencing it. This is significant in light of the 
Littlewood report, as the definition of laboratory animal suffering and pain was 
acknowledged by those very people who inflict that pain - the scientists - and this 
language of animal pain was brought into being by the law makers and politicians who 
are far removed from its processes. 
 
As we have seen, the Littlewood Inquiry demonstrated a shift in thinking about 
nonhuman animals compared to that of the 1912 Commission, namely, the ability for 
animals to suffer psychological as well as physical pain. This idea of openly and publically 
expressing this aspect of pain in the animal became a powerful way of politically 
representing vivisection as a force for good and one which was concerned about the 
welfare of the animal. The Report demonstrated that animal pain could be verbally 
expressed in an appropriate manner, and thus, through this rhetoric, enabled the 
construction of an image of the law as a force for good in the world and one that 
ensured pain’s diminishment in the laboratory: 
 
Pain is a subjective symptom… It is not surprising therefore, that detection and 
assessment of pain in the inarticulate animal should present such formidable 
problems. Nevertheless, these problems must be faced by those responsible for 																																																								
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the regulation of experiments on animals and some guidance as to the proper 
approach to them can be reasonably expected by licensees.860 
 
Pain thus became an ambiguous phenomenon and a subjective experience, something 
inexpressible and difficult to see in the animal. This acknowledgment of the subjective 
experience highlights an important shift in thinking about the animal. Further, these 
verbal representations of pain in the Report were also expanded to encompass 
psychological pain, and the committee noted how many of the witnesses made analogical 
comparisons of mental illness in humans to the psychosomatic effects on animals, 
especially when it concerned psychological experiments ‘designed to find forms of 
treatment for disordered states in human patients’.861 Consequently, in the era of stress 
(see chapter five), even the nonhuman had to have some form of psychological neuroses. 
The concept of stress provided the committee and scientists with a device to at once 
continue with experimental science, but at the same time, one which made the 
nonhuman even more invisible: 
 
Within the concept of “pain”, it is desirable to provide for at least three states of 
suffering: (a) discomfort (such as may be characterised by such negative signs as 
poor condition, torpor, diminished appetite); (b) stress (i.e. a condition of tension 
or anxiety predictable or readily explicable from environmental causes whether 
distinct from or including physical causes); (c) pain (recognisable by more 
positive signs such as struggling, screaming or squealing, convulsions, severe 
palpitation).862 
 
The first two clauses constitute noticeable signs of withdrawal in the nonhuman and the 
third clause the more physical and vocal signs of suffering. But surely, the question 
remains, that any laboratory animal undergoing experiment will suffer all three at any 
given time? If the nonhuman is undergoing procedures designed to create discomfort, 
they will inevitably suffer and be hurt in the process. Further, their captivity in the 
laboratory animal house, in wire cages laid out in racks and in enclosed environments, 
exacerbates the pain felt and the psychological distress encountered. Hence, the 
committee and scientists rendered both physical and psychological pain visible whilst 
suppressing them by objectifying and defining them. They naturalised laboratory human-
animal relations via the redefinition of the Pain Condition and the concept of stress. This 
in effect was an obliteration of the experience of pain in the nonhuman: the law 																																																								
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transformed this pain into a form of hierarchical and disciplinary power over the 
nonhuman. 
 
The Committee sought to legitimise their definition of pain by acknowledging the 
UFAW, as they were the only organisation to ‘offer serious criticism of the text of the 
[Pain] Condition’.863 The UFAW exemplified the stressed animal perspective and this 
came across in their rewording of the Pain Condition. For instance, they stated that any 
discomfort felt by an animal that was likely to continue, should be ‘painlessly killed as 
soon as the experiment has been completed’. They also suggested that the Pain 
Condition should be ‘embodied in the law as a cardinal feature of the whole pattern of 
control’.864 The committee accepted the suggestions of the UFAW, claiming that their 
draft of the Condition ‘is not that it would make it more objective or precise the standard 
of assessment [of pain], but that it placed in the setting of a more specific range of 
suffering subject to the Act, the licensee who detects “pain” as distinct from 
“discomfort” or stress will be immediately altered to consider its severity and likely 
duration’. The Committee therefore fully ‘endorsed the principles of the UFAW proposal 
and recommend[ed] that they should be embodied in the Act’. 865  
 
Furthermore, the Report drew on the recommendations made in the Handbook on the Care 
and Management of Laboratory Animals regarding anaesthesia and how to eliminate ‘the risks 
of premature recovery’ from experiment.866 Hence, death of the nonhuman was also 
dealt with in the Report, under the heading ‘Painless Killing’. Again, reference was made 
to a UFAW pamphlet published in 1950 and written by the organisation’s technical 
secretary Jean Vinter, entitled Kind Killing.867 Speaking on humane killing, the Littlewood 
Report referred readers to Vinter’s pamphlet: 
We were told that manual methods were sometimes used in laboratories to 
destroy rabbits and smaller rodents e.g. by striking the back of the head smartly 
with the side of the hand or against the edge of a bench. We learned that this 
method was quick and, in experienced hands, simple and painless. Nevertheless, 
we formed the view that many licensees would welcome further guidance on this 
subject as new methods of painless killings are explored and established, and we 
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recommend that this subject should dealt with in the code of practice we 
recommend later in this report.868 
 
The laissez faire attitude of the Report’s description of killing indicated three things: 
firstly, the separation of ‘body from text’, 869  or in other words, the nonhumans’ 
experiences of manifest pain from the aforementioned descriptions of suffering.  
Secondly, this was linked to the UFAW publication, and its oxymoronic title ‘Kind 
Killing’. This was a rhetorical device that detracted from the nature of the task: that of 
putting to death a sentient being. Thirdly, the advice on how to kill with kindness via the 
work of the UFAW was inherently gendered. The pamphlet conveyed techniques of 
killing to those people who ‘may have to destroy animals when there are no experts 
available’ advising that ‘it is best to select methods most suited to one’s temperament and 
to practice it on dead animals until it can be performed skilfully’.870 The pamphlet gave 
instructions on methods of killing according to specific mammalian species, however, 
those who were to kill rabbits had to be a particular kind of person and the instructions 
were to: 
  
Hold [the rabbit] by the hind legs in the left hand and strike the back of the neck 
violently downwards with a stick about 1 inch thick and 15 inches long or with a 
poultry stunner. A man or really strong woman can use the “heel” of the hand i.e. the 
back edge of the hand held with the fingers extended and rigid, but a very hard 
blow is required.871 
 
The act of killing became a gendered process through the stipulation of needing a man or 
really strong woman to kill. The nonhuman almost disappears through the language of 
killing. Where is the Pain Condition in respect of this process of ‘destroying’? Ironically, 
the action of killing forms part of the legal act of the humane approach to getting rid of 
an animal that is suffering.   
 
This raises key issues about the nonhuman in both law and science at the time, with 
particular reference to points raised by Judith Butler in her work Frames of War: When is 
Life Grievable?. 872  Butler questions the social and political ‘frames’ that contribute to 
western society’s construction of who is a living subject in their own right. Butler asserts 																																																								
868 "Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on Animals."pp.62-63. 
869 Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. p.70. 
870 Vinter, "Kind Killing." p.1. 
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that certain lives cannot be grasped as living if they are not firstly seen as alive, and 
because of this, how we construe what is living is an issue of power that is politically 
shaped.873 In other words, the very ‘being of life itself is constituted through selective 
means, as a result we can’t refer to this “being” outside the operations of power’.874 
Nonhuman animals in the laboratory are articulated through these mechanisms of power 
via the discourse of law, which in turn produces articulations as to what counts as a 
living, active being. Accordingly the UFAW recognised the nonhuman as a living object, 
but not one with agency or moral standing in the world, hence animals became active 
objects but not active moral agents.875 This clearly influenced the Littlewood Committee’s 
interpretations of pain in the animal and consequently of “painless killing”. What we see 
here is a paradigm shift in the construal of the nonhuman in experimental science and its 
regulation. The body of the animal, although it feels pain and experiences suffering, is 
constructed with words and meanings that define who it is and how it feels pain. As 
Butler states, ‘to be a body is to be exposed to social crafting and form’.876 The discourse 
of suffering contained within the law became an ‘ethico-political judgement’,877 one that 
entailed making distinctions between what was human and what was animal, what 
constitutes sanctioned pain, suffering and killing compared with unsanctioned hurt, 
distress and murder. In other words, what counts as animal, and what counts as human. 
 
The Littlewood Report failed to make any significant policy changes and instead 
reinforced the 1876 Act’s administrative procedures. This was evidenced by its emphasis 
on experimental research being fundamental to the advancement of knowledge, with 
animal welfare a secondary commitment that was only considered in terms of the effect 
on experimental methodologies.  The Government did not implement any of the 
recommendations and clearly favoured the interests of the pro-vivisection groups, whilst 
slowly, over the course of the decade following the Report, increasing the number of 
inspectors.878  
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Animals, Women and the Law 
 
Overall, the investigation into the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876 involved many different 
groups on both sides of the vivisection debate. Further, the decision to review the Act, 
was politically-motivated rather than one of ethical and moral praxis. The main debates 
surrounding the relevance of the Act for contemporary scientific practice revolved 
around the idea of animal pain and suffering. We also saw the influence of a burgeoning 
animal welfare discourse on the legal representations of animals, animal experimentation 
and pain.  However, as we have seen, enshrined in law was the notion that the 
nonhuman was an object, or a piece of property that could be owned by the [hu]man 
scientist. This final concluding section of the chapter advances the idea of the nonhuman 
in law as being parallel to discourses about women as represented in the legal structures 
of mid-twentieth century Britain. I will be arguing in this section that both animals and 
women were entangled in what Kimberlé Crenshaw calls ‘intersectional oppression[s]’.879 
This means the binding together of several systems of subjection,880 in this case, the 
structural interrelationship between animals and women through the confines of legal 
discourse, and policies that are not directly associated with either agent. Crenshaw asserts 
that ‘what distinguishes this intersectional problem [from others] is that the policy in 
question is not in any way targeted toward women... it simply intersects with other 
structures to create a subordinating effect.881 In this sense, we can argue that the legal 
systems in place at the time were very much organised and based on principles of 
hierarchy that subordinated some groups to others, namely, animals over humans. 
Further, on closer inspection, animal experimentation law and the regulation of 
vivisection also implicitly subordinated women through its representations of the 
nonhuman. Only by addressing the philosophies of the legal system in relation to animal 
experimentation can this be exposed.  
 
Within the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, its review in 1965 and the regulation of 
vivisection, one could argue that the legal positioning of the nonhuman as a piece of 
property, and the representation of the nonhuman body in pain as formulated through 
the creation of a select criteria to determine that pain, intersects with the law at the time 																																																								
879 Kimberlé Crenshaw, "The Structural and Poltical Dimensions of Intersectional Oppression," 
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in relation to women, whether that was with regards to women’s position in the public or 
private sphere, in employment and/or in relation to marriage, divorce and sexuality. In 
other words, the nonhuman body shared its legal position with that of the female body in 
mid-twentieth century Britain. As Catharine MacKinnon, a prominent feminist legal 
scholar, argues, ‘the legal system’s response to animals is gendered, highlighting its 
response to women’s inequality to men as well’. 882  This is because of the socially 
structured binaries that manifest as hierarchies in particular societies at particular points 
in time. MacKinnon explains these social hierarchies as divided into the binaries of 
animate-inanimate, human-animal and male-female divisions. 883  This too echoes the 
discussions in previous chapters regarding the philosophies and methodologies of 
science: is the problem then, not necessarily men per se, but rather the ubiquity of an 
ideology that stems from paternalistic thinking? 
 
It is no coincidence that the antivivisection movement was historically dominated by 
women, and emerged at the same time as the suffragette movement in the nineteenth 
century. As Mary Ann Elston, amongst others, has demonstrated, the nineteenth century 
also saw a conflation of women’s bodies with that of images and representations of 
nature and animals in medical and popular cultural narratives.884 The idea of what is seen 
as ‘natural’ shapes a particular society’s views on who is an active moral agent and subject 
in their own right and who is not.885 This then links to the question of law and legal 
rights: the person in law who is deemed “rights-bearing” rests upon an historically 
contingent liberal theory (private property ownership) of legal philosophy still present in 
the practice of law in the western world today. It creates a distinction between the 
objects of knowledge (non-rights bearers) and the inquirers or subjects (rights bearers).886  
This kind of legal doctrine holds that animals have no inherent rights or interests, or at 
least none that supersede human ones.887 Therefore, nonhumans became classified as 
property and as having object status. This too paralleled the objectification of women as 
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represented in law,888 as for a time, women were seen as ownable property and non-rights 
bearers.889  In 1929 by order of the Privy Council, a select group of senior political 
advisors to the Monarch enacted a law to allow women to become persons in their own 
right.890 However, despite women’s personhood status, the mid-twentieth century was 
witness to a host of complex and often contradictory (legal) doctrines which affected 
women’s’ lives, and paralleled those of the nonhuman in scientific research: 891  were 
women seen as not fully human, as active objects? This question is at its most resonant 
when we address issues of pain and suffering, as noted by MacKinnon:  
 
Women’s suffering, particularly in sexual forms, has not delivered us full human 
status. It has gotten us more suffering. That women feel, including pain, has been 
part of stigmatizing them, emotions in particular traditionally have been 
neglected to the lower, animal, bodily, side of the mind-body split.892 
 
The parallels between animals and women in law can be demonstrated most palpably 
through the idea of the dividing line between sanity and madness and the shaping of 
public policy in relation to this. As will be recalled, the objectification of pain in the 
nonhuman in the Littlewood Inquiry was expanded to include signs of stress and 
distress. I argued that with its objectification through these criteria, the very experience 
of pain is actually demolished by its discursive formation as espoused by legal and 
scientific representatives. This too echoes the 1957 Royal Commission on Mental Health 
and Deficiency, and the 1959 Mental Health Act which described mental illness as 
‘illnesses which need medical treatment’.893 This paved the way for psychiatrists to ‘cure’ 
people of their mental illness through such techniques as leucotomies and lobotomies, 
(brain surgeries). The types of people recommended for such surgeries were of course 
depressed women who were victims of domestic violence at the hands of their 
husbands.894 This, then, supports the notion of intersectional objectification through the 
philosophies of law and their material implications on animals and women. As 
MacKinnon observes, the way women have suffered at the hands of the legal system has 
meant that their pain and suffering has been ‘denigrated, and denied and when 																																																								
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recognised, more often used to see us as damaged goods then as humans harmed’.895 
Taking into account the above, does this sound familiar with view to the 
conceptualisation of the nonhumans’ pain and suffering?  
 
The key to understanding these intersectional oppressions is by addressing the 
philosophies of science and law, and how they buttress, embellish and support each 
other by claiming to demonstrate ways of knowing and understanding nonhuman and 
human others through this discourse of “Rights” and through a growing discourse of 
animal welfare. These discourses of rights and welfare affected definitions of pain, which 
also became gendered. 
 
The Power-Pain Nexus 
 
Although other animals can be experimented upon only because they are not 
human, if they were not like humans nothing would be gained for humans by 
studying them. But what precisely is gained? How can pain be measured, 
quantified, interpreted, especially if chronic pain changes an animal’s response? 
Once gained, how is the knowledge applied? Once the dilemma (animals are 
different from us; animals are like us) is acknowledged, it attaches itself to the 
rationale of the animal experiments…The wedge of differentiation between 
humans and other animals, which can never be precisely located, is both 
necessary for and undercuts the premise of scientific knowledge.896 
 
Is the infliction of pain on the nonhuman body under experiment a way to de-subjectify 
them, as much as it contributes towards subjectifiying them and classifying them as being 
a body in pain that is other than human? 897  Is the pain experienced by the nonhuman an 
acknowledgment of their subjectivity and presence in the world, or is the classification of 
their experience of pain an exercise of power, manifested and exercised through the 
institutions that sanction the infliction of that pain in first place? This chapter has 
explored in several parts the effects of power over the experimental animal by the legal 
establishment, and how these effects help codify and structure gender relations in 
broader society.  
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What has become clear is that in order to maintain animal experimentation in mid-
twentieth century Britain, scientists had to acknowledge that nonhuman animals could 
suffer pain and psychological distress. To conclude this chapter I want to discuss the 
gendered nature of pain and its classification by law under the concept of the ‘power-
pain nexus’. It is evident of this chapter and the preceding ones that pain forms the basis 
of the experience of the nonhuman animal in the laboratory, and its relationship to 
humans. This experience of pain, from my preceding analyses in this work, echoes the 
comment made by feminist philosophy Wendy Lynne Lee: that it is rooted in Cartesian 
dualism.898 This dualism is implicit in the construction of power-knowledge relations 
mentioned above, but also in the very experience of pain itself, and the reasons why the 
nonhuman is acknowledged to experience that pain. The infliction of pain, whether it be 
within the laboratory, in the slaughterhouse, or farm, or on human beings because of 
their sex, class and/or race is a form of violence. Violence on the micro-scale acts as a 
veil to the violence perpetrated on the macro-scale. As Lee asserts, violence ‘is so deeply 
woven into our social institutions (law, medicine, marriage, family and so on)’899 that it 
inevitably goes unnoticed and even becomes normalised.  
 
This normalisation of violence on nonhuman animals was evident during the review of 
the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act. Science, law and government were so entangled with 
each other that they formed networks of powerful relations. Social actors within these 
institutions exchanged correspondence, even scientists such as Dr Lane-Petter, moved 
between these institutions and contributed to the development and regulation of 
laboratory animal science (see chapter six). Therefore, in the Littlewood Report’s review 
of the Pain Condition, the idea of the experience of pain in the nonhuman was discussed 
at length and a new definition was created that encompassed psychological aspects. is the 
question follows: how can I claim that despite this changing definition of pain to one 
that recognises both the mind and the body, that the definition, and thus the experience 
of pain was still dependent on Cartesian dualism as a way to organise the world? That this 
was so despite the growing support from various scientific circles for a rejection of 
Cartesianism?  
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It is here that we might turn to the work of Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, Elaine Scarry, and the 
aforementioned Wendy Lee to address this question.900 As described above, Scarry claims 
that pain (in the human) lacks referentiality, and hence precedes language. In other words 
it de-subjectifies the person and rests in the material realm of the body.901  In a sense, 
Scarry is right, the human in pain becomes a person disassociated from language, culture, 
meaning and understanding. 902  But on the other hand, this too reinforces the 
human/animal divide by perceiving the human in pain as returning to a prelinguistic state 
that animalises the person, which is a form of speciesism. Scarry postulates a form of 
dualism that ignores the nonhuman experience, presupposes that it is only human beings 
that have the gift of language, culture and experience and in turn reiterates the discourses 
of the animal/human dualism which circulated in mid-twentieth century Britain. While I 
am sympathetic to this account, and its usefulness to this aspect of animal law, Scarry 
ultimately reinforces the very logic that supports the institutions that inflict pain.903 She 
assumes nonhuman animals are lacking cognitive/emotional capacities and inadvertently 
turns the experience of pain into a process of ‘Othering’.   
 
Nevertheless, the lawmakers and scientists conceptualised and normalised the experience 
of pain in the nonhuman laboratory animal by their very acknowledgement and 
objectification of that pain. To draw on Scarry’s notion of the indescribability of pain is 
important, yet it needs to be extended to include the nonuhman body. A body that is 
seen as being always a part of culture and language: inscribed by culure and experienced 
through culture. The black feminist scholar Bakare-Yusuf, discusses this process with 
regard to slavery. The situation of the body outside of culture was ‘clearly not the case 
for slaves’ as from the moment of enslavement, a slave had ‘no claim to her person, no 
right to citizenship; she [was] the property of her master or mistress’.904 This is not to 
compare the experience of slaves with that of laboratory animals, but Bakare-Yusuf’s 
point is relevant, as the body of the nonhuman, from the moment of their use in the 
laboratory to the discussions which abounded in the 1960s about their legal standing; had 																																																								
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no claim to rights, but rather was seen in law as having the status of property (see 
above).905 
 
This property status of the animal allowed for the continuation of vivisection, which 
removed any chance of acknowledgement that animals were living sentient beings in their 
own right. In other words the nonhuman animal was already - despite the 
acknowledgement from scientists of the capacity for animals to suffer physically and 
psychologically – de-subjectified. This new definition of pain (as discussed above) further 
entrenched this de-subjectification (they were given active object status), which made the 
laboratory animal more vulnerable to objectification.906 This further ingrained the subject-
object dualism, which produced the circumstances within which the experience of pain in 
the nonhuman had a purpose: that animal experimentation was both expedient and right, 
that science was the best way to develop a civilisation and defend one, thus ‘licensing any 
pain necessary to secure it’.907 This included the military and medical laboratory that 
produced a biopolitics of care, which had disciplinary techniques that made the 
nonhuman docile, and under its control.  
The tortured body speaks through the subject’s attempts to protect herself, 
through her compliance, and the through the physical space she occupies... Her 
very comportment signifies the institutions and practices reinforced in the 
violence acted out against her. Even in death, her body signifies her an 
individuated thing whose identity is past or spent, and whose treatment in death 
is as much prescribed by law as her actions in life… Dualism functions as a 
justificatory instrument in law in that, while it is not the truth about the law’s 
foundation in the positing of materiality through language, it does provide the 
conceptual ontological framework within which devaluation, and the violence 
necessary to enforce it can be codified and preserved.908 
 
Pain then, was fundamental to all aspects of legal laboratory life, with reference to the 
above. The Power-Pain Nexus can be defined as the (historical) conceptualisation of a body 
experiencing pain, forged by various powerful institutions in society (medical, military 
and legal institutions).  Institutions that exercise this power-knowledge collude in 
regulating bodies, subjectifying some bodies (male) whilst desubjectifying others 
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(nonhuman and women). This creates relations and hierarchies of power between groups 
of living beings.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown the emergence of the changing definitions of pain in the 
nonhuman laboratory animal and how key state and scientific actors discussed the 
regulation of laboratory life through discourses of pain. Networks of power-knowledge 
were enhanced in this period in order to standardise animal experimentation and 
legitimise its practices. The next chapter discusses all the key themes that have emerged 
during the course of this research, and concludes this thesis with an overview of its main 
points. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
The primary focus of this thesis has been upon the production of medical and military 
scientific knowledge through the use of nonhuman animals and how this domain of 
knowledge intersects with the legal domain. As we have seen, in order to maintain the 
continued use of nonhuman animals in scientific research, a discursive shift in the 
construction of the nonhuman under experiment had to occur. This discursive shift can 
be expressed as a move away from the animal as seen as passive object to view the 
animal as one which is active, yet essentially still objectified. Animals gained what I 
termed an “active-object status”, still objectified yet acknowledged as living and docile.  
 
Through this construction of the nonhuman as living matter, discourses of animal 
welfare in mid-twentieth century Britain emerged to help maintain science’s hegemonic 
status and enable to continuation of animal experimentation. This emergence of 
discourses of care/welfare was most evident in the redefining of the experience of pain 
in the nonhuman animal, via science’s acknowledgement of animal stress (albeit a 
biologically determined definition of this). This paradigm shift was encapsulated in 
discussions about changes in the lawful definition of pain under the Cruelty to Animals 
Act, 1876, during its review in the 1960s. Relations between science and government 
were strong in the era immediately after World War Two, and their mutually reinforcing 
networks of power have been evident throughout this study. 
 
My argument in this thesis has been two-fold: firstly, that the construction of scientific 
knowledge through the use of nonhuman animals was one that created subject-object 
binaries, which had powerful and detrimental consequences for nonhuman animals. 
Secondly, this objectification of the nonhuman had resultant power-knowledge effects that 
reinforced the continuation of specific kinds of scientific knowledge and its associated 
masculinist ontology of positivism. Consequently the effects of these power-knowledge 
relations were gendered and had implications for (and intersections with) other 
subjugated groups in British society, most significantly for this thesis, women.  This 
study pursued three research questions, and if we revisit these, we can see how animal 
experimentation in mid-twentieth century Britain still unconsciously enforced Cartesian 
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dualisms, which as a consequence were gendered. The following questions were asked at 
the outset of this thesis: 
 
• How is it that in both the theory and practice of science the nonhuman body is 
objectified, and how, as a result of this, does the animal body as object presuppose 
them as being useful for animal experiments? 
• What kinds of knowledge does laboratory animal science produce, under what 
circumstances and methodologies? Do the knowledges produced link to the 
exercise of power both within and without the laboratory? 
• Is the production of scientific knowledge through the use of animals gendered 
and what are the effects of such knowledge production? 
  
Animal Body as Presupposed Object 
 
In relation to question one, the creation of active objects (or in Foucauldian terms, as 
discussed in chapter five: docile nonhuman bodies) was facilitated through the 
techniques of welfare promulgated by the UFAW. This was done in the name of creating 
an economics of efficiency in laboratory human-animal relations: reducing wastage of 
animals, improving their physical and psychological health in order to make experiments 
more valid and housing animals in clean conditions so as to reduce the occurrence of 
extraneous variables such as certain diseases that were not part of the experimental 
procedure. Through the mechanisms of laboratory human-animal relations in mid-
twentieth century Britain, the idea of welfare as we saw in chapter five, increased the 
animal body’s utility and therefore increased the power the human had over the 
nonhuman body, establishing ‘in the body the constricting link between an increased 
aptitude and an increased domination’.909 In other words, scientific welfarism created 
healthier animals but in doing so, increased regulation, control and domination over the 
nonhuman body to ensure their healthiness was fit-for-purpose. Animal bodies were 
already seen as objects, which lent to further objectification. Structured by the discourse 
of stress examined in chapter five, the actual material spaces of the laboratory, as we saw, 
became gendered and heavily disciplined spaces of care and welfare. Women were 
recommended as being perfect for the role of laboratory assistant or “nurse” to the 
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animals, and the uneducated farm worker (see chapter six) became the ideal executioner, 
acting as the person who would kill the unwanted and sick animals.  
 
Knowledge Production and Power Relations: The Authorising Gaze 
 
As was discussed in chapter five, one of the ways of managing animal bodies and 
behaviour was through the scientists’ gaze. This gaze over the laboratory animal was 
structured in this period by the work of the UFAW and Laboratory Animals Bureau. 
Laboratories and nonhuman animals became standardised in mid-twentieth century 
Britain via the circulation of the UFAW’s discourses of care towards the laboratory 
nonhuman. If we look back to chapter five and the nonhuman animals’ role in the 
formation of a medical conceptualisation of ‘stress’, the gaze over their living bodies 
became essential in order to delineate the very symptoms of this condition. 
 
The gaze over the dead animal body was examined in chapter four, exercised in the post-
mortems conducted during the biological weapons trials by Porton Down Chemical and 
Biological Research Establishment. A strict adherence to a post-mortem technique was 
required, which equipped the scientists involved with a gaze that could conceptualise 
disease as a means of weapons of war.  As I argued in this chapter, the post-mortem 
acted as an exercise of power over the nonhuman which was grounded in the socio-
political and helped to establish the creation of a military-animal-industrial complex in 
mid-twentieth century Britain.  The animal body, subjected to the gaze of the scientists, 
became divided and separated into sections, each aspect representing a piece rather than 
the whole of the nonhuman. In this chapter I drew on Lisa Johnson’s Foucauldian 
inspired discourse of lines to elucidate the complex power-knowledge relations between the 
animals, scientists, the British military and the broader socio-historical context in the 
creation of the military-animal-industrial complex.910  
 
This gaze over the nonhuman animal not only entrenched a standardised view of the 
nonhuman but also created a body that was docile, yet still objectified. It was only 
through the gaze of the scientist that the status of nonhuman animals changed, and a 
whole set of discourses and practices surrounding laboratory animals became established. 
The nonhuman body was being ‘rewritten’, with the help of the judiciary and their 																																																								
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relations with various scientific bodies (see chapter six), so science could continue its 
practices. This meant a shift to more ‘humane’ practices in laboratory human-animal 
relations, as was evidenced in chapter five. 
 
Gendered Science and Knowledge Production 
 
Throughout all the chapters, I have argued that science was gendered and helped create 
gendered power-knowledge relations. Both animals and women became subjected to the 
male gaze, and as a result became objectified and used to create knowledge and powerful 
discourses about the world, as evidenced in chapter three with their use in the creation of 
biological weapons in the name of ‘defence’, and chapter four with the discourse of pre-
menstrual stress and menstruation.  The effect of this gaze is one that exemplifies power-
knowledge relations which have been demonstrated throughout this thesis, notably, in 
the philosophical underpinnings of science and jurisprudential ones in law (as outlined in 
chapter four and six). Implicit in the methodologies of biological warfare trials and the 
jurisprudence of the Cruelty of Animals Act 1876 was the reliance on Cartesian dualisms 
that rendered women and animals on one side of a dualistic divide, and that entrenched 
their inferiority to that of the human male. As we can see, there are links between 
scientific knowledge and legal knowledge creation. 
 
Likewise it is worthy of note that through the male gaze and the creation of such 
binaries, laboratory animals became individualised and recognised as having individual 
‘personalities’. This too, was a form of disciplinary power over the nonhuman body that 
combined with the spatial layout of the laboratory, the result of which was that 
nonhuman animals, through the male gaze, were to become even more subjugated in the 
relations of power-knowledge. This individualisation via the male gaze created subject-
object binaries that were masculinist and had implications for both animals and women. 
These binaries, as discussed in chapter four, were inherently masculine and rested in the 
philosophical assumptions of positivism. The very methodologies of science, its 
positivistic ontology and absolute belief in objectivism contributed towards the 
development of the military-animal-industrial complex. Laboratory animal science in 
mid-twentieth century Britain was gendered and powerful.  
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Power over both animals and women was regulated through different yet comparable 
techniques. Both forms of power encapsulated scientific knowledge about the bodies of 
animals and women. The history of the female body is tied to that of the history of the 
animal body and of course, the male body. This ties to power-knowledge relations which 
discursively construct bodies through techniques pervasive in modern society, in this 
case, mid-twentieth century Britain. The power-knowledge of the discourses of 
laboratory animal science shows that gendered disciplinary power can be articulated 
through the very performance of science and its enunciation of an objective reality 
through the paradigm of positivism as evidenced in chapters four and five.  
 
As we saw in chapters four to six, mid-twentieth century Britain was an era of experts 
who took up powerful positions in government departments such as in the Ministry of 
Supply, the Medical Research Council and the Home Office, all of which recruited 
scientists to advise on technology, industry and law making. This scientific approach to 
governance infiltrated all areas of British life. Britain in this period was a technocratic 
state. Forging scientific understandings of the world was imperative in order to re-build a 
Britain that was suffering from great economic and social losses after the war, and losing 
its grip upon Empire. This scientific approach advocated the unabashed use of 
nonhuman animals, and its methodology was one that described and analysed methods 
for attaining a particular goal. Returning to the chapters in this thesis, this positivist 
approach was particularly advocated in laboratory animal-dependent science in the post-
war period, and via the work of the UFAW, most notably in its Handbook on The Care 
and Management of Laboratory Animals.911 
 
This striving for control over nature is a form of power that was inherently gendered. 
Power-knowledge relations promoted the masculine worldview at the expense of the 
feminine.912 Animal experimentation upheld this notion, even at the UFAW’s declaration 
of its rejection of Cartesianism (see chapter five). Science in Britain still pursued the 
positivist methodology, which, as Foucault claims, instilled upon social life a certain 
arrangement of knowledge about the world,913 creating a set of classifications about the 
nonhuman, replete with psychological, physiological and social characteristics. These 																																																								
911 Worden, ed., The Ufaw Handbook on the Care and Management of Laboratory Animals. 
912 It is worthy of note that I am speaking of the masculine and feminine as historical social 
constructs, not in an essentialised manner.  See introduction for ‘note on terminology’. 913	Foucault, The Order of Things. p.172.	
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classificatory mechanisms, that included the acknowledgment of psychological 
dimensions in the nonhuman animal, ensured that they would continue to be used in 
experiments. The very methodological approach used to test on animals further 
entrenched this classificatory knowledge about them. Positivism dealt in absolutes and 
strict universals, advocated theory-testing, and rested upon a priori assumptions that 
ultimately: 
delimit[ed] the totality of experience [of] a field of knowledge, define[d] the mode 
of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man’s [sic] everyday 
perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can 
sustain a discourse about things that is recognised to be true.914 
 
This power-knowledge derived from the state’s experts enabled a transformation of the 
laboratory animal (and woman). It also provided the basis of laboratory animal science in 
post-war Britain, which rested upon the dualistic assumptions of the doctrine of 
positivism, in order to subjugate bodies and make them docile. This was most noticeable 
in discussions of animal pain in chapter six, and its changing legal definition during the 
review of the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, which I called the power-pain nexus. 
 
For the most part then, this thesis has documented the nature of laboratory human-
animal relations in mid-twentieth century Britain and demonstrated that animals played 
an integral part in state science and structuring ideas concerning gender roles in mid-
twentieth century Britain. The gendered aspect of science in mid-twentieth century 
Britain was bifurcated: firstly, science itself was masculinist (through its ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings, and methodologies – see research questions two and 
three), and secondly via its outcomes which had detrimental effects on those deemed 
extraneous to masculinity, in this case animals and women (research questions one and 
three). Consequently, this thesis has helped to render visible the cultural and social nature 
of science, and how the creation of laboratory animal science was far from objective but 
in fact, drew on the social norms and values of contemporary Britain. This has been 
evidenced through the use of animals in experiments conducted in the military and 
medical arenas as well as its regulation by law. Overall power-knowledge relations and 
their effects on nonhuman animals and other subjugated groups in society has been the 
main focus of this work. With this study I respond to other feminist histories of science 
that have neglected to take into account the significant role of the nonhuman within this 																																																								
914 Ibid. p.172. 
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history, and have overlooked the crucial developments in this sphere in mid-twentieth 
century Britain. 
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